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A B S T R A C T 
The period o-f Resa Shah, founder o-f the 
Pahlavi dynasty, is an important phase in the history of 
modern Iran. Not without reason he has been called the 
'father of modern Iran'. After his accession to the throne 
in 1925 he introduced a number of radical reforms. These 
westernizing reforms went to undermine the position of the 
clerics, who had become powerful since the sixteenth 
century. They opposed the reforms tooth and nail as anti-
Islamic. However, the reforms of the Shah were more anti-
clerical in nature than anti-religious. 
The first three chapters of the thesis give 
the historical background which are necessary for the proper 
understanding of Shi'ism and Shi'i institutions in Iran 
during Reza Shah's reign. Thus chapter one deals with the 
consolidation of Shi'ism in Iran. It traces the origins of 
Shi'ism in Iran, the principles of shi'ism, and the growth 
of power and authority of the clerics. A proto-Shi'i group 
emerged in the middle of the eighth century among the Arab 
nomadic tribemen who followed 'Ali . At the beginning 
Shi'ism appeared as a political movement which claimed 'Al i 
as the true caliph. The Shi'is at that time were mostly 
Arabs though some of the non-Arabs also joined them. 
Gradually, the idea of the immortality of Imam (Muhammad b. 
al-Hanafiyya) spread among certain sections of the Muslims. 
This was the beginning o-f the messianic concept in Sh i''ism ., 
The concept was artfully exploited by the clerics during the 
Pahlavi period. As is generally known during the Umayyad 
time Shi'ism had generally adopted the attitude o-f political 
quietism. This became the main theme of Shi'ism for many-
years. In fact the Shi'i political thought and institutions 
emerged after the occultation of the Twelfth Imam. Shi'isrn 
flourished during the Buyid dynasty in the tenth century and 
was active upto the end of the eleventh century. In Iran it-
prospered. During the Abbasids, after the martyrdom of Imam 
Husayn, it got split into a number of groups. 
The rise of the Safavid dynasty in the 
sixteenth century was a turning point in the history o !' 
Iran. It marked the domination of Shi'ism in that countr-y , 
Shah Ismail (1501) declared Twelver Shi'ism (Ithna 
'Ashariya) as the state religion and since then all the 
Safavids accepted Shi'ism as the official religion. Shah 
Isma'il invited Shi'i theologians from Syria, Bahrain and 
L.e?taanon who would prepare and spread Shi'a jurisprudence in 
Iran . 
The Shi'is believe firmly in the principle of 
Imamate. They hold that Ali's descendants are infal1 i bie 
Imams or leaders. They believe in the super personal it-/ o-l' 
'Ali . This belief emerged from the belief in the 
charismatic qualities of the leaders in the time of proto-
shi'ism. The Twelvers also believe that their last Imam has 
been hiding himself and will one day reappear to spread 
justice in the world. 
The Shi'i theory supported the claim of 
legitimate power by the mujtahids, the most learned among 
the clerics. The institution of clerics was born during the 
Safavids. Although they had no legitimate authority in the 
beginning but it gained influence by performing some 
important functions in the society according to the 
principles of Shi'ism. As some authors point out the Shi'i 
clerics did not get their authority from the doctrine of the 
legitimation of the Imams but from the natural process of 
historical evolution. 
The second chapter deals with the rise of 
clerical influence in Iran upto the rise of Reza Shah. It 
aims at the exploration of the role of the Iranian clerics 
during the Constitutional Revolution in Iran which greatly 
influenced the growth of Shi'ism till the modern period. 
The early period of Constitutional Revolution (1905 - 06) 
shows great influence of the clerics. The combined efforts 
of the clerics and the masses made the constitutional 
movement a nationalist one. The clerics were able to 
mobilize support from the masses which ultimately led to 
their success. Under the Safavids the state was partly 
accepted by the clerics due to the claim made by the 
monarchs that they were the descendants of the Imams. But 
during the Qajar period the relation between the clerics and 
the state underwent a change. Though the king continued to 
claim himself to be 'the shadow of Sod on earth' he could 
not get symphathetic response from the clerics. Thus the 
monarch was looked upon as illegitimate? and this became the 
cause of the hostility of the clerics towards the state. 
The clerics expected that the state should at least submit 
to them. And that 'the state could ultimately have been no 
more than the executive branch of a cl€»rical power' to which 
the state did not agree. The clerics derived their power 
from their close relationship with the community which the 
state lacked. 
Throughout the nineteenth century till the 
Pahlavi period the religious institutions of Iran got fully 
involved in politics. Several political events assisted the 
hostility between the two. It can be said that from the 
beginning upto the end of the QaJar period the clerics of 
Iran played a leading role in the affairs of the country. 
In the Russo-Iranian War (1804 - 13) the clerics issued 
fatva against Russia, making the war as a Holy War (Jihad) . 
The clerics also took part in the war and acted as national 
leaders. The mujtahids's revolt against the state in the 
reign of Muhammad Shah was very serious. It was caused by 
the attempt to crush the power of the religious body as a 
policy of the Shah and the ambition of the clerics 
themselves. During the later period of Nasir al-Din Shah, 
the king's attempts to westernize some aspects of the state 
brought about more and more bitter fights between the state 
and the clerics who refused innovations. When the state 
turned towards foreign powers to ask help from them the 
opposition of the clerics became more strong. The 'ulama' 
consol idated their strength on two occasions! One was the 
Reuter Concession (1873) in which the clerics intervention 
could stop the king's acion in that direction. Another was 
the Tobacco Concession ( 1891 - 02 ) in which the clerics 
played a leading role resulting in the fall of the Qajar 
dynasty. 
Chapter three is about the growth of clerical 
power on the eve of the rise of Reza Shah to power. It 
discusses the authority of the clerics in Iran, their 
financial status and their control on education. The 
clerics' financial status was an important source of their 
power. It was the result of the Shi'i doctrine which 
endowed them the authority of collecting and administering 
the khums tax and the zakah because it did not recognize the 
right of temporal rule. The waqf land and properties were 
also under the administration of the clerics. This led to 
the clerics' independence from the government control in the 
field of economy. 
During the reign of Re;:a Shah the status and 
power of the clerics were undermined b6?cause the government 
entrusted the juridical power to the state in 1 ieu of the 
religious authorities. Besides, the Shah also issued 
several laws to limit the educational control of the 
clerics. 
Chapter four describes the rise of the 
Pahlavis to power. At the end of World War I Iran fell 
under the pressure of the Shah and foreign powers. The 
British forces did not withdraw from the Iranian boundary 
and continued to interfere in the inte?rnal affairs of the 
country. In such crisis Iran needed a leader who would 
1 iberate the country from foreign control. The leader was 
found in the person of Reza Khan who came from a smal1 
family in a village of Masandaran. Reza Khan became the 
commander of the machinegun in 1911. He played an important 
role in fighting with the internal enemies of the 
government. He very quickly rose to power. Iran was 
invaded by Russia and Reza Khan bravely led his troops to 
fight the enemies. In the end, though Iran was defeated yet 
the bravery of Reza Shah was recognized and he was promoted 
to the post of the commander of Cossack Division. In this 
he was helped by Sayyid Zia al-Din, a famous editor of the 
newspaper Ra'd. The two men joined together to stage a 
successful coup d'etat on 21 February, 1921 as a result of 
which Reza Khan became the Prime Minister. When the last 
Shah -fled to Europe, Reza Khan became Reza Shah of the new 
dynasty. 
Chapter -five critically examines Westernizing 
reforms of Reza shah. An attempt to westernize Iran became 
a difficult work for Reza Shah due to the weak development 
of the middle class in Iran as in other countries of the 
Islamic World led to the very slow assimilation of Western 
influence. However, during his reign many changes took 
place. As a result of various capitalistic measures a new 
middle class was developing in Iran which played a vital 
role in the spread of Westernizing ideas in the country. 
Chapter six discusses the response of the 
clerics to the reforms of Reza Shah. Immediately when he 
gripped the full power, he began to curb the power and 
influence of the clerics and embarked upon radical reforms. 
The clerics responded by claiming that the government was 
illegitimate hence un-Islamic. They were supported by 
merchants, craftsmen and traders. There took place several 
clashes between the clerics and the police. The clerics 
anger reached its apex when veils were removed by the order 
of the government. 
Reza Shah succeeded in building up a strong 
army and bureaucracy. He paved the way for the capitalist 
development of Iran. However, the modernizing efforts of 
a 
Resa shah was not successful in completely undermining the 
position of the clerics in Iran. In fact his reform led to 
the consolidation of the position of the clerics who 
remained dormant. But after the abdication of Resa Shah the 
clerics stood up for their cause and reasserted their power. 
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I N T R O D U C T I O N 
THESIS SECTION 
Iran occupies a unique position in the world 
o-f Islam. It is the country whose vast majority are Shi'i 
Muslims although there is a minority o-f Sunni Muslims. 
Persians and Azerbayjanis are mainly the •followers o-f 
Shi'ism, while other ethnic groups are mainly Sunnis. 
The present study is an attempt to examine 
critically the roles played by the clerics oi Iran during 
the reign of Reza Shah in a broader perspective. Although 
the period from 1921 to 1941 is a short span in Iranian 
history but this is the period which marked the rise to 
power of Reza Shah Pahlavi. Reza Shah's reign is^considered 
as one of 'cataclysmic change'. The European influences 
which had been penetrating in Iran since the sixteenth 
century, at last gained ascendency during the pQriod. It 
was during this period that Iran underwent a phase of 
intense westernization and modernization. It wag a 'period 
of borrowing from Europe as well as of fierce assertion of a 
national spirit'. 
The study is based on the important writings 
of the Iranian clerics of the period whose works have been 
quoted. Efforts have been made to analyse both n^ative and 
positive aspects of the roles of the mujtahids during the 
period. Not much has been written by Iranian and Western 
scholars on the speci-fic question of clerical attitude 
towards the change. However, I have made use of such works 
which help in interpretating the attitude of the leading 
mujtahids of that period towards the westernizing reforms of 
Reza Shah. 
A good historical literature is available on 
the problems studied in the present work. A number of 
general histories and standard works on the constitutional 
movement, such as those of E.G. Browne, Ahmad Kasravi , 
Abdul-Hadi Hairi, Maiik-Zadah and Nazim al-Islam are 
available. These works may be considered as prinwry source 
material for the period. They deal with the 'general' role 
of the clerics in modern Iran. Scholars like Ann K.S. 
Lambton, Nikki R. Keddie, Hamid Algar and F.R.C. Bagley, 
have examined the roles of the Iranian clerics during the 
constitutional Revolution based on the earlier sources. 
Among the Iranian authors Shahrough Akhavi's 
Rel igion and Pol itics in Contemporary Iran ± Cl.ergy-State 
Relations in the Pahlavi Perod (New York, 1980) deals with 
clergy-state relations during the period. In this work the 
author discusses the anti-modernization role of the Iranian 
clerics. He tries to overcome some of the omissions of 
Wilber's study on Reza Shah. However, a proper historical-
theoretical perspective is lacking in this work. 
P.W. Avery's Moc|ern Iran <London, 1905) is 
useful but it is very general in nature. The works found 
useful on the early part of modern Iran include biographical 
studies of Amir Kabir, especially 'Abbas Iqbal's Mirza Taqi 
Khan Amir Kabir (Tehran, 1840), and Firidun Adamiyat's, Amir 
Kabir va Iran (Tehran 1955). 
Among the European pub!ished sources for the 
period, although The History of Iran by Sir Percy Sykes is a 
standard work but it does not provide us with deeper 
understanding of the period. However, E.G. Browne's The 
Persian Revolution (Cambridge, 1910) is still very useful 
and generally authentic although outdated in some parts. 
Among the European sources travel books provide much 
informative material for the student of modern Iran. George 
Curzon's Persia and the Persian Question (2 vols. London, 
1892) contains a mine of information for a researcher of the 
period but it does not give a proper appraisal of the 
situations. Elwel1-Sutton's book Modern Iran (London, 1941) 
is a critical but brief study of Reza Shah's regime. 
Wilber's Riza Shah Pahlavi t The Resurrection and 
Reconstruction of Iran 1898-1944 (New York, 1975) is the 
first detailed descriptive biography of Reza Shah. 
Although the importance of this work cannot be denied it 
does not treat the subject in depth and in proper 
perspective. The work appears to be a mainly eulogical 
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nature. Although it is a good study as compared to the 
works o-f AT gar, Banani, Cattam, Ramazani, Zabih and others, 
it has 'little new to offer to the specialist' based as it 
is on the secondary sources. an important lacuna of the 
book as pointed out by one critic is his failure to study 
the impact of Reza Shah's reforms 'over the masses bound by 
their centuries old traditions, and analyze the reactions of 
the people in general and of the intellectuals in 
particular'. However, in spite of these shortcomings, the 
book provide us with ample material about Reza Shah's Iran. 
Nikki R. Keddie's Iran; Rel igig>n, Pol itics 
and Society (London, 1980), a collection articles, gives a 
critical account of the historical relations between 
religion and politics from the early period until the modern 
time. It discusses more recent developments, especially 
developments related to the post Reza Shah period. Another 
recent work Iran ± from religious dispute to revolution. by 
Michael M. Fischer (Harvard University Press ; Cambridge, 
M.A. 1980) focuses attention on the madrasa system in Iran. 
AB the title suggests, the author ignores socio-economic 
factors. He traces the history of secular Iran from the 
point of view of logical differences. His overemphasis on 
ritual and practices blurres the real understanding of 
modern Iran. 
The first three chapters of the thesis give 
the historical background needed for the proper 
understanding o-f Shi'ism and Shi'i inistitutions in Iran 
during the reign o-f Reza Shah. Chapter one cteals with the 
spread and consolidation o-f Shi'ism in Iran. It traces the 
origins of Shi'ism in that country and the growth o-f the 
power of the clerics. It also traces how the idea o-f the 
immortality o-f Imam (Muhammad Ibn-al-Hanaf iyya) spread among 
the Muslims. This was the starting point o-f the messianic 
concept in Shi'ism. The concept was artfully exploited by 
the clerics during the Pahlavi period. As is generally 
known during the Umayyad time Shi'ism was confined to 
political quietism. This became the main concept of Shi'ism 
in many forms during the early period. However, the Shi'i 
political thoughts and institution* emerged after the idea 
of the occultation of the Twelfth Imam. The second chapter 
deals with the rise of clerical influence in Iran. It aims 
at the exploration of the role of the Iranian clerics in the 
Constitutional Revolution which greatly influenced the 
future growth of Shi'ism in Iran. There were m*ny factors, 
both internal and external, which promoted the emergence of 
the Constitutional Revolution. (An important external 
factor was the constitutional movement which sprang up in 
various parts of the world during the later half of the 
nineteenth century). The earlier part of Constitutional 
Revolution also shows the great influence of the clerics. 
The combined strength of the clerics and the people made the 
constitutional movement a nationalist one. The clerics were 
able to mobilize supports -from the masses, which led to 
their success. During the Safavids the statd was partly 
accepted by the clerics mainly due to the claim made by the 
monarchs that they were the descendants o-f the Imams. But 
in the Qajar period the relation between the clerics and the 
state underwent a change. Though the kings continued to 
claim themselves to be 'the Shadows of God' they could not 
get sympathetic response -from the clerics. Thus the monarch 
was looked upon as illegitimate and this became the cause of 
the hostility of the clerics towards the ttate. This 
phenomenon became very pronounced during the Pahlavis. The 
clerics expected that the state should at least submit to 
them and that 'the state could ultimately have been no more 
than the executive branch of a clerical power' to which the 
state did not agree. The clerics derived their power from 
their close relationship with the community while the state 
lacked it. Throughout the nineteenth century the religious 
institutions of Iran got fully involved in politics - a 
state which continued till the Pahlavi period. Several 
political events assisted the hostility between the two. 
Chapter three is about the growth of clerical 
power in Iran. It discusses the authority of the clerics in 
Iran, their financial status and control on education. The 
clerics's financial status was an important source of their 
power. Their high income was the result of the Shi'i 
doctrine which endowed them with the authority of collecting 
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and administering the Khums and the zak —. 
did not recognize the right o-f temporal rule. The waqf land 
and properties were also under the administration o-f the 
clerics. The right on these monies led to the clerics's 
influence over the government in the field of economy. 
Chapter four describes the rise to power of 
the Pahlavi dynasty. At the end of World War I Iran fell 
under the pressure of the Shah and the foreign powers. In 
such crisis Iran needed a charismatic leader who could 
salvage the nation. The leader was found in the person of 
Reza Khan who came from a small family in the village of 
Mazandaran. He was later on promoted to the post of 
commander of the Cossack Division. His rise to power was 
helped by Sayyid 2ia-al-Din, a well known editor of the 
newspaper Raid.. The two men Joined together to stage a 
successful coup d'etat on 21 February, 1921 as a result of 
which Reza Khan became the Prime Minister of the country. 
V&^en the last Qajar Shah fled to Europe, Reza Khan became 
Reza Shah of the new Pahlavi dynasty on 12 December, 1925. 
Chapter five introduces the westernizing 
reforms of Reza Shah. An attempt to westernize Iran became 
a difficult works for Reza Shah due to the fact that the 
weak development of the middle class in Iran was a great 
hindrance in the assimilation of Western influences. 
However, throughout his reign many changes in various fields 
were introduced. At the same time special institutes were 
a 
establ ished to produce a semi-professional sta-f-f and 
supervisors. The vocational and technical Bchool s were 
built in order to supply semi-skilled technicians and 
manpower. Many capitalistic measures taken by the 
government led to development of a new middle class in Iran 
which played an important role in the spread of westernizing 
ideas in the country. 
During the reign of Reza Shah a great change 
took place. The status and power of the clerics declined 
since the government entrusted the judicial pc»«ier to the 
state in lieu of the religious authorities as before. 
Besides, the Shah also issued several laws to limit 
educational control of the clerics. These attempts led to a 
strong opposition by the clerics. 
Chapter six, i.e. the last one, analyses 
critically the attitude of the clerics towards the reforms 
of Reza Shah. The clerics were never prepared to accept his 
radical reforms. At the time when he forced the last Qajar 
king out of Iran, it was believed that Iran would become a 
republic like Turkey. This displeased the clerics because 
they were not happy at the developments in TLM"key under 
Kemal Reza Shah succumbed to the clerics' pressure because 
at that time he had to depend on them as he was yet not able 
to consolidate his power. 
But immediately when he gripped the -full 
control o-f the state machinery, he began to cut the power 
and influence of the clerics and embarked upon a series of 
radical reforms such as the establishment of modern school 
system, the modern judicial system and the centralization of 
power, army, and bureaucracy. However, Reza Shah's reforms 
were more anti-clerical in nature rather than anti-
religious. The clerics opposed to the reforms by claiming 
that the government was 'illegitimate' hence un-Islamic. In 
this they were supported by traders and craftmen. There 
took place several clashes between the clerics and their 
followers, on the one hand and the police, on the other. 
The clerics' anger reached its apex when veils were removed 
by the order of the government. However, during the later 
parts of his life, Reza Shah turned Iran into a 'police 
state'. There began to emerge growing unrest 'beneath the 
surface of apparent modernization'. Many Iranian 
intellectuals who supported his modernizing reforms were 
thrown into jail . He vigorously suppressed the people when 
they raised their economic demands. This led to the growing 
isolation of Reza Shah. 
*###**#**# 
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CHAPTER - I 
CONSOLIDATION OF SHI^ISM IN IRAN 
It is believed that the origins of the term 
Shi'a could be traced to some 'proto-Shi'ite groups' which 
emerged during the middle of the eighth century. Caliph 
'ATi used to call his followers and those who supported him 
against his bitter enemies such as Talha and al-Zubayr as 
1 
•shi'ati' (my party) . 
2 
The term S h i ' a was def ined by a l -Nawbakht i 
( d . 922) as those who fo l lowed ' A l i , who inc luded decendants 
of J a ' f a r Ibn Abi Ta l i b and of a l - ' A b b a s . In the n i n t h 
cen tu ry Ibn al-Rawandi accepted i t as a fundamental sect of 
3 
I s l am ic community. According t o Shahrastani <d. 1153) ' t h e 
S h i ' a are those who " f o l l o w " (shaya'u) ' A l i - peace be on 
1 . Cf . a l - A s h ' a r i , l iaqalat a l - I s l amiyyin . 2 v o l s . , ed . H. 
R i t t e r , ( I s tanbu l 1929-30), pp. 93-100; a l -Baghdad i , Al 
f a r q bavn a l - f i r a q . e d . M. Badr, (Cairo 1329/1910) , p p . 
72 -82 ; a l -Shahras tan i , K i tab al m i l a l wa-n-nijhal ; e d . W. 
Cere ton , (London 1946); 95-100 ( i 201-12) jCf , Montgomery 
Wat t , The Formative Per iod of I s l amic Thoijight (Edinburgh, 
1973). 
2 . Abu Muhammad Hasan b . Musa a l - N a w b a k h t i . 
3 . I b i d . 
11 Cchapter-I3 
him - in particular, and assert his imamate and caliphate by 
appointment and delegation (nass. wasivya) made either 
openly or secretly, and who believe that the imamate does 
4 
not depart -from his descendants. 'They hold that his 
caliphate and imamate were based on designation and 
appointment, either open or hidden. They maintain also that 
the imamate must remain in 'Ali's family; if it were ever to 
go outside of it, this would be either because of a wrong on 
the part of another, or because of dissimulation on the part 
of the rightful imam. According to them the imamate is not 
a civil matter, validly settled by the will of the people 
appointing an imam of their own choosing: it is a 
fundamental matter and a basic element of religion. 
Messengers of God may not ignore and disregard it, nor leave 
5 
it to the choice of the common people. 
At the beginning Shi'ism came into existence 
6 
as a political movement claiming 'Al i as the true caliph. 
It did not exist prior to the last quarter of the ninth 
century. 
4 . Montgomery Wat t , o p . c i t . . p. 57 
5 . Muhammad b. 'Abd a l -Kar im Shahras tan i , Musi im Sects and 
D i v i s i o n s (K i tab a l - m i l a l w a ' n - n i h » l ) , Eng. t r . by A.K. 
Kazi and J.G.Flynn (London, Boston, Melbourne and Henley, 
1984) , p. 125. 
6 . N i k k i R. Keddie, I r a n ; R e l i g i o n . P o l i t i c s and Soc ie ty 
(London, 1980), p . 8 6 . 
12 tchapter-I3 
The Shi'is believe that 'Ali's decendaints are 
infallible Imams (leaders). The emergence of th^ Shi'i 
movement was preceded by some phenomena which took place 
under the Umayyads. Though Shi'ism is usually thought to 
belong to the persians while Sunnism belon/g to the Arabs, 
several phenomena of proto-shi' ism first appeared aimong the 
Arabs. During the Umayyad period many leaders of the 
revolt, other than the Kharijites, tried to take revenge for 
7 
the 'People of the House' <ahl al-bayt). The proto-Shi'ism 
movement, as well as the Kharijite movement, came from the 
nomadic tribesmen who formed the majority of participants in 
the revolt against the Umayyads. Most of them belonged to 
the Yamanite tribes who came from South Arabia, the land of 
ancient civilization. The Yamanites paid reverence to 
Charismatic leaders. 
As Montgomery Watt writes, the proto-Shi'is 
believed in the super human personality of 'Ali. This 
belief prevailed among a large number of those who supported 
'Ali. The charismatic qualities could be interpreted in 
7. The term is used in the Qur'an» and in the H^dith. for 
the Prophet's household. 'Al al-bayt' (the 'People of the 
House') and Al_ al -Nabi ('The family of the Prophet' - all 
these terms are used interchangeably. It has been noted that 
the term ahl al-bavt represents 'strong clan sense of the 
pre-Islamic Arabs'. Among the Shi'a it was applied to 
Muhammad, 'Ali, Fatima, al-Hasan and al-Husayn. Others 
apply the term to the families of Ali, his brothers' Akil 
and Jafar and al-Abbas. However, according to the prevalent 
view the term ahl -al bavt includes the ahl al -'giba.' i.e. 
the Prophet, 'Ali, Fatima, al-Hasan and al-Husayn, together 
with the wives of the Prophet. 
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various ways like the special human excellence o-f the 
leadership and supernatural endowment. It is notable that 
the belief in special human excellence could be traced to 
pre-Islamic Arabs. 'The idea o-f the manifestation in men of 
superhuman qualities may rather have come from Aramaean and 
8 
Persian elements among the Muslims'. Gradually, the belief 
became more restricted to the descendants of al-Husayn. 
After that Muhammad Ibn-al-Hanafiyya, the third son of 'Ali , 
who was said not to have died but had hidden, and Abu 
Hashim, the son of Hanafiyya were the centers of attraction 
for many decades. These ideas among the house of Hashim 
appeared during the year 700 to 850 A.D. and also after 
that. The house of Hashim had a charismatic appeal for the 
people. Around the year 750 there was a claim of charisma 
for other members of Hashimis clan especially Ja'far, 'Ali's 
brother and Abbas, the Prophet's uncle. Thus the belief in 
charismatic qual ities was a distinguished character of 
proto-Shi'ism. 
Around the year 683 A,D. Shi'i phenomena was 
entirely confined among the Arabs, but the non-Arabs also 
began to take part in it. Al-Mukhtar Ibn-Abi 'Ubayd ath-
Thaqafi who sided with 'AH and based his policy on the Book 
of God, the Sunna of the Prophet, the aim to take vengeance 
8. Montgomery Watt, qp.cj.t.. pp. 34-55 
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•for 'All's -family, defence o-f the weak, and the Jihad 
9 
against the evil doers re-fused to acknowledge the cal iphood 
o-f Ibn-az-zubayr in Iraq and fought with the Umayyad army 
till he himself was killed. 
After the death of al-Mukhtar, another 
important proto-Shi'i phenomenon appeared in the middle of 
the eighth century. In 700 A.D. the poet al-Kuthayyir who 
belonged to the Caliphal court of 'Abd-al-Malik and his son 
Yazid in Damascus propagated the idea that Muhammad Ibn-al-
Hanafiyya had not died but hid himself in the mount Radwa 
and would return at the appropriate time to give justice to 
the world. This was the first time that such an idea 
appeared among Muslims, and it was the starting point of the 
idea of the immortal' Imam or messianic idea which began to 
spread after that. During the Umayyad period the messianic 
idea was mixed with political quietism and became the main 
idea of Shi'i groups in several forms. 
Also during the Umayyad period, Shi'ism 
spread widely. But later on non-Arab Muslim, mainly the 
Iranian Muslims, were not satisfied with the Umayyad rulers 
due to injustice. As Hitti writes: 
'^ • "Ta-fsii" z Jafni 'al-fclayan f i-Tafsir al-Qur'an. 30 <10) 
vols? (Cairo 1321/1903) ii - 569 f. cited by Montgomery 
Watt, op.cit., pp. 44. 
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'Non-Arabian Moslems in general and Persian 
Moslems in particular had good reason for 
dissatisfaction. Far from being granted the 
expected economic and social equality with Arabian 
Moslems, they were instead generally reduced to 
the position of clients and were not always 
exempted from the capitation tax paid by non-
Moslems. What made them more discontented was the 
consciousness that they represented a higher and 
more ancient culture, a fact acknowledged even by 
the Arabians themselves. It was among such 
discontented neophytes that the Shi'ite 
'Abbasid seed found fertile soil. From al-'Iraq, 
always loyal to the 'Alid cause, the Shi'ah 
doctrine spread into Persia and struck root 
especially in the north-eastern province, 
Khurasan, which was then much larger than now. 
10 
In 744 A.D. the Abbasids who were the progeny 
of the Prophet's uncle put an end to the Umayyad rule. But 
the Abbasids changed their attitude towards the Shi'is and 
destroyed them. 'One would think that the Abbasids would 
have favoured the Shi'a, with which they had originally been 
allied, but they changed when they had attained to the 
chief power, turning rather as enemies against the Alids 
with whom they had formerly been identified, in order to put 
11 
aside their claims'. As a result of their bitter failure, 
the later Imams stopped themnselves from political 
activities. Anyhow, 'from the middle of the 2nd/8th. 
century ... Shi'ism was able to gain a new life as a result 
of the languid and weak state prevailing at the time. Soon, 
10. P. K. Hitti, History of the Arabs (New York, 1968), p. 
283. 
11. J. Wellhausen, The Arab Kingdom and its Pal 1 . Eng. tr. 
by Margaret G. Weir (Beirut, 1963), p. 563. 
16 Cchapter-i; 
however, conditions became di-fficult onca again and until 
12 
the end o-f the 3rd/9th. century became even more stringent' . 
By the beginning of the tenth century the 
Buyid dynasty became strong. It lasted until the end of the 
eleventh century. Shi'ism flourished ag«ih because the 
13 
Buyids themselves were the Shi'is and they encouraged 
Shi'ism. The Shi'is were then free to carry out their 
activities. The took part in scientific and scholarly 
14 
debates and spread their ideas. 
In Persia, the survival of Shi'i nucleus 
helped the growth of Shi'i and Sayyid communities in 
different towns, especially Qum, Ray» Qazvin and Nisapur. 
Shi'ism became fairly prosperous and active henceforth until 
the triumphant Safavids, several centuries later, imposed 
Shi'ism on the Sunnites as the official creed of the whole 
15 
land . 
During the Abbasid period <749-1258) Shi'ism 
splitted into different groups. Their differences were 
caused by their ideas concerning the number of Imams. There 
12. Al1 amah Sayyid Muhammad Tabatabai, Shi'a. Eng. Tr. by 
Sayyid Husayn Nasr (Qum, 1981), p. 84. 
13. The three great periods of Imami Shi'i jurisprudence are 
the Buyid, the Ilkhanid and the Safavid periods. Ibn 
Babuya al-Saduq <d. 381/991-2), Shaykh Muhammad al-Mufid 
(d. 413/1022), his pupil (Aim al-Huda Sayyid Murtada (d . 
436/1044). (The great grandson of Imam Musa al-Kazim) 
and Muhammad b. a1-Hasan al-Tusi Shaykh al-Ta'ifa (d . 
460/1067) belong to the Buyid. 
14. All amah Sayyid Muhammad Tabataba'i.op.cit.. p . 84 . 
15. The Encyclopaedia Iranica^ art. 'Abbasid Caliphate' 
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16 
were the zaydis, the Isma'ilis or the Sab^ ivva (Sevener^  
which again sub-divided into several branches - the Batini* 
the Nizaris or the Assassins, the Musta'lis, the Druze a 
the Muganna. The sect which was clos« to sunni and wa^ 
moderate was the Fivers or Zaydis which had rather meagr^ 
importance in Iran. The Isma'ilis were more active and -for 
many times led revolutionary movemants for instance' 
Qaramitah or the Carmathians who apposed the Abbasids and 
those who established the Fatimid dynasty in North Africa 
17 
and Egypt. 
The Isma'ili community was -from the very 
beginning represented in Iran the eleventh century great 
Iranian poet - thinker Nasir-i Khusraw was an Isma'ili da'i 
in the Upper Oxus area -for fifteen years. He came to be 
known as the 'founder and patron saint of the Isma'ili 
18 
community' . 
The Isma'ili da'wa in Persia was strongly 
propagated by Hasan al-Sabbah (d. 1124). (He was perhaps a 
Persian from Tus. He claimed his descent from the Himyarite 
Kings of Saudi Arabia). He travelled widely and propagated 
Isma'ili da'wa in various parts of the country. In A.D. 
16. Sab'iyya flourished under the rule of Mukhtar in Kufa 
(66-7/686-7), They were known as Mukhtariyya. 
17. Nikki R. Keddie, ibid.^ p. 87. 
18. Cf . W. Ivanow, Problem i_n Nasir-i Khosraws Biography, 
cited by W. Madelung, Encvclooaedia of Islam. <N. ed.) 
art. 'Isma'iliya. 
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1090 he captured the fortress o-f Alamut in the mountains of 
Daylum. This was the beginning of a new phase in Ismaili 
(ja'wa in Persia. In a short time the Ismail Is captured 
several towns in Eastern Kuhistan. In 487/1094 when al-
Mustansir died a major split arose among his sons. Nizar 
and Ahmad fought each other for the post of Im*mate. The 
result was that Ahmad the youngest son of Mustansir who was 
supported by vizier-Afdal won Nizar, his brother fled to 
Alexandria where he revolted against his brother. Later on 
he was captured and died in the prison. After the death of 
Niszar, Hasan-al Sabbah who refused to recognise al-Musta'1 i 
(Ahmad) became the leader of the Nizaris. After his death 
in A.D. 1124, Buzurq Umid Rudbari followed by his son Kiya 
Muhammad, continued to rule the country in the manner of 
Hasan al-Sabbah. 
7he communities of Ismaili in Persia were 
destroy and massacred. However, • with the surrender of 
Alamut and other fortresses in Daylam and Kuhistan it 
survived once again. In the year 674/1274 Alamut was 
reoccupied but was released within one year after that. It 
again fell into the occupation of the Nizaris in the eighth 
century and the beginning of the ninth century. In this 
period the local force which struggled against the Zaydi 
regimes of Zahidjan was the Nizari community in Daylam. 
This community disappeared soon after that. It seemed to be 
that the Ismail is who lived in the region of the Upper Oxus 
have accepted the imamate of the Nizari period to the last 
day of the Alamut time. 
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The rise o-f the Sa-favid dynasty (1501-1722) 
proved to be a turning point in the history of Persia and 
also marked the beginning of a new phase in the history o-f 
Islam in that country. This period was preceded by a series 
o-f religious and intellectual activities preparing the 
ground for establishing Shi'i order in Persia and the 
19 
transformation of the country into a predominant Shi'i area. 
The Safavid order became Shi'ism in the roign of Shaykh 
Ibrahim, Junayd's father, with an extremism tendency. 
Shi'ism became militant because Ounayd instructed his 
* 20 
followers to fight for power. 
The most important group of Shi'ism were the 
Safavids who earlier followed sufi order. But during the 
fifteenth century, the chief of the order, -Junayd and his 
son, Hayder, had contacted with the tribes of Eastern 
Anatolia. Then Junayd adopted Shi'ism and His followers 
were known as the Qisilbash or the 'Red Heads'. Hayder died 
in the battle and Ismail, his son occupied Tabriz, an 
important city of Iran in 1501. After the conquest of Iran 
he submitted himself to Shi'ism. 
In the reign of Hayder, the sufi Khulafa' 
'came from every direction and foolishly announced the glad 
21 
tidings of his divinity (uluhivat)'. 
19. Hossen Nasr, 'Religion in Safavid Persia', Cambridge 
History o£ Islam. Vol. V (Cambridge, 1970), p. 271. 
2U. A. K. S. Lambton, State and government in Medieval 
Islam. (Oxford, 1981), p. 265. 
21. M. ^^ MoEzaoui, The Origins of the Safavids (Wiesbaden, 
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Unlike the moderate Twelver Shi'ism during 
the Abbasid dynasty, the religion o-f Junayd, Hyder and 
Isma'il f and their -fonowers was on the pattern form o-f 
22 
popular extremist heresies as Nusairies or Alavis and 
23 
Hurufis. Junayd, Hayder and Isma'il considered themselves 
to be divines. 
24 
When Shah Isma'il came to power in Iran, he 
determined that Ithna 'Ashariya or the Twelver form of 
25 
Shi'ism should be the "religion of the state. This policy 
created rivalry among the Shi'i divines who considered that 
the Sunnis were more in number. E.G. Browne writes: 'This 
decision caused anxiety even to some of the Shi'a divines of 
Tabriz, who on the night proceding Isma'ils coronation, 
represented to him that, of the two or thw"ee hundred 
thousand inhabitants of that city at least two-thirds were 
22. Nusairi s an extreme Shi'i sect in Syria. 
23. Hurufis : the unorthodox Muslim sect of 'gnostic-
cabalistic' tendencies founded by Fadl Allah of 
Astarabad in Iran at the end of the 8th./14th. Century. 
24. For the Persian sources about Shah Isma'il see Ghiyath 
al-Din b. Humam al Din Khwandamir, Habib, al -siyar. 
Tehran ji Ahsanu't-Tawarikh of Hasan-i Rumlu, ed. CM. 
Seddon, Baroda, 1931; Khwurshah b. Kubad al-Husayni, 
Tarikh-i Ilci-yi Nizamshah, (British Museum Ms. Add. 23, 
513 British Museum Ms. Or. 3248) (an anonymous history 
of Shah Isma'il); Sharaf al-Din Bitlisi, Shar^fnama (ed. 
Veliaminof-zernof) , (St. Petersburg 1860-2). 
25. The majority of the Iranians might have been Sunnis at 
the time Shah Isma'il ascended the throne. Though the 
Shi'is were strongest amging the population who spoke 
Turkish at the time, two-third of the population in the 
city of Tabriz, the place of crowning, were Sunnis. The 
Safavid had a policy to make Shi'ism as the state 
religion, and this brought a quick change. 
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Sunnis, that the Shi'a -formula had not been publicly uttered 
•from the pulpit since the time o-f the Imams themselves; and 
that if the majority o-f the people re-fused to accept a Shi'a 
ruler, it would be di-fficult to deal with the situation which 
26 
would then arise'. Anyhow, -finally, in 1501 Isma'il was 
27 
successful in introducing Shi'ism as the religion of Persia. 
However, 'Shi'ism, did not replace sunnism but became the 
28 
most dominant form of Islam in Persia'. 
Isma'il, by means of his skilful propaganda, 
was able to attract under his banner many Shi'i Turcomans 
from Asia Minor, Cicilia and Syria. He gained a great 
support from Turcoman military tribes of Takkalu, Dhu'l-
29 
Qadar Shamlu, Ramlu, Ustajlu, Afshar, Qajar and Varsaz . 
After the death of Isma'il in 930/1524, all 
the other Safavids till 12/18th. century accepted Shi'ism as 
the official religion of the country and made it strong in 
their land. When they were at the peak of their power 
during the period of Shah 'Abbas, the Safavid territory 
extended far beyond. 
26. E. G. Browne, A Literary History of Persia, Vol . IV 
(Cambridge, 1978), p. 53. 
27. R. Savory, ibid., pp. 397-398. 
28. Hossen Nasr, 'Religion in Safavid Persia', Iranian 
Studies. Vol .III, no. 12 Winter-Spring (1974), p. 274. 
29. Laurence Lochart, The Fal 1 of the Safavid Dynasty and 
the Afghan Occupation (Cambridge, 1958), p. 19. 
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It was the first time after the Arab 
conquests with the coming to power of the Safavid in the 
10/16th. century, that Persia appeared as a territorial 
state. The adoption of the Ithna "Ashapi Shi'ism as the 
state religion helped creating the sense of aloofness from 
the outside world as well as the sense of national unity 
against the Ottoman Empire. In fact the conflict between the 
two countries tended to be religious, that was between Sunni 
and Shi'a than political, that was between Ottoman and 
30 
Persia. 
The imposition of militant form of Shi'ism in 
Persia posed a threat to the Ottoman Empire, mainly because 
in eastern Anatolia, within the border of the Ottoman empire 
itself, there were large numbers of Turcomans who were the 
supporters of the Safavids. Isma'il who had occupied whole 
of Persia by A.D. 150, challenged the Ottoman power in 
918/1512. This led to the execution of a large number of 
31 
Shi'is in Anatolia. The establishment of militant Shi'a 
shake on the Ottoman border posed a great challenge to 
Sultan Salim. In A.D. 1514 he invaded Persia and inflicted 
a crushing defeat on Isma'il at the battle of Chaldiran. 
30. Encyclopaedia of I si am. (N. ed.), art. 'Kawmiyya' 
31. R. Savory, 'Safavid Persia', The Cambridge Histqry of 
Islam.Vol. 1 (Cambridge, 1970 ), pp. 399-340. 
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The imposition of Shi'ism on a country whose 
population was still predominantly Sunni evoked strong 
opposition. Those who did not con-form to the new creed were 
persecuted. Disobedience was punished by death. The Sunni 
'ulama' who showed resistance were put to death. Many of 
32 
them fled to Sunni dominated areas for protection. Even 
during the early period of the Safavid rule when 
revolutionary fervour was still strong, great emphasis was 
laid on ritual cursing. The Safavid zealdts known as 
33 
tabarra'iyyan walked through the streets and bakarss cursing 
not only the first three Caliphs but also all the enemies of 
34 
'Al i and other Imams and the Sunnis in general. Immediately 
after his coronation Isma'il ordered that all the preachers 
throughout his realms should introduce the distinctively 
Shi'a formulae : "I bear witness that 'Ali is tjhe friend of 
God" and hasten to the best of deeds" (hayya ila Khayri-L-
amal) 
32. Ibid., p. 398. 
3 3 . Those who have pledged themselves body and soul t o the 
Shah. According t o Nasr A l l ah F a l s a f i , Z i n d j g a n i - v i 
Shah Abbas-avval . 4 V o l s . (Tehran 1955-61), V o l . I I I , p . 
3 1 . 'Anyone who f a i l e d t o respond w i thou t de lay 'May i t 
( the curs ing) be more and not less ! " , was able t o be 
p u t t o death on the s p o t ' . ) c i t e d by R. Savory, I r an 
Under the Safav ids (Cambridge, 1980), p . 28. 
3 4 . R. Savory, I r an Under this Sa fav ids , pp . 27-28 
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into pro-fession o-f faith and the call to prayer 
35 , 
respectively. The imposition by the Safavids o-f Ithna 
Ashari Shi'ism as the official religion of the state had the 
effect of producing a greater awareness of national 
identity, and this led to the creation of a stronger and 
more centralised government. 
As Savory writes 'Once Isma'il had declared 
that Ithna 'Ashari Shi'ism was the official religion of the 
Safavid state, there was an urgent need to impose doctrinal 
uniformity by directing and accelerating of the propagation 
of the Shi'i faith. We are told that there was an acute 
shortage of works on Shi'i jurisprudence, and that a 
religious judge produced a copy of an ancient manual on the 
fundamentals of the faith which served as a basis for 
religious instruction. There was a shortage of Shi'i 
'^ul ama' and Isma'il was forced to import some Shi'i 
36 
theologians from Syria'. 'There was the problem of how to 
incorporate the Sufi organization of the Safawid tarika. of 
which Isma'il was the murshid-i kamil . in the newly 
established Safawid state, of which he was the padishah . 
There was the problem of how to reconcile the "mien of the 
sword", the Turcoman military elite which had brought him to 
power, with the "men of the pen", the Persian bureaucrats on 
35. E. G. Browne, op.cit., p. 54 
36. R. Savory, op .cit., p. 30 
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whom he depended -for the efficient functioning of his 
empire There was the problem of imposing doctrinal 
uniformity as rapidly as possible, while at the same time 
maintaining political control of the religious institution 
in order to prevent the ^ulama' from assuming a dominant 
position in the state (the undue growth of the power of the 
mudJtahids was later to become one of the principal cause of 
37 
Safawid decline') . 
A number of famous Shi'i scholars (one of the 
most influential was Shaykh 'Ali b. Husayn b. 'Abd al-'Al i 
al-Karaki al-'Amili al-Muhaqqiq al-Thani> from Bahrayn and 
Jabal Amil (presently Lebanon) were invited to Iran for the 
purpose of converting Iran into a country of Shi'ism. 
The theocratic nature of the Safavid state 
made the Shah the apex of the whole administrative 
structure. His rule was in theory absolute. He was the 
38 
living shadow of God upon earth. Since the ruler was 
considered to be directly appointed by Sod, his subjects 
were required to obey his commands whether they were just or 
unjust. As the representative of the Mahdi, the Safavid 
Shah was closer to the source of absolute truth than other 
persons were. Consequently the disobedience of his subject 
39 
was considered a sin. 
37. Encycl opaedia of Islam^ (N. ed.), art. 'Isma'il I' . 
38. Fadl Allah b. Ruzbihan considered Isma'il a leader of 
the heretics who called himself 'God' (i 1 ah,) and called 
his son the 'Son of God' (Ibn All ah) . 
39. Ibid., p. 33 
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The Safavids -followed the r e l i g i o u s and 
p o l i t i c a l t rends o-f the Sunnis . They had the p o s i t i o n o^= 
f a d r shavkh al - I s l a m . Imam-Jum^a^ the qaz is and mi4htasibs. 
Some members among the e a r l y pe r iod of the Sa-favid t ime came 
-from ou t s i de and they almost depended themselves on the 
posts g iven by the Sovernment. 
By p o l i t i c a l reasons, the Safav id r u l e r s 
needed the muj tah ids or the c l e r i c s t o main ta in r e l i g i o u s 
con- formi ty . The o f f i c i a l s of the r e l i g i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n 
encourgraged Sh i ' i sm of the imami r i te which was no t 
40 
es tab l i shed by the ghul at of the Safav id order but by the 
g rea t muj tah ids of the former days. The S h i ' i c l e r i c s 
became pub l i c o f f i c e r s and used the s t a t e machinery f o r 
enforcement of t h e i r o r d e r s . S h i ' i s m , t h e r e f o r e , entered 
the s t a t e a f f a i r s and the r e l i g i o u s i n s t i t u t i o n came under 
t h e p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s though the muj tah ids were s t i l l , 
i n some degree, f r e e . This freedom became grea te r i n t h e 
l a t e 1 1 t h . / 1 7 t h . century t o the ex ten t t h a t the most 
powerful r u l e r s showed t h e i r respect t o them. f o r ins tance 
Shah Tahmasp was under the in f l uence of Husayn a l -Husayn i 
41 
a l - K a r a k i a l - A m i l i as Shah Sul tan Husayn <1105/35/1694/1722) 
42 
was under the i n f l uence of Baqir M a j l i s i . 
40 . Ex t remis t i n r e l i g i o n . 
4 1 . Husayn a l -Husayni a l -Ka rak i a l - ' A m i l i was the grandson 
of Shaykh 'Al i b. 'Abd a l - ' A b d a l - ' A l i a l - K a r a k i . 
4 2 . Muhammad Baqir M a j l i s i known a lso as 'Al laf l iah M a j l i s i 
and M a j l i s i - y i - T h a n i (1627-98) he ld the grand o f f i c e o f 
Shavkh a l - I s l a m under Shah Sa f i (Sulayman) and Shah 
Su l tan Husayn. M a j l i s i v i o l e n t l y opposed t o both the 
Sunnis and the Su f i s and condemned the ph i losophers as 
f o l l o w e r s of i n f i d e l Greeks. An a u t h o r i t a t i v e j u r i s t , a 
most p r o l i f i c had i th c o l l e c t o r , an unprecedented1y 
i n f l u e n t i a l author in the woVrld of the Twelver S h i ' i s . 
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The Shi'i school system under the Sa^ a^vids 
suppressed the Sufis and Sunnis and -freedom oi expression. 
Thus they were successful to a great extent in achieving 'an 
ideological-religious unity/. However, under the late 
Sa-favids, some of whom were weak and impious. Some 
43 
mujtahids called for the people to follow them instead of 
following the Shah. 
The Safavid dynasty was overthrown by the 
Afghans in 1722. The triumphs of the Afghans over the 
SAfavid dynasty was the beginning of a difficult and 
dangerous condition for Iran Shi'ism. Shi'ism gradually 
declined, the shrines were disparaged, the status of Shi'ism 
became equal to the four Sunni schools. 
Nadir Shah (1736-47) wanted to set up his own 
rule in the areas of the Sunnis outside Iran and also wanted 
to weaken Shi'ism but with the conflict in his empire after 
44 
his death the Shi'is, then again re-united. 
The Zand dynasty took power in the south in 
the second-half of the eighteenth century. Though they 
believed in Shi'ism, but Shi'ism was still not popular like 
it was in the Qajar dynasty. 
43. One who may act according to his own judgement in matter 
relating to religious law; who practice ijtiNid. 
44. Nikki R. Keddie, op .(;it., p. 92. 
28 Cchapter-n 
Right from the sixteenth century there 
45 
appeared a movement known as Akhbaris which questioned and 
re-fused the claims of the mujtahids. The main reason was on 
the restriction exercised by religious authority and 
corruption which prevailed in the ruling classes. They 
believed that the Traditions of the Prophet and Ima^ ms were 
sufficient guidance without the need of the mujtahids' 
46 
rul ing . 
The claim for legitimate power of the 
mujtahids was supported by the Shi'i theory. In the 
47 
eighteenth century one Shi'i school of thought, the Usui is 
or mujtahids won over the Akhbaris. These Usui is or 
45. Akhbaris : a school established in 1624 A,D. that held 
the mujtahid to be an invalid feature of Shi'ism and 
minimized the clergy role. For details on Akhbaris see 
al-Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Musawi al-Khwansari. Rawdat 
al-Jannat fi Ahwal al-'Ulama' wal-Sadat <n.p. 1889) ; Aqa 
Muhammad Baqir Bihbahani, Risalah al-Ij^ihad wa '1 -
Akhbar (n.p. 1896); 'Ali-Davvani, Ustad-i Kul1 Aga 
Muhammad Baoir Ibn Muhammad Akmal Ma'ruf bi Vahid-i-
Bihbahani (Qum, 1958). 
46. Nikki R.Keddie 'The Roots of the Ulama's Power in Modern 
IrAn', Studia Isl arnica. Vol. XXIX (1969), p. 45. 
47. Usuii : a school established under the leadership of 
Agha Muhammad Baqir (Vahid) Bihbihani <1705-1803) that 
insisted on the doctrine of ;jtihad, the necessity of 
the role of the mujtahid and a broader role for the 
'ul ama' in society. 
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mujtahids was supported by the Shi'i theory. In the 
eighteenth century one Shi'i school o-f thought, the Usui is 
or mujtahids won over the Akhbaris. These Usui is or 
mujtahids were those who claimed the right in interpretating 
doctrines and laws for the mujtahids. They held that each 
believer had to choose one living mujtahid and absolutely 
obey his judgement. This built up the power of living 
mujtahids. 
The Usuii. emphasized greatly on the role of 
the 1iving mujtahids. For them the ijtihad arrived at by 
the mujtahids was almost correct. So the mujtahids enjoyed 
48 
both the personal and political power. This principle gave 
a great power to the living mujtahids and gave a sanction to 
their ruling beyond those reserved by the state. 
The leading clerics of Iran had started 
leaving Iran to the Shi'i shrine cities in Iraq in the 
eighteenth century where the leadership of Shi'ism has 
continued to remain until very recently. 
The establishment of Shi'ism as the state 
re!igion of Iran in the Safavid period in the beginning of 
the sixteenth century marks a turning point in the nature 
48. Ibid., p. 47 
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49 
and principles o-f Shi'i thought and Jurisprudence. The 
dominant theme o-f Shi'ism is the question o-f Imamate is an 
institution o-f a succession of those w{io posses charismatic 
character, who comprehend the inner sense of the revelation 
of the Prophet and by which the community is guided. 
Shi'ism stresses one primary duty af the 
follower, that is vilavat or whole loyalty and obedience to 
the Hidden Imam, after the belief in Allah and the Prophet. 
In spite of the belief that the last Imam has not 
disappeared for ever, his primary duty has to be maintained. 
At the same time the community needs the mujtahids to lead 
them in the matter of practice. The community is to be 
divided into two groups: the mujtahids (those who may act 
according to their own Judgement) and the muqa?1 ids (those 
50 
who have to follow the judgement of the mujtahids. 
49. For details about Shi'i beliefs see Muhammad. Rida a}-
Muzaffar The Faith of Shi 'a Islam , (J^ nsariyan 
Publication Qum, Iran 1982); al-Hasan Ibn Musa, an-
Nawbakhti, Firaq ash-Shi'a ed. H. Ritter, (Leipziq, 
1935); AF. Badsha Husain, 'Shiah Islam MW 31 (1941), pp. 
185-192; J. Elder, Family Life in. Shiah Islfm' MW 18 
(1928), pp. 14-23; Hilli. Tabsirat al-Mut'ajll min. ed . 
and tr. by Syed Manzur Mohsin Rizvi , (Aligarfj, A.M.U., 
n.d.) Ibn Sharashub (d. 588/1192), Ma'al im alf-ulama ed. 
Abbas Eghbal , (Tehran 1353/1934); S. Hussain Jafri , M., 
Origins and Earl y Devel opment of Shi'a Islart, (London 
and New York Longman/Librairie du Liban J979); Ali 
Shariate, Selection or Election Eng. tr. by All Asghar 
Ghassemy (Tehran, 1979); Paid 'Alam Sidddiai . Haqiaat-i-
liadhab-i-Shi 'a. Lahore, Tijarat Printers, 1*?78; Ibn al 
Mutahhar al-Hilli, Khul asat al -makal (Tehran 1310); al-
Alusi Mahmud Shukri, liukhtasar al -tuhfa al -
ithna'ashariva; (Pr. 1301); Dwight M. Donaldson, The 
Shi'ite Religion. (London, 1933). 
50. Hamid Algar, Rel igion and State jjn Iran 1785-1906; The 
Role of the Ulama in QaJar Period (Berkeley and Los 
Angeles 1969) , p. 7. 
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The occultation o-f the twelfth Imam endowed a 
distinguished character to Ithna^Asharism or the Twelver 
Shi'ism which were predominated in Iran in the Sa-f avid and 
post-S«-favid periods 'while the Imam remain in occultation, 
a shadow of illegitimacy was bound to cover all wordly 
striving and activities above all those related to 
Bovernment' . 
The theory o-f the Twelver Shi "is concerning 
the Imamate insists that 'the Imams are the replacement of 
the Prophet'. 'The Imam is the infallible, omrjiiscient 
agent of God who carries the news of His commandments to 
men. Without the Imam men could not know what God wants of 
them, they being too insignificant in their knowledge, his 
light being inaccessible to mere mortals. Whereas for the 
Sunni sects, the Qur'an and the Sunnah are the fM"oofs of 
God, to the Shi'ah it is the Imams-pure souls - who are the 
proofs; they are necessary, each one for every historical 
age, for the guidance of the society because the Qur'an and 
Sunnah are susceptible to erroneous interpretation by 
51 
evil doers' . 
The relation between the clerics and the 
Hidden Imam can be compared to that between the Imam and 
51. Shahrough Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary 
Iran: Clergy - State Rel ati017s in the Pa^ l avi Period 
(State University of New York Press, Albany, 1980), p. 
13. 
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God. The Imam is the intermediary between the source of 
divine guidance and the community while the clerics are, in 
some senses, the intermediaries between the Imams And the 
community. But this does not mean that the clerics can 
claim that they are infallible as the Imams or that they 
have similar authorty as the Imams. The c)eric institution 
which was born in the Safavid period participated In the 
Charisma and authority of the Imams, but in fact there was 
no rea] authority existing in the cleric body since the 
Shi'ism did not accept any legitimate authority of any 
wordly power, as has been mentioned. Anyhow, the clerics 
performed some important practical functions in the 
community from which, naturally, an authority came to them. 
It was necessary to give continuous 1iving guidance to the 
community by examples of the best clerics those who were 
called the mujtahids the highest rank of the clerics. 
The power of the Mujtahids is expressed in 
the form of taqlid. It is in fact the ultimate basis for 
the authority of the mujtahids. This authority is expressed 
in several functions performed by them such as: 
(a). They are the protectors of the minors' 
estate and the orphans, according to the saying of the 
Prophet 'The 'ulama' are guardians of those who are without 
protector' . 
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(b). Further, they might administer the 
private vag-fs (endowments) that is those establ ished not for 
charitable aim but -for providing security to the tenants. 
In case the administrator of an endowment is dismissed, the 
52 
mujtahids always can act as a trustees. The clerics can also 
be entrusted the task of certifying the legality of 
documents who can do it by affixing their seals. 
(c) . They collect and distribute various 
53 
kinds of alms and money intended for charitable aims (zakah « 
khums. etc.). 
(d) . They share in the administration of 
justice. The courts presided by the clerics are called 
shar' courts which deal with disputes and contests of a 
personal or commercial nature, or theft and drunkenness. As 
Algar points out 'A governor in Judging a case brought 
54 
before him might request a fatva from a mujtahid, as might 
either of the parties to the dispute; such a fatva once 
55 
issued, was normally acted upon'. The fatva of a mujtahid 
may also be utilised in a case out of the court. 
52. A.K'.S. Lambton, Landlord and Peasant in Persia (London, 
1953) , p. 230. 
53. Atrpyet (pseudonym), Imamat' : Strana Poklonnikov 
Imamov (Alexandropol, 1909), p. 35, cited by Hamid 
Algar, op.cit.. p. 11. 
54. A religious decree or an expression of opinion on a 
point of religious law. 
55. C.J. Wills, Persia as It Is (London, 1886), p. 47, cited 
by Hamid Algar, op.cit., p. 13. 
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(e). They hold religious performances and 
ceremonies. Religious settings in villages and old urban 
neighbourhood are several and deal with various social needs 
such as daily praysr^ preaching, weekly gatherings -For 
religious discussions, recitations, annual passion plays, 
special pilgrimages, celebration of Umar's death, mourning 
on the death days of the various Imams. traditional 
gymnasium, ritual feasts, visiting tombs of saints, 
gatherings for weddings and deaths. Of these activities, 
the clerics perform their duties in only four or five such 
functions namely, preaching, ritual feasts, maj,1 is madhhabi 
(weekly gatherings for religious discussions), weddings, 
56 
funerals, and leading in prayers in the mosque. All the 
great clerics serve as Imams or prayer leaders. 
(f). Most importantly, they act as the 
spiritual and practical guides of the individuals in the 
community. 
After considering these functions performed 
by the clerics or the mujtahids, it will not be too 
difficult to realize their influence on the people, both in 
rural and urban areas. Again, if we want to see by what 
means a mujtahid attained power and influence and examine 
the nature of that influence, it is necessary to know that 
56. Michael M.J. Fischer, Iran; from rel ig^pus dispute to 
revolution (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1980), 
p. 136. 
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piety and learning are the two important characteristics for 
57 
considering the one worthy of tagl id. His piety must be 
made known by his reputation spread by his disciples. His 
learning can be made known by producing scholarly tests in 
large number. The mujtahid is again, the most knowledgeable 
person in his vicinity in religious matters, so he naturally 
gains a general authority over his neighbours. The mujtahid 
also has relation with the mullahs (masters or lords) of the 
neighbourhoods and in certain circumstances, the mullah may 
act as a deputy of the mujtahid. The mullahs are, 
therefore, the supporters of the authority of the mujtahid©, 
because their numbers indicate the power of the particular 
mujtahid. Examples can be seen in several cases, the 
mujtahids in Isfahan and Tabriz are surrounded by private 
armies of the mullahs. In fact they are composed of 
straight forward brigands (lutis) than the mullahs. The 
1 utis support clerical power by challenging the state and by 
enforcing fatvas. The lutis were later on replaced by the 
58 
tullab. or the madrasa students in the nineteenth century. 
The number and strength of these students indicates the 
clerical power. 
57. The process of following the practices and 
pronouncements of a scholar more learned than oneself in 
matters relating to the religious law, with faith in his 
correctness and without independent investigation of his 
reasons. 
58. The student at a madrasa (employed both as a singular 
and a plural noun, although an exclusively plural form 
in Arabic). 
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Another source of clerical power Mas the 
right of takfir. or declaring an enemy to be an infidel , 
though it is not clear that how much the takfir was 
effective. History tells us that the mujtahidB used this 
weapon against the ftkhbaris and the Shavkhis and again 
against the reformers and innovators in the nineteenth 
century. It is however, a dangerous weapon to be used 
59 
against those who oppose the clerical power. 
Anyhow, the division of the community into 
the mujtahid and the muqal1 id was rejected by the Akhbaris 
on the ground that the whole community were mugal1 ids to the 
60 61 
Imams; and for the Shavkhis. the mujtahid was not an 
adequate in being the intermediary between the community and 
the Hidden Imam. 'A more authoritative incarnation of divine 
guidance was necessary. Such was to be the "Perfect Shi'a" 
(shi'a-vi kamil). later termed the "Fourth Pillar" (rukn-i-
62. 
rabi) . 
The place of the mujtahid in Shi'i community 
has been very important. A person has to follow a certain 
59. Hamid Algar, op.cit.. pp. 19-20 
60. 8. Scarcia, "Intorno alle Controversie tra Akbari e 
Usui i RSQ. XXXni. (1958), 244-245, cited by Hamid 
Algar, p. 7. 
61. See below chapter II. 
62. RJ, P. 246, Shaykh Ahmad Ahsa'i, founder of the sect, 
considered his pronouncements to be literally - not 
merely in form or content - those of the Imams (see 
Muhammad Hashim Kirmani, "Ta'ifa-yi Shaykhiya" , MM. 1.1 
(1337 sh/19583, 240), cited by Hamid Algar, Ibid.. p. 7. 
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mujtahid whom he has chosen as his guide. The mujtahid he 
chooses must be a living one because it forbidden to follow 
the deceased mujtahid. In case a living mujtahid is too iar 
to be contacted, indirect access to a living mujtahid is 
preferable and can be done by listening to his words from a 
trustworthy person or by reading his books. 'The muqallid 
must conform not only to the practice of a living mujtahid 
but also to any changes in the rulings and pronouncements of 
63 64 
the marja-'i taqlid he has chosen'. 
In this manner, the relation between the 
believer and the mujtahid will be constantly renewed and not 
static. The principle of following the guidance of certain 
mujtahid is important in ensuring the continuity of 
authority. 
The mujtahid means the one who exercises 
ijtihad. that is, "the searching for a correct opinion 
(ra'v-i savab)" particularly in "the deducing of the 
specific provisions of religious law (furu)from its 
65 66 
principles (usul) and ordinances (ahkam)". The ijtihad is 
exercised by consulting the Qur'an. the Sunnah. the 
63. A Mujtahid whose practices and pronouncements furnish as 
binding examples for those unable to exert independent 
judgement in matters relating to the religious law. 
64. Husayn Tabataba'i Burujirdi, Taudih ul-Mytsa' il (Tehran, 
n.d.), p. 4, cited by Hamid Algar, op.cit.. p. 10. 
65. Hujjat ul-Islam Muhammad Sanglaji, QafJa dar Isl am 
(Tehran, 1338 Sh/1959-1960), p. 14, cited by Hamid Algar 
op . cit., p. 6. 
66. Independent exertion in deciding matters relating to 
religious law; or the competence and ability so to exert 
onesel f. 
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tradition of the Imam and the consensus (ijma) of the 
67 
learned since the beginning of the Grater Occultation. 
The mujtahid whose example in matters of 
practice is above others is called the mar J a ^  - i -t ag 1 ^  (j . The 
six conditions of being the marja'i-taqlid are: maturity, 
intelligence, being a male, faith, Justice, and legitimate 
birth. Sometimes other qualities are also considered 
necessary. These are liberty, having both the sights and 
hearing, and being a free man. Six preconditions needed 
for seeking of the rank of ijtihad are : knowledge of 
theology (kalam); of the principles of faith (usul-i din) t 
of grammar <sarf-au-nahv); of the Arabic language; of 
logic and the principles of jurisprudence. The ways of 
recognizing a mujtahid as a'lam (most learned), and hence 
worthy of taqlid (adherence to the exemplary model) are 
either through personal ability to ascertain degree of 
learning, or by accepting through the testimony of two pious 
and learned persons or by following the judgement of a group 
68 
of people who are accepted as a 'laiTi by a certain mujtahid. 
67. Ali Akbar Dihkhuda, Lughatnama, Fasc. IV (Tehran, 1326 
Sh/1947) , p. 1033, article on ijtihad. cited fay Hamid 
Algar, p. 7. 
68. Burujirdi, op. c it. , p. 3, cited by Hamid Algar , op . 
cit., p . 10. 
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The Status and Power o-f the Clerics: 
The term 'alim (cleric) denotes those who are 
learned in Islamic religious laws. 'The sources o-f their 
knowledge, of course, were Qur'an. Sunpah and Haditth.' The 
Qur'an refers to the ulu '1-amr as those who arm in 
authority which means the spiritual leaders of the 
community. The learned men of the earlier times of Islam 
played an important role in choosing the Prophet's successor 
along with the community leaders. Apart from that, they had 
the role of codifying and interpreting the religious laws. 
This status came from these activities. In the earlier 
period of Islam those religiously learned men did not 
establish any structure of any institution of their own 
because they were involved in the setting up of the ethical 
69 
details of behaviour. 'If the 'ulama' can be said to have 
had an identity, it was the guardians of Allah's words and 
70 
hopes for an ethical community of believers in this world'. 
They supervised public worship and they were greatly influ-
ential due to their knowledge in Islamic theology. 'They 
69. The term 'ulama, literally "1 earned",'is generally used 
by all Muslims to designate those clerics who have made 
a study of theology. MuJtahids are the highest 
dignitaries of the shi'i sect. They provide a 
continuity of authoritative religious legislation, based 
on a comprehensive knowledge of the Kor'an and its 
traditions and arrived at by extreme de^igence and 
endeavor. One becomes a mujtahid by receiving a fatwa 
(decree from another mujtahid)' . Amin |ianani , The 
Modernization of Iran (Stanford University Press, 
Stanford, California, 1961), p. 18. 
70. Shahrough Akhavi, op.cit.. p. 7. 
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exercised an ef-fective but never decisive-pressur«e in the 
71 
realms of public order and government'. 
There are some who consider that the 
corporate character of the clerics came from their reaction 
against the three movements taking place in the eighth 
century - Manicheanism (an extreme ascetic view of man and 
his relationship to God), Shu'ubism (a social movement of 
secretaries, scribes and functionaries who preferred the 
Persian culture to the Arab one and led the believers to a 
sceptical attitude towards the world and man's role in the 
world) and liu'tazilism (a form of rationalism which was 
against the orthodoxy and which held that God could be known 
through the use of reason). 'It was in response to these 
challenges to the orthodox interpretations that the'ulama' 
truly began to initiate their own professional roles, 
structures, processes and functions as a social force in 
72 
society'. Before the establishment of Shi'ism as the 
Iranian national religion by Shah Ismail, it was the Sunni 
clerics of the Umayyad and Abbasid times who had started 
their organizational structures, processes and functions. 
The Imami Shi'ism was late in building its political 
structures and thoughts. 'Since the death of 'Ali Abi Talib 
in 661, there was no extensively recognizeable Shi'i 
community that could be said to be following any of the 
71. Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islamt Conscience 
and History in a World Civilization. Vol. I (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1974), p. 238, cited by 
Sharough Akhavi, ofi.. cit., p. 7. 
72. Sharough Akhavi, Ibid.. p. 7. 
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eleven Imams. Shi ^  i organization and institutions and 
political theory therefore came after the occulation of the 
73 
twelfth Imam. 
In the year 1501 the charismatic movement 
emerged in the north-western part of Iran and won state 
power in the name of Imami Shi'ism for the first time in 
Shi'i theory. So the Shi'i clerics at last began to have 
some influence, though not completely in the public and 
governmental orders which previously were in the hands of 
the Sunni clerics. The victory of the Shi'i clerics can be 
considered as the victory of the followers of the 
charismatic authority of the community (not of the single 
leader). But there were some clerics who held that Khariji , 
Rafidi or Shi'i thought deviated the meaning of the charisma 
of the community into that of the single leader <Imam) . The 
idea of the Imamate was built in the period of Imam Ja'far 
al-Sadiq, Watt said that 'twelver Imami doctrine became 
'widely accepted by moderate Shi'ites' in the early part of 
74 
the 10th. century'. But most of the scholars believed that 
the more revolutionary forms of Shi'ism had surrendered to 
75 
so-called quietism during the ninth century. 
73. Ibid.. p. 5. 
74. Ibid., p. 8. 
75. Ibid. 
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Concerning the authority, the jurisprudence 
76 
and theology o-f the Shi'i in the early period coincided 
with the opinion o-f the Sunnis that Allah's will is the 
source of al1 power and He bestows it to the successor of 
the agencies of inferior, like the Prophet and the caliphs 
(or Imams). But are difference among these sects is that 
the Shi'i community did not, in the final stage, exercise 
judgement and power as the Sunni community did, because the 
Twelver Imami Shi'ism considered that the supreme power and 
judgement was for the Imam alone. This aspect was stressed 
77 
by Hamid Algar who wrote that 'for Sh^'i Muslims the 
doctrine of walayah - obedience to the rule of the Imam -
stands out above all other obligations of the faith save 
those of the profession of faith in the unity of God and in 
the prophecy of Muhammad. Shi'i belief holds that 
continuity with the rule of the Imam is vcauchsafed by the 
authoritative interpreters of the religions law. Shi'i 
76. 'As for theology, kalam, it is clear that from the 
beginning when the Shi'ites separated from the Sunni 
majority they began to debate with their opponents 
concerning their own particular point of view. It is 
true that a debate has two sides and that both the 
opponents share in it. However, the Shi'ites were 
continuously on the offensive, taking the initiative, 
while the other side played the defensive' role. In the 
gradual growth of kalam, which reached it height in the 
2nd/8th. and 3rd./9th. centuries with the spread of the 
Mu'tazilite school, Shi'ite scholars and learned men, 
who were students of the school of the Household of the 
Prophet, became among the foremost master of kalam. 
Furthermore, the chain of theol ogiana of the Sunni 
world, whether it be the Ash'arites, Mu'tazilites or 
others, goes back to the first Imam of the Shi'ites, 
Ali'. All amah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba'i, Shi'a, 
p. 107. 
77. Religion and State in Iran, p. 6, cited by Sharough 
Akhavi, ofi. cit.. p. 10. 
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Muslims hold that the highest ranking members of the clergy 
in effect possess the key to right conduct by their superior 
knowledge and ability to deduce 'ordinances according to 
78 
logical proof. The Imam's leadership depends upon his ' il m 
(knowledge), piety and justice. 
This belief built up the clergy's powerful 
influence in the Shi'i Muslim society, through their members 
of highest ranks. How it can be so ? The reply is that 
since guidance is an indispensible condition in Shi'ism and 
those who have no knowledge in religious law sre forbidden 
in iJtihad. so in each generation there must be a guide (or 
guides) for the people until the Imam come back. The person 
who does this duty is the 'source of emulation' (marja'-i 
Tadl i d) as well as the centre of people's loyalty in the 
field of social behaviour and social relation. 
79 
Joseph Eliash points out that the authority 
of the clergy did not come because of their receiving an ex 
ante appointment from the Imams. He said that the clerics 
of Shi'i sect act as the general agency of the Imams so they 
78. Idem. 
79. 'Some Misconception Concerning ^hi'i Political Theory'. 
International Journal of Middle ^ast Studies^ Vol . IX, 
no.l (February, 1979), pp. 9 - 25. 
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do the -functions of the Imams, until the Imam reappears. 
'The Imams did not prepare the way for the clergy to become 
their agents or deputies' but the clerics took for grant, 
gradually, that they were really such deputies of the Imams 
even they never pretended to identify themselves as having 
equal infallibility and mysterious knowledge to the Imams. 
Therefore, we can say that the Shi'i clerics did 'evolved 
its authoritative position in the community not on the basis 
of doctrinal legitimation by the Imams, but rather as a 
natural process of historical evolution in which the need 
for interpreters of the law as applied to concrete matters 
of litigation could not be denied; and somehow the 'ulama' 
came to act on their own as though e><. ant^ appointment from 
80 
the Imam in fact has occured'. In the history of Iran, 
there were a few individuals who attained the post of marja-
i-taglid and gained great influence and political power. 
80. Shahrough Akhavi, gg.. cit., p. 11. 
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81 
Shi ^  i Jurisprudence: 
As A.A.A. Fyzee writes 'within the last two 
decades a great deal o-f research has been done on the Shi'a, 
but the earliest phase of their religion and law remains 
81. 'The outstanding intellectual on Shi'i juresprudence 
are: 'Thiqat al-Islam Muhammad Ibn Ya'qub Kulayni (d. 
329/940) is the first person in Shi'ism to have 
separated the Shi'ite hadiths from the books called 
Principles (usul ) and to have arranged arid organized 
them according to the heading of jurisprudence and 
articles of faith. (Each one of the Shi'ite scholars of 
hhhadith had assembled sayings he had colleated from the 
Imams in a book called As! , or Principle). The book of 
Kulayni known as Kafi is divided into three parts ; 
Principles, Branches, and Miscellaneous Aiiticles, and 
contains 16, 199 hadiths. It is the most ' trustworthy 
and celebrated work of hadith known in the Shi'ite 
worl d' . 
'Abu'l-Qasim Ja'far Ibn Hasn Ibn Yahya Hilli (d. 
676/1277), known as Muhaqqiq, was an outstanding genius 
in the science of jurisprudence and is cons^ idered to be 
the foremost Shi'ite jurist. Among his mastierpieces are 
Kitab-i mukhtasar-i naf i' and Kitab-i shairavi. which 
have been passed from hand to hand for seven hundred 
years among Shi'ite jurists and have always been 
regarded with a sense of awe and wonder. 
Following Muhaqqiq, we must cite Shal id-i Awwal 
<the First Martyr) Shams al-Din Muhammad Ibn Makki, who 
was killed in Damascus in 786/1384 on the accusation of 
being Shi'ite. Among his juridical masterpieces is his 
Lum'ah-i dimashqivah which he wrote in prison in a 
period of seven days. Also we must cite Siaykh Ja'far 
Kashif al-6hita' Najafi (d. 1327/1909) among whose 
outstanding juridical works is Kitab kashf a^ -ghita. 
Khwajah Nasir al-Din Tusi (d. 672/iZ74> is the 
first to have made kalam a thorough and complete 
science. Among his masterpieces in this domain is his 
Tajrid al-iteqad which has preserved its authority among 
masters of this discipline for more than seven 
centuries. Numerous commentaries have been written on it 
by Shi'ites and Sunnis alike. Over and abovie his genius 
in the science of kalam, he was one of the outstanding 
figures of his day in philosophy and mathematics as 
witnessed by the valuable contributions he made to the 
intellectual sciences. Moreover, the Maraghah 
observatory owed its existence to him'. Al 1 amah Sayyid 
Muhammad Husayn Tabataba'i, g£. cit.. pp. 109-110. 
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82 
l a r g e l y u n e x p l o r e d ' . 
As mentioned above, r e l i g i o n became a means 
of p o l i t i c a l ambi t ions a f t e r the end of the f i r s t f o u r 
83 
c a l i p h s . The ' o f f i c i a l S h i ' i s m ' came t o *n end w i t h the 
murder of Husayn, the Prophet ' s grandson. La te r on a 
84 
theo logy (kalam) and a law (f iqh) were s y s t e m a t i c a l l y 
82.A.A.A. Fyzee ' S h i ' i Legal Theor ies ' i n L^w i n the l i idd l e 
Eas t . ed . Maj id Khadduri and Herbert J , L iebesny (The 
Middle East I n s t i t u t e Washington D.C., 1955), p . 113. 
83.See above, Chapter I . 
84.Accord ing t o Murtada Mutahhari s The S h i ' i t e kalam. on 
the one hand, emerges from the core of S h i ' i t e had i t h , 
and , on the o ther i s mixed w i t h S h i ' i t e ph i l osophy . We 
have seen how in the e a r l y c e n t u r i e s , kal am was 
considered t o be i n im ica l t o the Sunnah and t he had i th by 
t h e Ahl --al-Sunnah. But the S h i ' i t e kalafru not on ly does 
no t come i n t o c o n f l i c t w i th the Sunnah and the h a d i t h , i t 
i s f i r m l y rooted in the Sunnah and t he h a d i t h . The 
reason i s t h a t t he S h i ' i t e h a d i t h , con t ra r y t o the Sunni 
carpus on h a d i t h , cons i s t s of numerous t r a d i t i o n s i n 
which profound metaphysical or soc ia l problems have been 
dea l t w i t h l o g i c a l l y and analysed r a t i o n a l l y . But i n t h e 
Sunni corpus such a n a l y t i c t reatment of these sub jec ts i s 
m i s s i n g . For i ns tance , i f t he re i s any mention o f such 
problems as t ha t of D iv ine providence and 
p rede te rm ina t i on , the a l l -embrac ing w i l l of t h e A lm igh ty . 
The D iv ine Names, A t t r i b u t e s , or such t o p i c s as the 
s o u l , the l i f e a f t e r dea th , the f i n a l r eckon ing , t h e 
S i r a t . the Balance, or such issues as ( the) Imamah. 
K h i l a f a h . and the l i k e , the re i s no argument or r a t i o n a l 
exp lana t ion of the t o p i c s ment ioned. But i n the Sh i 'ah 
corpus on had i th a l l such issues have been d e a l t w i t h i n 
a r a t i o n a l and d i s c u r s i v e manner. A comparison between 
the 1 i s t of the chapters of the s ix Sihah and t ha t of al -
K u l a y n i ' s a l - K a f i w i l l make t h i s q u i t e c l e a r . 
A c c o r d i n g l y , kalam. in the sense of r a t i o n a l and 
a n a l y t i c a l t reatment of problems, i s found i n the Sh i ' ah 
h a d i t h . Th is i s the reason why the Sh i ' ah were no t 
d i v i d e d i n t o two groups, l i k e the Sunnis were, i n t o 'Ahl 
a l - h a d i t h ' and 'Ahl atl - kalam' Murtada Mutahhar i 
I n t r o d u c t i o n t o ' I l m - a l '-Kalatr). Eng. t r . by 'Al i Qui i 
Qara a l -Tawhid ( E n g l i s h ) , V o l . I I , n o . 2 , Rab i ' a l -Than i , 
1405, pp. 51-92, c i t e d by Wahid Akhtar ' I n t r o d u c t i o n t o 
Imamiyah s c h o l a r s : A l -Ku layn i and His works: Part 2 a l -
Tawhid ( E n g l i s h ) , V o l . I I , no . 4 , Shawwal-Dhu a l - H i j j a h 
1405 (July-September 1985), pp . 129-130. 
47 Cchapter-13 
85 
established in opposition to Sunni Islam. 
It appeared that at the turn o-f eight and the 
ninth centuries A.D. the It^ tna 'Ashari or the Twelvers came 
up as a distinct entity separate from other ^i'i groups and 
it was the clerics who undertook the work of de-fining its 
doctrine and engaged with its polemics. But in Sunni Islam 
the caliph acted merely as a symbolic head o-f the community. 
This sign of symbolic head remained with him even though he 
stopped to exercise any political power. Anyhow, in the 
case of Shi'i Islam at the time of the occultation of the 
Imam, the Shi'is looked for someone among the clerics who 
86 
were most learned such as Shaykh al-Mufid and Shaykhu't -
87 
ta'ifa, to be considered as the head of the community. 
It is generally said that in legal system 
Shi'i Islam followed Sunni Islam closely. Therefore, its 
jurisprudence does not differ significantly from the four 
schools of Sunni jurisprudence. However, according to some 
85. Ibid. 
86. Who wrote Kitab al-Irshad. Tehran, 1377. He was 
considered as the first scholar who pioneered the 
tradition of comprehensive scholarship in the Shi'i 
world. 
87. Abu Ja'far Muhammad Ibn al-Hasan Ibn 'AH al-Tusi (d. 22 
Muharram 460/December 2, 1067). He was the first a'lim 
to found the science of comparative fiqh. On the life 
and works of al-Tusi see Wahid Akhtar 'An Introduction 
to Imamiyyah Scholars! Shaykh al Ta'ifah al-Tusi; Life 
and Works' Al-Tawhid (English), Vol. IV, no. 2, Rabi'al 
Thani - Jamadi al-Thani 1407 (December 1986 - February 
1987), pp. 126 - 165. 
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writers there are fundamental differences between the Shi'i 
and Sunni laws. Though the same method and terminology are 
applied by both the sects, the Sunni law is based on the 
assumption that 'the Islamic revelation only fnodified the 
existing customary tribal law while Shi'i law assumes that 
Islam represents a fundamental break and a new legal system 
88 
based on the 'nuclear family'. 
The impact of Mu'tazilite school began to 
influence Shi'ism at the time of Shaykh al-Mufid and his 
successors when the use of reason became more essential in 
the development of theology and its influence also emerged 
in the area of jurisprudence. 
The use of deductive reasoning based on the 
89 
Qur'an and Hadith was widely accepted by the jurists. In 
Shi'i law, four pillars are considered to be important, i.e. 
the Qur'an, the Hadith (Tradition), Ijma' (consensus) and 
90 
'aql (reasoning or intelligence). 
88. See Noel J. Coulson, History of Islamic Law. Islamic 
Surveys, No. 2, (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 
1964) pp. 105, cited by Moojan Momen, An Introduction to 
Shi' i Isl am (Yale University Press, London, 1985), p. 
184. 
89. Al 1 amah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Tabataba'i writes : 'The 
principle that the hadith possesses validity, as 
attested by the Qur'an, is not at all disputed among 
Shi'ites or in fact among all Muslims. But because of 
the failure of some of the early rulers of Islam in 
preserving and guarding the hadith, and excesses of a 
group among the companions and followers of the Prophet 
in propagating hadith literature, the corpus of hadith 
came to face a certain number of difficulties' Al 1 ahmah 
Sayyid Muhammac^ i Tabataba'i, ofi.. cit.. p. 101. 
90. Moojan Momen, bfi.. cit., p. 185. 
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In case of ijma^. it is regarded that all the 
decisions which were agreed upon Ijma^ of the whole 
community cannot exclude the opinion of the Hidden Imam. 
This has been stated by the Ithna ^Ashari writer, Hasan b. 
Zayn'l - din b. 'Al i Ahmad al-'Amili, known as Shahid-i 
92 
Thani , in his book Ma'alimu'd-din fi M - usuj where he says 
91. 'The Shi'i encyclopaedist, Shams al-Din Muhammad b. 
liahmud Amul i, who was mudarris of the Sultaniyya madrasa 
in the reign of the 11 khan Oljeitu and died in Shiraz in 
753/1352-3, refuting the claim that the Shi'a did not 
regard ijma' as a proof (hujja) , states, 'They do not 
reject the proof of ijma' but differ in how they deduce 
the proof from those who say that ijma/ is a proof 
because it is the consensus of those who loose and bind; 
(the Shi'a say) that the infallible imam, who is the 
most excellent of them, must have been included (in the 
consensus) and when he is, it is a proof Nafais al 
f unun. 2 vols (vol. 1, ed. Abu'l-Hasan Shi'rani, Tehran, 
1377/1958, vol ii, ed. Sayyid Ibrahim Miyanji, Tehran , 
1379/1959, i444, cited by Lambton, State and Bovernment 
in Medieval Islam. p. 228; 'The Imamiyya, because of the 
authoritative position given to the Imam, reject qiyas. 
About 287/900 Abu Sahl Isma'il (d. 311/923) of the Banu 
Nawbakht condemned it in a treatise entitled Ibtal-al-
givas. Al-Kulayni also attacks qivam and maintains that 
every case could be solved by recourse to the Qur'an and 
the Sunna, provided they were properly, understood and 
it was known how to remedy the divergences in the 
interpretation of hadith'. Brunschvig, 'Les usmi al-
f iqh imamites' 202-3. Schacht states that the Usui is 
recognise 'aql (reason) as the third of the usul ('Usui' 
in EI'), cited by Lambton, j.bid.. 'Similarly Ibn al-
Mutahhar al-Hilli and later authorities categorically 
reject recourse to personal opinion (ra'y) and qiyas' . 
Cf. Laoust, 'La critiqe du sunnisme dans la doctrine 
d'al-Hilli', 56-7, cited by Lambton, ibi.d.. p. 228. 
92. Published 'Abdur-Rahim (Tehran, 1312/1894). 
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that imja' among the ithna' Ashari means 'agreement o-f whose 
who interpret in their rel igious judgements (-t-atawa shar-
' ivva) the commands o-f the imams on a particular question' 
'Thus for any major point o-f law or doctrine individual 
Bhi'i mujtahids came to various dif-fering opinions <iktilaf) 
through use of ijtihad. From considering these varying 
opinions, the comunity finally arrives at a consensus 
94 
(ijma') which is the truth'. It is clear that the mujtahids 
the only duty is to interpret the law and not to create laws 
or deduce the rules. In Shi'i belief the Imam will ever 
iniiiiim> Hill 
remain present. As the Shi'i authority puts it, 'Verily the 
Time of Obligation (Zamanu'l-taklif) is never ^  without an 
imam who is infallible (ma'sum) . who is the Guasrdian of the 
Law (hafiz 1i'sh-shar'), a reference to whose word is 
95 96 
obligatory'. In the words of Fyzee: 'The ijma' is the 
pronouny (Kashif) of the saying of the Imam. Later on a 
whole section is devoted to the "frustation" of qiyas and 
97 
istishab. 
93. Cited by A.A.A. Fyzee, 'Shi'i Legal Theories', p. 127. 
94. Moojan Momin, QB.. cit.. p. 186. 
95. Ma'al im. p. 175, cited by A.A.A. Fyzee, p. 127. 
96. 'Shi'i Legal Theories', p. 127. 
*'*7' Istishab or istisl ah ; 'evokes, etymological 1 y, the idea 
of an implied connection between a present situation and 
a previous one. In the vocabulary of the fukaha' , it 
designated the principle by which a given judicial 
situation that had existed previously was held to 
continue to exist as long as it could not be proved that 
it had ceased to exist or had been modified'. 
fheyclopaedia of Islam <N. ed.) art 'Istishab'. 
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In spite of the -fact that many theoretical 
principles o-f Shi'i jurisprudence were laid down by well-
known Shi'i clerics such as 'All amah al-Hilli, Shahid al-
Awwal and Shahid ath-Thani of 14th. ~ 16th. centuries A.D., 
yet there was a hiatus at the time where there was a 
controversy between the Usui is and the Akhbaris. As stated 
above, the Usui is are those who follow the general 
"principles (usul) which have been deduced from the Qur'an 
and 'accredited traditions and employ analogy (qivas) in 
98 
arriving at their conclusions' to solve the problems and 
accredit the Hadith. while the Akhbaris follow only the 
tradition but do not accept analogical reasoning. The Usuii 
theory came into practice only at the end of the eighteenth 
century. It was Bihbahani who brought Usuii system to a 
victory. Following this event the term mujtahid came to be 
99 
used in the same sense as the term faqih . 
It is generally known that the Shi'is accept 
the authority of the Qur'an and the Sunnah of the Prophet. 
But in case of the Hadiths. they believe that 'no hadith is 
98. E.G. Browne, Literary History of Persia, Vol. W., p. 
374 
99. One who is an expert in jurisprudence of the Shari'a. 'A 
fakih is, in the first instance, one who possesses 
knowledge of or understanding about a thing (syn, 'alim. 
fahim). Then as fikh passed from being synonymous with 
'ilm (as in fikh al-lugha) and became limited to 
religious knowledge (' il m al -Din) then to the religious 
law (al-shari'a) and finally to the derivative details 
of the last (al-furu')' Shorter Encyclopaedia gf Islam 
art. 'Fakih' . 
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ordinarily accepted unless related by an Imam descended -from 
the Prophet. They further believe that 'only the Imam, and 
in his absence the mujtahids. his servants, and teachers of 
the True Faith, can tell us what the correct interpretation 
of the law is. The Imam is the law-giver himself, the 
speaking (natiq) Koran; he may in a proper case even 
legislate, make new and abrogate old ones; but as he is 
Hidden or Evanescent, the muJtahids. who Are present at all 
times and in each country, are his agents, the recognized 
interpreters of the law in accordance with the canonical 
100 101 
tradition'. D.B. Macdonald has pointed out that, 'the Shi'i 
still have muJtahids who are not bound to the words of a 
Master, but can give decisions on their responsibility. 
These seem to have in their hands the teaching power which 
strictly belongs to the Hidden Imam. They thus represent 
the principle of authority which is the governing conception 
of the Shi'a'. For the Shi'is only those who attain the 
rank of mujtahidds can act on behalf of the Imam and can 
interpret the Law. However, tag!id appeared among the 
Shi'is to the same extent as among the Sunnis and imitation 
became the rule for both the communities. 
100. A.A.A. Fyzee, Out!ine of Muhammadaq Law (Oxford, 
University Press, London, 1964), p. 45. 
1*^1 • Devel opment of liusl im Theol ogy. Jurisprudence and 
Constitutional Theory (London, 1903), p, 46. 
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Legal Significance of the Imamatet 
In Shi'i jurisprudence since the Imam is the 
leader of the community and the law-giver by the command of 
God, it is the duty of each follower to devote himself to 
102 
the Imam. Such love and allegience is called walava. An 
Ithna ^Ashari Hadith related by Shaykh Saduq Ibn Babuyah 
mentions that 'the friendship of 'Al i is my stronghold 
(hisn) and whoever enters my stronghold is safe from my 
103 
punishment'. The said Hadith reflects the legal and moral 
principles as '(1) love of and devotion to the People of the 
Family (ahlu '1-bayt). the imams, (2) obedience to their 
commands, <3) imitation of their actions and conduct,and (4) 
recognition of their rights and bel ief in the institution of 
104 
the imamate'. 
A Shi'i authority is reported to have said, 
'he who dies without knowing the Imam of his time, is as if 
105 
he dies in Ja'hiliyyah (the time of ignorance)'. So total 
obedience to Imam for a mukal1af (common man) is necessary. 
102. Da'aimu'l-Islam, Vol. 1, Chap. 1, cited by Fayzee in 
'Shi'i Legal Theories',, p. 113. 
103. Dwight M. Donaldson, og.. cit.. p. 347. 
104. A.A.A. Fyzee, A Shite Creed.. p. 97, cited by Fyzee 
'Shi'i Legal Theories, p. 120. 
105. Muhammad Rida al-Muzaffar, The Faith of Shi'a Islam. 
p. 32. 
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X 
In order to understand Shi'i legal theories 
one needs to understand the legal distinction between he who 
imposes the law (mukal 1 i-f) and he who is required to obey it 
(mukal 1 a-f) . The takl i-f doctrine has been developed by 
Shaykh Saduq in his book I ^ tiqadat. The doctrine of takl i-f 
concerns with the obligation to obey the laws. ' In this 
doctrine Sod is mukal 1 i-f who imposes the laws upon man, the 
mukal 1 a-f. Through Imam God en-forces his laws and later on 
the mujtahids serve by interpreting them. 
An important part o-f takl if doctrine is the 
justice o-f Sod. That is why the Shi'i called themselves as 
106 
ahluM -'adl wa'l tawhid in order to di-f-ferentiate themselves 
from the Sunnis, the ahl u'l-sunna wa"!-jama'a. Such 'adl 
includes His kindness (lutf) not to place upon human beings 
a burden greater than their strength can carry as mentioned 
in the Qur'an that 'Allah burdens not a soul beyond its 
107 
capacity'. 
Other important issue regarding the Shi'i law 
is the question of qivas (measurement of comparison) . 
108 
Accordng to J. Schacht, 'individual reasoning in general 
called ra'v 'opinion' but when it is directed towards 
achieving systematic consistency it is called qiyas' . 
106. Ibid.. p. 121. 
107. Qur'an 11, 296. 
108. Origins of liuhammadan Jurisprudence (Oxford, 1950) , p 
98. 
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This fourth prnciple of the Sunni law is not acceptable to 
most of the Shi'is whether the Fatimids or Ithna' 'Asharis. 
The Nizari Isma'ilis also ignore qiyas as it is not definite 
system of jurisprudence. Only the Zaydi accept qiyas. 
Although there are considerable differences 
in the principles of jurisprudence between Shi'i and the 
four schools of the Sunni laws, still there are fewer 
differences in the practical application of jurisprudence in 
109 
the field of social transaction and ritual observances. 
The qiyas was rejected by the Shi'is due to 
the fact that if they accepted qiyas the foundation of 
Imamate would be destroyed since man cannot interfere in 
this devine institution. Such actions namely election, 
appointment of 'Ali by the Prophet, the 'divine right' of 
the ahl al-bayt. the mysterious connection between the nur 
(light) of Imamate and legitimate descent from 'Ali - all 
these would be meaningless if by the process of qiyas human 
beings could interfere with the law as laid down by divine 
ordinances contained in direct rtevelation (Ghjr'an) or 
indirect revelation (the rules laid down by the Prophet or 
110 
the Imam) . 
109. Moojan Momen , op .cit.. p. 188. 
110. A.A.A. Fyzee, 'Shi'i: Legal Theories', p. 122. 
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We may conclude that Shi'i law, according to 
the learned Shi'is is composed of rules -for human conducts 
laid down by the authoritative interpretations of the Qur'an 
and the Sunnah and the decisions of the Imam and his 
servants, the mujtahids. According to Abd'al 'Aziz the 
Fatimid jurist, the Law is classified on the following 
categories: 
1. The Qur'an 
2. The Sunnah 
3- M ja'a mina'l-a'imma ( 'What comes to us from 
Imams'). 
On the question of Sunni and Shi'i Imams 
there are some fundamental differences. While the caliph 
(Khal ifa) is a servant of the law, the Imam acted as the 
interpreter of the law. The caliph is elected by the people 
while Imam is appointed by the previous Imam. A democratic 
choice can be applied by the caliph because he is elected by 
the wish of the people but the appointment of an Imam is an 
"Act of God" and is announced by the former Imam. In case 
the caliph commits a mistake he can be removed but the Imam 
cannot do wrong because he is infallible. In the Sunni 
world the most significant constitutonal issue is that the 
caliph may or may not exist in the world but still religion 
will be there, but in Shi'i fundamental belief the Imam must 
111 
be present and function as gha'ib in Twelver Shi'ism or as 
mastur (hidden) in Fatimid and hadir (present) in Nizaris 
111. It is important to note that the Sunni will follow the 
laws even without an Islamic head. But in Shi'ism the 
Imam will always remain. This gives a solace to Shi'i 
followers and establishes a central and infallible 
authority who offers moral and legal sanction. 
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and 'Ali-Ilahi. 
113 
The Drama of Husavn's Martyrdom and the Passion PJLftyjt: 
The martyrdom of Husayn was of great 
significance for the development of Shi'is religion. It 
gave a new turn to the Shi'i movement. The commemoration 
concerning Imam Husayn's martyrdom (61 AH/680) or the drama 
114 
of Karbal a had a strong influence in consolidating Shi'ism. 
It has a long history in Iraq and Iran before the rise of 
the Safavid dynasty which adopted Ithna' Ashari Shi''ism as 
115 
the state religion of Iran. 
112. Ibid. 
113. For the 'symbolic importance' of the passion plays see 
E.L. Peters, 'Aspect of rank and status among Muslims 
in a Lebanese village', in Mediterranean Countrymen, 
Essay on the Social Anthropol ogy of the Mefiiterranean . 
(ed.) J. Pitt-Rivers, Monton, (Paris and the Hague), 
1963, pp. 159-200. 
114. The passion play is, related to the phenomenon known 
®s tawwabun or the penitents. See S.H. Jafri, Origins 
and Earl v Development of Shi'a Islam pp. 22-33, 235-6, 
passim. 
115. Jean Calmard 'Muharram ceremonies and diplomacy, 
(prel iminary study) in QaJar Iran s Pol itical.. social 
and cultural change. 1800-1925 eds. Edmund Bosworth and 
Carole Hillenbrand (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 
1983), p. 213. 
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The mourning o-f Husayn on 'Ashura (the 
tenth) in the form o-f drama, it is believed, was introduced 
117 
in the tenth century while the passion plays started in the 
118 
•seventeenth century during the Safavids. As there was a 
difficulty in the Safavid period in imposing Shi'i faith in 
the territory of Iran, an effort was made by Shah' Abbas I 
(1588-1629) to support the traditional mourning ceremony 
together with the commemoration of the Karbala tragedy. By 
the eithteenth and nineteenth centuries it became more 
itnportant particularly under Nasir al-Din Shah. Nasir al-
Din Shah himself built a royal stage for the display in 
Tehran. 
116. I.e. the name of the first month of the Islamic year. 
It is also the name given to the days of mourning spent 
by the Shi'is in commemoration of the martyrdom of 
caliph 'Al i and of his two sons, Hasan and Husayn. 
C.F., 'Rev. Edward Sell , The Faith of Islam (Delhi, 
1986), p. 418. These days of mourning are observed by 
the Shi'i Muslims 'but the tenth day of 'Muharram is 
observed by the Sunnis in commemoration of its having 
been the day on which Adam and Eve, heaven and hell , 
the pen, fate, life and death, were created' (Ashura')' 
Thomas Patrick Hughes, A Dictionary of Is!am art. 
'Muharram (Delhi, 1973), p. 407 Cf., Encyclopaedia of 
Isl am (N.ed.), art. 'Ashura'. 
117. Donaldson noted that the passion plays have many 
allusions to the 'redemptive work of Husayn bin 'Al i 
and the voluntary sacrifice of his body for the sins of 
the Musiim wor1d'. The Shi'ite Religion 339 ff., cited 
by A.K.S. Lambton State and Government in Medieval 
Isl am. p. 236. 
118. 'The passion play (ta'ziva) developed into an 
aristocratic art during the Safavids and Qajars. It is 
essentially a popular religious manifestation. 'It is 
by the 'ulama' although they 
it is the medium of 
Seyyed Hossein Nasr 
not usual 1y encouraged 
not oppose it since 
religious expression' 
'Ashari Shi'ism and 
Journal, Vol. II, 1948. 
do 
profound 
"Ithna 
Iranian Islam' The Middle East 
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119 
In 1936 Resa Shah had banned the carrying o-f 
the naqi in the city, but three villages outside Yazd 
continued the ceremony. Such ceremony was accompanied by 
the parade of floats representing Karbala episode. In towns, 
during the first ten days of Muharram the activities would 
120 
reach its apex rawdas from several neighbourhood mosques 
121 
were held in each evening. 
119. 'Having banned in 1939 self-flagellation in public on 
the anniversary of Imam Hussein's death on the tenth of 
Muharram, the Shah tried to stop the public performance 
of Shi'a passion plays preceding the mourning, and 
prohibit the pilgrimage to Mecca'. Dilip Hiro, Iran 
under the Avatol1ahs (London, 1987), p. 28. 
120. Rawdas literally means garden. 'It consist of sessions 
during which sermons are del ivered combined with the 
chanting of verses of the Qur'an and rel igious poem 
with special emphasis on the tragedy of Karbala'. 
Seyyed Hossein, 'Ithna 'Ashari Shi'ism and Iranian 
Islam' in Religion in the Middle East; Three Religion 
in Concord and Conf 1 ict. ed. A.J. Arberry, Vol. II 
(Cambridge, 1969), p. 113 
121. Fischer gives an eyewitness account of the rawdas; 
'Each evening there are rawdas in the several 
neighbourhood mosques consisting of a series of 
speeches lasting from ten minutes to half an hour each. 
At mid-evening lines of dastas form; beating their 
backs and chests in rhythm with their chanting, they 
led to the local assemblies to the central 
Congregational Mosque of the village, where more rawdas 
are read by more important preachers brought from as 
far as Tehran, punctuated from time to time by 
procession of dastas. On 'Ashura (the tenth), the day 
Imam Husayn was martyred, crowds gathered from Yazd 
city and surrounding areas to watch the dastas, the 
floats, and finally at noon the carrying of the naql to 
the chant of 'Husayn, Husayn.'Some men may still cut 
themselves on the forehead, although this is illegal . 
Meanwhile in town on 'Ashura Dy, the Barkhordar 
Mosque (endowed by the industrialist at that name) 
becomes the focal center to which all dasta groups 
come. On the edge of the town, in the Arestan 
graveyard, processions of people collect to march with 
standards and carry two small naqls to their villages. 
Given the ulama's hostility to Sufism, one of the 
interesting dasta groups is that of Pash-e-Bagh 
Neighbourhood, which is led by a darvish singing to the 
accompaniment. He further writes; 
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The conscious practice o-f Karbal a Tragedy as 
a 'living piece o-f metahistory' has long been supported 
122 
throughout the nineteeth century in the -form of a^'iziya and 
rawdakhani . the dramatic performance and the recitation o-f 
verse at the commemoration of Husayn martyrdom. Although 
t^'ziva and rawdakharni were cultivated only on a socially 
more restricted scale, they were 'usually performed with 
unending passion and devotion'. Such action, though 
consisting of some superstitious elements could invoke 
religious emotions and this can be observed in case of 
ta'ziya where some participants show violent self-
flagellation with an aim to join the martyrdom of the Imam. 
The emotional as well as political effect of the Ta'z i ya is 
discussed by Algar who says: 'It is hardly an exaggeration 
to say that the emotions generally displayed in ta'ziya can, 
in the course of political agitation, leave their 
representational framework of expression to make of the 
On the third day after 'Ashura, the Mul1 a Ismail 
Mosque, behind the bazaar, become the focal centre for 
the dasta groups. This is the day that the Bani Asad 
found the headless body of Husayn and buried it. A 
special shovel-and-pick dasta, carrying mats and 
headless bodies, often with a mourning lion putting 
straw on its head chants: 'The Bani Asad have come to 
bury Husayn'. Michael Fischer, op.cit.. p. 172. 
122. 'Among the Shi'is it means in the first place the 
lamentation for the martyred imams, which is held at 
their graves and also at home. In particular, however, 
it is mourning for Husain. The tabut or Na'sh, a copy 
of the darih, is also called ta'ziya such models, often 
richly executed in the ceremonies of mourning for 
Husain.' Shorter Encycl opaedia of Islam art. 'Ta'z iya'. 
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contemporary struggle a reenactment o-f Karbala. This 
potentiality o-f ta'ziva -for the inspiration of revolt has 
removed several Iranian statemen and governments to work -for 
its abolition, concern for its possible illegitimacy in 
123 
terms of religious law and precedent has been secondary'. 
'The political implications of Karbala cannot 
be underrated. The drama of Husayn at the beginning of 
'Ashura could be seen everywhere in Iran. As Fischer writes 
'on the 'Ashura (the tenth of Muharram) the city of Yazd 
throbs with activity - 1entern lights, chanting preparations 
as did the camp of Imam Husayn on the desert battlefield 
124 
thirteen centuries ago'. The stage is supposed to be the 
camp of Imam Husayn in the desert battle-field. In the city 
of Bagh-e-Safa a big forum is built on the edge of town with 
125 
only women joining in huge rawda. At nearby mosques many 
smaller rawdas are held. The forum for refuges from Iraq 
was stationed at Husayniyya. At this moment the pitch of 
126 
flagellation by the dastas reach its emotional height in 
123. Hamid Algar, 'The Oppositional Role of the 'Ulama' in 
Twentieth century Iran', p. 234. 
124. Michael Fischer, op.cit.. p. 170. 
125. Preachment, homilitic sermon. 
126. Group of youngmen, usually in black shirts who beat 
their chests with their hands or their backs with 
chains, during religious processions. 
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which the men take o-ff their clothes to the waists in order 
127 
to beat themselves. At the noon o-f 'Ashura the nagl is 
carried to mark the three—fold desecration held by Yazid 
army under Shimr and Ibn Sa'd. 
127. A huge, tear - shaped, woden structure, requiring a 
hundred o-f men to 1 i-ft it, representing the coffin of 
Husayn . 
*******## 
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CHAPTER - II 
THE MUJTAHIDS AND THE STATE 
The Twelver Shi'is believe in an idea 
regarding God-ruler in Islam in the sense that it is God who 
rules the community and that Prophet Muhammad was chosen by 
Him to be his representative to perform His authority in 
this world. According to them the Prophet himself holds two 
important attributes : he is designated by God and that he 
is in-fallible. It is, therefore, believed that the 
successors of the Prophet must al so have these two 
qualities. It is also believed that it is God who appoints 
1 
the individuals as Imams. 
The first appointment was made by the Prophet 
himself. He appointed 'Ali b. Abi Talib as his successor 
who came to be regarded as infallible. This example was 
later on followed by the Twelver Shi'is. So the genuine 
1. According to Ibn al-Mutahhar Hilli <1250-1326); '...the 
Imamate is a universal authority (rivasa) in the things 
of religion and of the world belonging to some person and 
derived from (niyaba) the Prophet. And it is necessary 
(wajib) according to reason. For the Imamate is a 
kindness (from Allah) (lutf) . and we know absolutely that 
when men have a chief (ra' is) and a guide <muifshid) whom 
they obey, who avenges the oppressed of his oppressor and 
restrains the oppressor from his oppression, then they 
draw near to soundness (sal ah) and depart from 
corruption'. Hasan Ibn al-Mutahhar al-Hilli, Al-Babu I-
Hadi'Ashar: A Treatise on the Principles of Shi'ite 
Theology, with commentary by Miqdad-i Fadil al-Hilli, 
trans. William McElwee Miller (London, 1958), p. 62, 
cited by Abdul-Hadi Hairi Shi'ism and Constitutional ism 
in Iran (Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1977), p. 56. 
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r ep resen ta t i ves of God on ear th who became I"mams were 
con-fined t o the descendants of ' A l i and h i s w i f e Pat imah. 
The l i n e of the i n f a l l i b l e Imams came t o an 
end by the death of Hasan a l - ' A s k a r i , the e leven th Imam, i n 
837. The S h i ' i s hold the b e l i e f t h a t t he t w e l f t h Imam s t i l l 
remains a l i v e but h idden , leav ing the work of r u l i n g t h e 
Muslim community t o the f ou r s p e c i f i e d persons who were 
appointed by h im. Consequently, a f t e r these s p e c i f i e d 
agen t s , the task of r u l i n g in temporal and r e l i g i o u s mat te rs 
were t r a n s f e r r e d t o the q u a l i f i e d c l e r i c s . In the S h i ' i 
f i q h . Hadi th and kalam, the idea about r u l e r s h i p became more 
e s s e n t i a l . 
The CI e r i c ' s a t t i t u d e towards the States 
The S h i ' i p r i n c i p l e denies the l eg i t imacy of 
secu la r power. The s t i l l o c c u l t a t i o n of the Imam means t h a t 
a l l rea l a u t h o r i t y cannot be ava i l ed i n w o r l d l y a f f a i r s . The 
l e g i t i m a c y of the Safav id regime was p a r t l y accepted by the 
c l e r i c s due t o the reason t h a t t he k ings of t h a t dynasty 
c la imed themselves as the descendants of the Imams. There 
2 . The l e g i t i m a t e and i n f a l l i b l e Imams approved by the 
Twelver S h i ' i s weres ' A l i b . Abi T a l i b a l -Mu r tada , Hasan 
b . ' A l i a l -Mu j t aba , Husayn b. ' A l i a l - B a q i r , J a ' f a r b . 
Muhammad, al Sad iq , Musa b. J a ' f a r a l -Kazi f f ) , ' A l i b . 
Musa, al R ida , Muhammad b. A l i , a l - T a q i , ' A l i b. 
'Muhammad, a l - N a q i , Hasan b. ' A l i a l - A s k a r i and Muhammad 
b . al-Hasan , a l -Mahd i . 
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were also, in that period, a number o-f the clerics who 
gradually gained authority and in-fluence in the community 
through the exercise of practical functions. When the 
Safavid dynasty fel 1 , there was interregnum before the 
3 
emergence of the Qajar dynasty. By the end of that 
interregnum the relation between the clerics and the state 
had been changed. One was more assertion in Shi'i fiqh 
emphasizing the function of the mujtahids in directing, and 
even ruling the community. Another factor was that 'the 
establishment of Qajar rule presented the ulama 
with the spectacle of a state that made many of the same 
assumptions concerning the nature of royal power as had the 
Safavids but was itself deprived of the semilegitimacy 
provided by alleged descent from the Imams. The Qajars 
called themselves "Shadows of God", but the claim to divine 
4 
appointment was only formal ' . 
As A. K. S. Lambton writes: 'The Qajars could 
5 
not claim as the Safawids had, descent from the Imams nor 
3. A Turcoman tribe to which the Qajar dynasty* of Persia 
belonged. For the Persian sources on Qajar fee Muhammad 
Taki Lisan al-Mulk Sipihr, Nasikhi al-tawarik^ ta'rikh-i-
Kajariyya. ed. Jahangir Kaim-Makami, Tehrafi 1961; Amir 
Gilanshah, Yak sad u panjah sal-i saltanat dar Iran, 
Tehran 1963; 'Adud al-Dawla Sultan Ahmad, Ta'rikh-
i'adudi. Bombay 1ith 1889; Sa'id Nafisi, Ta'rikh-i 
ijtima'i va-sivasi-i Iran dar dawra-i mu'ayir. Tehran 
1947-8; 'Al i Asghar Shamim, Iran dar dawra-j| sal tanat-i 
Kaiar, Tehran, 1965. 
4. Hamid Algar, Religion and State in Iran. p. 22. 
5. Cf. , R.M. Savory ' A curious episode of Safavid history ' 
in Iran and Is!am. ed. C.E. Bosworth, (Edinburgh, 
University Press, 1971), pp. 461-471. 
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did they claim to rule in sucession to or on behalf of the 
Imams, though they arrogated to themselves the title of the 
Shadow of God with its implications of absolute rule. The 
way was open for a c]earer demarcation between the religious 
and the political institution. Once more there was a 
religious institution standing over against the state and 
not wholly incorporated into it. The ^ulama* . however, 
lacked formal organization and unity. They were not 
incorporated into the government to the extent that they had 
been under the Safavids, but the fact that the government 
appointed and in many cases paid the imam jum^a. the shaykh 
al-islam. the qadi and the pish-namaz reduced their 
6 
independence and forced upon them an ambivalent attitude. 
The clerics who had established their 
position as the representatives of the Imam could not allow 
the same position to the monarchs. Thus the monarchs were 
looked upon as illegitimates when without such a position. 
This contradiction, though hiddenly availed, became the 
cause of the hostile attitude of the clerics towards the 
state and vice versa. Even though the clerics could not 
expect to destroy all the power of the state, they expected 
that the state should at least partly submit to them. Due 
to the fact that the ruler, as any other ordinary believers. 
6. A. K. S. Lambton, State and Government in Medieval isTam, 
p. 286. 
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had to be a muqal1 id. attached to a certain mujtahid and to 
be under his ruling. Then the state had to become the 
executive branch of the clerical power. In the same time the 
state naturally did not like this idea and the -fact that any 
other groups of people should revolt or oppose them. Thus 
the hostility between the two went on, mostly iralicitly but 
explicitly on some occasions. 
The idea representing the state a« a tyranny 
resulted in the way that the mujtahid who became the marJa-
i-taqlid was indirectly forbidden to be close to the state. 
7 
The visible example was that Shaykh Fazlullah Nuri who had 
nothing against the state could not be considered as 
8 
influential as Muhammad Tabataba'i and 'Abdullah Bihbihani 
who were against the state though Nuri might be a very 
learned mujtahid of Tehran. Though there were «ome clerics 
in the end of the nineteenth century who rendered some 
cooperation to the state, they were counted as treacherous 
to their faith. The exemption of this consideration was in 
9 10 
the cases of shaykh al -Isl am and imam jum'a who were 
appointed by the state because these persons behaved 
independently and impartially. 
7. He was a religious leader , anti-constitutionalist and 
anti-modernist. 
8. See below, p. 96. 
9. See below, p. 72. 
10. See below, p. 72. 
68 Cchapter-m 
The power of the clerics came from their 
close relation with the community while the state generally 
ignored them. A symbol of the function did by the 
legitimate body to protect the people from the tyranny of 
the illegitimate power or the state. The common alienation 
of the people and the clerics from the state bound them 
closely together and the victory of the clerics over the 
11 
state, in many occasions, came from this relationship. 
In the Qajar period the political involvement 
of the religious body of Iran became clearer in the whole of 
the nineteenth century. The clerics who declared themselves 
as representatives of the Imam considered the monarchy 
illegal according to their doctrine. It became equally a 
binding for the monarch as well as his subjects to submit 
to the authoritative guidance of the mujtahids and this 
resulted in making state the executive branch of the clerics 
authority. However, this ideal was so far not fulfil in 
that period and it led to some conflicts in rel*tion between 
the clerics and the monarchy. The event which was 
considered a sign of this tension leading to a broken 
relation between the clerics and the monarchy was the 
participation of the clerics in the Constitutional 
12 
Revol ution . 
11. Hamid Algar, Rel igion and Stat^ in Irani p. 24. 
12. Hamid Algar, 'The Oppositional Role of the Ul ama in 
Twentieth Century Iran' in Scholars, Sainiis and Sufis, 
ed. Nikki R. Keddie (Berkeley Los Angeles London, 1972), 
p. 235. 
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As the clerics had an idea that the state was 
an agent of tyranny, they therefore, themselves al oo-f -from 
the state. The clerics who had a close contact with the 
state were be!ieved to be unfit for the post of marja^ i 
taqiid. By the end of the nineteenth century there were 
some cooperation between the clerics and the state, but 
since the state was considered to be an agent of injustice, 
those clerics who had relation with the state were 
considered to have rejected their faith. During the Qajar 
rule many mujtahids who resided in Najaf and Karbala 
13 
returned to Iran and displayed their influence. 
There were several political events which 
helped emphasize the hostility in religious and doctrinal 
motives towards the state throughout the century. The 
nature of Iran as an Islamic community was destroyed when 
the Qajar had relation with the aggressive non-Muslim power 
14 
who wanted total control of Iran 1 ike the Russians and 
British. The clerics's resistance to these foreign powers 
was directed to the state whose weakness allowed to 
encroachment of those powers. 
13. James Alban Bill, Politics of Iran (Columbus, Ohio, 
1921) , p. 23. 
14. Hamid Algar, 'The Oppositional Role of the Ulama in 
Twentieth Century Iran', p. 235. 
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The Qajars had no effective control over th# 
army or national bureaucracy which was really modernized. 
The army tended to be a paper organization. This weakness 
made the clerics very powerful. They owned 'private armies' 
and thus gained much power and respect from the people as 
15 
compared to the unpopular Qajars. As Lambton s«yss 
'The nature of the military forces 
of the Qajar did not contribute to 
stability. As in early times, the army 
was largely formed by provincial 
contingents and irregular cavalry and 
infantry, with a small body of regular 
troops. There was no clear dividing line 
between the provincial governor, the 
tribal leader, the land owner, and the 
military commander. This facilitated 
rebellion and made the control of the 
Shah almost always precarious'. 
16 
The time between the year 1785, the first 
year of Qajar dynasty, and 1905, the year of the 
Constitutional Revolution totalling 120 years, can be said 
to be the time when the Iranian clerics played a leading 
role in the affairs of the country. The emergence of this 
dynasty by chance coincided with the reformation of the 
Shi'i orthodoxy but the Qajars did not participate in it. 
They might, some times, try to reconcile but without much 
15. Nikki R. Keddie, 'The Roots of the Ulama's Power in 
Modern Iran' in Scholars. Saints and Sufis, p. 214. 
16. A.K.S. Lambton, 'Persia: The Breakdown of Society in The 
Cambridge History of Is!am. Vol . I, (Cambridge, 1970) , 
pp. 435-436. 
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success. The Shi'is recognized the Safavid dynasty -for its 
claim of being successors of the Imams, so there were some 
close relationships between the religious body and the 
state. The Qajars could not claim anything like that 
17 
because it was known that they came from the Mongols, so 
there were only some light contacts between the religious 
body and the state, mostly in negative terms. 
The first ruler of the Qajar dynasty was Agha 
18 
Muhammad Khan Qajar. When he crowned as a king in the 
spring of 1796 he determined to revive Shi'ism and the 
19 
national and religious glory of the Safavid times. In his 
reign there was a beginning of a connection between the 
clerics, the affairs of the state and the monarchy. 
However, the personal disposition of the monarch and the 
condition of his reign limited the extent of it. He showed 
many signs of piety. He observed regular prayers and kept 
fasts invited the mullahs to preach against the use of 
narcotics which was the result of the prohibition of wine 
drinking that led to the use of opium. All these efforts 
failed to enlist the support of the clerics. It is said 
17. It is said that in the middle of the 8th/14th century 
the Qajars migrated to Syria from the Mughan Steppe. 
After that they came to Persia along with Timur. Even 
this can be so, there is no evidence that a tribe called 
Qajar existed in Mongol or in the Timurid times. 
18. Cf. Sir John Malcolm's, A History of Persia. 2 Vols 
(London, 1815) . 
19. Saiyid Athar Abbas Rizvi, Iran;Roval tv, t^el igion and 
Revolution (Canberra, Australia, 1980), p. 94. 
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that except Mullah Muhammad Husayn Mazandarani Mullabashi, 
20 
there was only one Mirza Muhammad 'Ali Bihbihani who had a 
personal relation with the monarch. Anyhow, generally the 
character of the Qajar rule especially in the time o-f Agha 
Muhammad Khan barred the acquisition of any great influence 
of the clerics. 
Path 'Ali Shah's reign (1797-1834) was marked 
by religious revival. From the beginning of his reign he 
ordered many mosques to be built and shrines to be 
decorated. He supported many theological works and allowed 
the clerics to settle in many parts of the country and also 
paid respect to the sacred city of Mashad. 'The major ulama 
of this period were not only outside the state apparatus but 
also most of them resided in Iraq outside the state's 
21 
Jurisdiction'. Path 'Ali Shah allotted money and other 
grants to the clerics in order to win their hearts. 
However, the clerics did not want to join the government and 
were reluctant to act on behalf of the Shah. Shavkh al -
22. 23 
Islam and Imam Jum'a were appointed by him as a sign of his 
20. The eldest son of Sayyid Muhammad Baqir. 
21. Moojan Momen, op.cit.. p. 137 
22. The dignitary presiding over shar' courts in each major 
city. 
23. One designated by the monarch to lead congregational 
prayer and pronounce the Friday sermon in each major 
city. 
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good wishes and the state paid the salaries to them. He 
even entrusted them with governmental mission. But in fact, 
it was the clerics themselves who tried to enter the state's 
affairs. The princes and ministers, following the example 
of the Shah, tried to please the clerics and attract them to 
the governmental seats. 'In the unsettled and decentralized 
condition of the administration, caused in part by the 
vastness of distances, one of the most common forms of their 
intervention was mediation between the central government 
and rebellious towns, Khans, or governors, requesting 
24 
pardon for them.' In the beginning clerics' influence was 
confined to the urban population. Marvin Zonis writes : 'In 
contrast to the non-religious elite, the majority of the 
population of Iran, or at least the urban mobilized segment 
of the population, are allegedly committed Shi'ites. 
Certainly there exists a highly vocal (albeit privately 
highly vocal) cadre of religious leaders and activists who 
have immense influence with the urban population and who are 
unalterably hostile to the elite in this regime. Moreover, 
there is a long and revered tradition of religious officials 
leading mass movements into the midst of major political 
25 
controversy'. The tribes, especially in Khurasan, paid some 
24. Hamid Algar, Religion and State in Iran. op«cit., p. 52. 
25. Marvin Zonis, The Political Elite of Iran (Princeton 
University, 1971), pp. 150-151. 
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respect to the clerics as well as those in the urban areas. 
The policy of devotion and submission, by doing pious acts 
and accepting the clerics' mediation, helped the assertion 
of their influence. At the same time the Shah had a 
certain influence among some of the clerics. He had a close 
and lasting relationship with many of them. 
'Abbas Mirza, a successor of Path 'Ali Shah 
gave special consideration to the religious minorities. He 
was eager to seek the cooperation of the religious 
minorities. He also asked the cooperation of the clerics to 
protect these people. His aim of modernizing the country, 
which meant giving the state more privileges was, however, 
opposed by the clerics. 
An important event which involved the clerics 
in the politics of the period was the Russo-Iranian War. In 
26 
this war the clerics issued fatva during the years 1804-13 
against Russia that the war should be considered a Holy war 
(Jihad) . Some celebrated clerics such as Shaykh Ja'far 
26. A legal ruling: an expression of opinion, by one of the 
'Ulama'. on a point of religious law or on legal case. 
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27 
Kashif al-Bhita and Mullah Ahmad Naraqi took part in this 
28 
activity. In -fact it was the clerics who were threatening 
to take control o+ the government affairs and launch the 
j ihad themselves in case Fath 'Al i Shah would not do that. 
They gave fatva declaring the jihad to be obligatory and the 
opposition to it as a sign of kufr (disbelief). The cause 
of this war can be briefly explained as follow. After the 
death of Agha Muhammad, when Fath 'Ali Shah <1797-1834) 
ascended the throne he found the emergence of a new 
situation. The situation of Iran on the overland route to 
India showed that Iran was increasingly involving in the 
politics of the European powers which she had less 
experience in the past. The invasions of Egypt by Napoleon 
27. Shaykh Ja'far Kashif al-Ghita' Najafi (d. 1327/1909) 
among whose outstanding juridical works is Kitab Kashf 
al-ghita. 'For Shaykh Ja'far Kashif al-Ghita' tyranny 
was rebellion. 'Every tyrant was a rebel' and it was 
incumbent on every mukallaf to help the c^pressor in 
repeling tyranny from him. 'Anyone who rebels against 
the imam or his na'ib khass or na'ib'amm in what he 
commands or prohibits and whoever acts contrary (to his 
command and prohibition) in with-holding zakjat' or khums 
or in performing his due obi igations (hufliffl.) must be 
fought' . Kashf al -ghita; Kitab al -jihad^ . al -Bab al 
khamis al -f asl ^  al -thani. f i'l -bughat. cited by A. K. S. 
Lambton, State and Government in Medieval Isi am., p . 
287. 
28. Moojan Momen., op .cit.. p. 138. 
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in 1798 stirred up the hope of the Indians princes that 
Napoleon and the Russian Emperor would also invade India 
through Iran which would liberate India -from the grip of 
Britain, Sir John Molcom, the British Governor of 
India, at that time made political and commercial treaty 
with the Shah. But eventually when Russia attack Iran, 
Britain did not come to her rescue. After the defeats Iran 
29 
had to make the Treaty of Quiistan with Russia on 12th 
October, 1813, allowing Russian naval vessals to pass 
through the Caspian Sea and made a cession of Georgia, Qara 
Bagh and Tabsh to Russia. This unfavourable treaty made 
with Russia created distress among the patriot members of 
the court. Popular feeling was aroused in Azerbayjan while 
outside Azerbayjan the clerics played the leading role in 
stirring up the religious frenzy. 'Thus strengthened, the 
war-mongering bureaucrats forced,upon Iran a war with Russia 
which ended with the even more humiliating treaty of 
30 
Tirkomanchay in 1828.In the battle the troops were supported 
29. The Persian government was forced as a result of the 
Russian advance in the war (which was temporarily 
stopped by the Treaty of Peace of Gulistan, 1813) to 
realize that the Persian army would not be strong enough 
unless it was modernised. Thus in Persia, the three 
ideas - nationalism, patriotism and modernism - were 
closely knit. 
30. Sayyid Athar Abbas Rizvi, op.cit... p. 95. 
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by the clerics but they withdrew a-fter the first defeat. 
Moreoever, one of the clerics Mir Fattah, 'betrayed Tabriz 
into the hands of the Russians'. 
As a result of the defeat Iran was forced to 
part with some parts of its territory (Ej"ivan and 
Nakhichevan) and had to pay a large indemnity to Russia. 
31 
Anyhow, the second Russo-Iranian war led to the emergence of 
the clerics as a force capable of shapping national policy. 
It was the first link of a chain of episodes where the 
clerics had marked influence on the course of Iranian 
history. 'The subsequent links in this chain were to 
include agitation against Husayn Khan Sipahsalar in 1878, 
the opposition to the Tobacco Regie in 1391-2, the 
involvement of the ulama in constitutional movement in 1905-
,32 
9 and culminating in the Iranian Revolution of 1979. 
During the reign of Path 'Ali Shah, like 
those who preceded him, there was an unhappy alliance 
between the monarch and the religious authority. The 
dynasty's claim to be "The shadow of God" did not gain 
'J;:^  .TsS so ^ .0 
31 . On the second Russo-Iranian war see P.W.' Avery 'An 
Enquiry into the outbreak of the second Russo-Persian 
War, 1826-28' in Iran and Islam, pp. 17-46.' 
32. Moojan Momen, op.cit., p. 138. \ 
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popular support from the Shi'is as once the Sa-favids did. 
As one writer points out 'Naturally the Qajar sought to 
buttress their power by reluctantly associating the 'olema' 
with their administration and policies. The 'olema. 
however, gave early Sa-favids their confidence in order to 
strengthen the Shi'ism but the leading QaJar 'olema' had to 
•fight independently against the growing challenges to 
33 
Shi'ism' . 
The proclamation of 4^ ^^ °^ ^ was issued by the 
clerics against Russian expansion in Caucasus in the reign 
of 'Abbas Mirza (1789-1833). Immediately when the troops of 
'Abbas Mirza was attacked the people rose against the 
Russians. The uprising of the people and the attack made by 
the Iranians was considered by Vermelov, the commander-in-
chief of the Russian forces, as the product of "religious 
fanaticism". 
The agitation against Russia became more 
active when the clerics took part and acted as the de facto 
leaders of the nation. In the declaration of jihad against 
Russia, one of the famous mujtahids Aga Sayyid Muhammad 
34 
Isfahani in Karbala played an important role. When he got 
information of Russian oppression of the Muslim population 
33. Saiyid Athar Abbas Rizvi, op.cit.^ p . 96 . 
34. A grandson of Sayyid Muhammad Baqir Bihbihani 
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of the Caucasus, he then sent his representative, Mullah 
Rida Quii to Tehran to ask Path 'Al i Shah whether he wanted 
to declare Jihad. 'Although the reply was dif f irmative 
evidently Aga Sayyid Muhammad considered its sincerity 
doubt-ful . Such by now was the temper o-f the ulama that they 
declared themselves ready to go to war even without the 
35 
consent or participation of the Shah'. Knowing that this 
willingness was motivated by a fear of popular indignation, 
ha decided to go to Iran and reached Tehran in June, 1826. 
He received a warm welcome by the people especially the 
clerics and the princes. In this regard Path 'Ali Shah 
appointed 'Abdullah Khan Amin ud-Daula as Sayyid's mihmandar 
(official host) and allotted 3,000,000 tomans for military 
operation in this jihad. However, to have a strcng support, 
Aga Sayyid Muhammad wrote to the clerics of the provinces 
informing the need of the Jihad and requested for their 
cooperation. When Path 'Al i Shah left Tehran in June 3, 
1826 to Sultaniya for his summer holidays. Aga Sayyid 
Muhammad and a number of other clerics such as HajJ Mul 1 a 
Muhammad Ja'far Astarabadi, Aga Sayyid 'Azizullah Talishi 
came along with him at Sultaniya on June 11, 1826 to 
persuade the Shah. During the agitation against the tabacco 
monopoly 'Path 'Ali Shah found himself even more isolated 
36 
than Nasir ud-Din Shah' since the fatva said that opposition 
35. Muhammad 'Ali Kashmiri, Nujum u^-5ama (Lucknow, 1303, 
Q/1885-1886), p. 364 RSN, IX, 641, cited by Hamid Algar, 
Religion and State in Iran. p. 87. 
36. Among his courtiers, only 'Abd ul-Vahhab Mu'tamad ud-
Daul a and Mirza Abu-1-Hasan Khan Shirazi sought to 
resist the demand for jihad. They were silenced by a 
fatva that opposition to jihad constituted a sign of 
unbelief, RSN, IX, 646, cited by Hamid Algiar op. cit. . 
pp. 88-89. 
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to Jihad was a sign oi unbelief. The communication between 
37 
'Abbas Mirza, the heir apparent to Path 'Ali Shah and his 
clerics in the court created religious enthusiasm. It 
spread throughout Iran due to the effort of Aga Sayyid 
Muhammad and now reached its apex. Another group of clerics 
38 
comprising Mull a Ahmad Naraqi and Mul1 a Abd al-Wahhab 
Qasvini reached the royal camp cladding in shrounds as a 
symbol of preparation for jihad and martyrdom. Only then 
the Shah submitted. 
Although the war ended with calamity to Iran, 
it was evident that the clerics worked partly as an 
efficient instrument for arousing religious sentiment among 
the Iranian people and as the national leaders. 
37. 'Abbas Mirza, son of Path 'Al i Shah', born in Dhu'I-
Hidjdja 1203/Sept. 1789, in the small town of Nawa, died 
on 10 Dj umada II 1249/25 Oct. 1833. Although 
not the eldest son, he was made heir to the throne 
because his mother also belonged to the Kadjar family 
Europeans who knew him were unanimous in their praise of 
his bravery, generosity and other excellent qualities. 
R.G. Watson (History of Persia. 128-9) describes him as 
"the noblest of the Kajar race, Encvclopaedia of Islam 
(N.Ed.), art, 'Abbas Mirza'. On Abbas Mirza see 
Muhammad Hasan Khan, Matla'al-Shams. (Tehran, 1301); J. 
Morier, A second journey through Perisa Armenia and Asia 
Minor to Constantinople. (London 1818). 
38. The principal mujtahid during Path 'Ali Shah's reign. 
He was considered the most learned of the 'ulama' after 
the death of Sayyid Muhammad Baqir Bihbihani. 
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Muhammad Shah (1251/1836) also -foilowed the 
model o-f Path 'Al i Shah's policy towards the clerics. He 
showed his piety by supporting the construction of mosques 
/ 
and shrines, namely the Karbala shrine which was destroyed 
by the Wahhabi attack in 1216/1801. Also he gave the amount 
of 100,000 tomans yearly to the clerics. 
The clerics' rising against the Sharfi's policy 
which took place in Tehran can be said to be the most 
ominious in the reign of Muhammad Shah. The oppression of 
the government and the ambition of the clerics led to many 
clashes occuring in the provinces and in the capital where 
the hostility between the two bodies was very clear. In the 
reign of Muhammad Shah the hostility of the state toward the 
clerics became more obvious and strong. 'His heterodox 
tendencies, and the slow, almost unconscious, attempts at 
strengthening the central secular authority, exacerbated the 
inherent hostility of the ulama. While their power in the 
provinces continued undiminished, they became a constant and 
39 
formidable force in the politics of the capital . 
Though we cannot see any constant policy of 
Nasir al-Din Shah towards clerics in the early years of his 
regime, a tendency of the expanding of the enmity between 
the state and the clerical body existed. Attempts to 
39. Hamid Algar, op.cit.. p. 120 
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westernize some aspects o-f the state created disputes 
between the two, which became more and more bitter. The 
clerics had no trust in the innovations while the reforms 
gave more chances to assert the power on the part of the 
state. During the short period of Mirza Taqi Khan's 
ministry, his policy towards the clerics 'was more far-
reaching than the mere suppression of open rebellion'. His 
attempt at strengthening the state was a combination of the 
animosity for the clerics and reformist tendencies. His 
policy towards the clerics was not based on the ideal 
conception of their role in the state's affairs but on his 
aim to assert the state's power as much as possible. He 
then tried to destroy some of the clerics' power like the 
40 
right to grant the 'bast' and to minimize their juridical 
authority by widening the scope of 'urf jurisdiction and 
making a loose control over the shar' courts. His aim was 
to check the clerical power or to weaken it so that it could 
not challenge the state power. He clashed with the clerics 
when he denied their authority in some of their 
41 
functions. 
40. The Sanctuary from secular authority provided by 
mosques, residence of the 'ulama'. and other places. 
41. Abbas Iqbal , Mirza Taqi Khan Amir Kabir (Tehran, 
1340Sh./1961) , p. 163, cited by Hamid Algar, p. 129. 
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In the first year ai the regime o-f Najisir a1-
42 
Din Shah, Amir Kabir, the minister, arrested three leading 
clerics -from Tabriz and they were kept in Tehran. This 
action on the part o-f the government undoubtedly angered the 
clerics. 'The impious nature of Qajar's rule was now 
tacitly admitted'. The people then became more oppressive. 
With the failure of its oppressive policy the state turned 
towards the foreign powers for help who were ready to 
intervene in the internal affairs of Iran. So the clerics 
thought that it was their duty to prevent the foreign 
aggressions in order to protect their country's honour. In 
Iran the turmoil spread all over after the death of Muhammad 
Shah till Nasir al-Din Shah came to power in 1848. During 
the reign of Nasir al-Din Shah (1848-1896), the religious 
power rested with the clerics. The efforts aimed at 
westernizing the country became the main cause of mistrust 
43 
of the clerics. Thus throughout the reign of Nasir al-Din 
Shah there took place clashes between the two groups in 
Tehran as well as in the provinces. When the scope of the 
clerics' responsibility became wider, their involvement in 
the affairs of the state also grew more. Nearly every event 
in his reign helped to strengthen the power of the clerics 
as the national leaders opposed the monarch and the 
government. Nasir al-Din Shah whose piety was not like that 
42. On Amir Kabir see Husayn Makki in Zindagapi-yi Mirza 
Tagi Khan Amir Kabir (Tehran, 1327 Sh./1948 - 1949) . 
Abbas Iqbal , Mirza Tagi Khan Amir Kabir (Tehran, 1340 
Sh./1961), Firidun Adamiyat. Amir Kabir va Iran. 
(Tehran, 1334 Sh./1955). 
43. Hamid Algar, pp.cit.. p. 22. 
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0+ Path 'A1i Shah aimed at capturing the religious prestige 
•for himself which belonged to the clerics. At the same time 
as the power and ambitions of the leading clerics aimed at 
the increase of their personal wealth, 'their policies 
became more deliberate and when necessity dictated prudent'. 
Thus various factors which in future led to the rousing of 
the Constitutional Revolution, emerged during the early part 
of Nasir-al Din Shah's reign. The indirect control and 
attempt to limit the scope of the authority of the shar' led 
to the confusion in the juridical affairs. The situation 
was made worse by the introduction of Western legal and 
political concepts in the second half of the century. As it 
has been pointed out 'In the Constitutional Revolution and 
also destroyed it, as the differing aims and purposes became 
apparent'. During the latter period of Nasir al-Din Shah's 
reign the hatred against the abuse of power by the 
government officials and the religious classes increased. 
The revulsion against the European power in Persia also 
grew. It was during Amir Kabir's time (1264/1848-1268/1851) 
44 
that there appeared a new sect of Babism whose influence 
44. The Shi'is held that the founder of the Babi sect,Sayyid 
'Ali Bab, based his doctrines on the teaching of the 
later leader of the Shaykhiya movement, Sayyid Kazim 
Reshti, because he attended his lectures in Karbala. 
Sayyid 'Ali Muhammad was born in Shiras in 1819. 
In 1844 he called his disciples and declared himself as 
the bab (the Sate to the unseen Mahdi). In 1848 (in the 
convention of Badash) the Bab is declared their retreat 
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continued to grow. It was feared that Babism would attract 
the clerics and the state. Amir Kabir considered the 
execution of the Bab necessary. 
from Islam and Shari ^a soon as a result of the 
presecution from the orthodox Shi'i. One of the leaders 
in this movement was a poetess named Zarrin Taj or 
Qurratul 'Ayun or Janab-e-Tahira (Her Hoiiness the 
Pure). She unveiled herself in front of her men 
followers against the traditional teaching of Islam. 
After the convention, in 1849 one of the leaders of the 
Bab movement took a smal1 troop of the Bab is into 
sanctuary of Shaykh Tabari to fight bravely with the 
troops of Nasir-al-Din Shah who came to subjugate them. 
Their leader, Mul1 a Husayn, was killed and the others 
surrendered to the Shah on the condition that their 
lives would be spared. Instead they were mercilessly 
massacred. Soon after that, in January 1850, another 
leader Sayyid Yahya Darabi led the Babi group to fight 
bravely with the Shah's troop in the Kil 'a-i 'Ali Mardan 
Khan citadel and all of them were massacred. 'Ali 
Muhammad was shot dead. On 16 August 1852 the two Babis 
attempted on the life of Nasir al-Din Shah Qajar but did 
not succeed. Qurratul-'Ayn was arrested and imprisoned 
and finally strangled to death. The Babi leaders were 
banished to Iraq. One among them was Baha 'Allah (Mirza 
Husayn 'Ali Nuri) and another was his half-brother, 
Subh-i-Azal (Mirza Yahya Nuri). Subh-i-Azal claimed 
that the Bab had appointed him as his successor. He 
together with his followers adhered to the teachings 
stated in the Bayan. a part of work written by Bab, so 
they were called Bayanis. Baha 'Allah protested this 
claim and in 1863 he declared in a garden near Baghdad 
(the Garden of Ridwan) that the Bab had given him the 
honour of 'He whom God shall Make Manifest'. So other 
claims of succession to the Bab were false. So he was 
the founder of Baha'ism (which derived from the Babism) . 
On Babism and Baha'ism see E.G. Browne, ed., Tarikh-i-
Jadid or New History of Mirza 'Al i Muhammad the Bab 
(Cambridge, 1893) ; E.G. Browne, A Travel 1er's Narrative, 
written to II1ustrate the Episode of the Bab (Cambridge, 
1891); Agha Mirza Muhammad' Some New Notes on Babism' 
JRAS, n.v. July 1927; Firidun Adamiyat, Amir Kabir va 
Iran (Tehran, n.d.) 'Abd al-Husayn Awara, al-Kawakib al-
Durriya ii Ma'athir al-Baha'ivva. (Cairo 1342/1923-4)5 
'Abd al-Baha', Tadhkirat al Wafa, Hayfa 1924 (accounts 
and different tradition of Babi and Baha'i martyrs); 
Martha Root, Tahirih the pure, Iran greatest women, 
(Karachi 1938) with the Persian text of numerous poem; 
'Muh. Iqbal . , The devel opment of methaphysics ijn Persia, 
(London, 1908) . 
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In the eyes o-f the Iranian Shi'i Bahaism was 
considered as a political movement which occured mainly due 
to the incompetent rule o-f the Qajars. Generally, it was 
believed that the doctrine of Babism was entirely apposed to 
Islam. It was said that their belief in 'The coming of a 
new revelation would have destroyed the worth of the 
existing one, which regarded itself as final. The clerics, 
on the other hand, were the institutional expression of the 
power of Islam, the expositors and guardians of its doctrine 
and the enforcers of its law, and among their functions was 
45 
the rebuttal of heresy and innovation'. Acting as the 
custodians of Islam, the clerics therefore, immediately 
confronted the Babis when Sayyid 'Ali Muhammad claimed 
himself to be the Bab (gateway) of the Hidden Imam in 
1254/1848. The emergence of Babism during Amir Kabirs time 
was followed by bloodsheds and strong opposition by the 
clerics. 'More significant a cause for the hostility of the 
ulama to the Bab was doubtless provided by the realization 
that his doctrines constituted bid'at i.e., reprehensible 
innovation in matters of faith. Mull a 'Al i Akbar Ardistani , 
one of the early converts, appended to the idhap (call to 
prayer) he proclaimed from the mosque of Aga Qasini in Shiraz 
"I bear witness that "Ali Muhammad is the 'remnant' (baqiva) 
46 
of 6od" . 
45. Hamid Algar, ibid.. pp. 137 - 138. 
46. E.G. Browne, ed., Tarikh-i-Jadid or New Histpry of Mirza 
Ali Muhammad the Bab (Cambridge, 1893), p. 200. 
According to Khan Bahadur Agha Mirza Muhammad ('Some New 
Notes on Bab ism,' JRAS. n.v. (July 1927, 451), Mull a 
Muhammad Sadiq was the first to proclaim this deformed 
idhan, cited by Hamid Algar, p. 138. 
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As A.K.S. Lambton writes: 'In Qajatr times as 
earlier, movements o-f social revolt tended to take on a 
religious coloring "because orthodoxy was associated with 
the ruling institution", and that "because there was no 
separation between Church and State, unorthodoxy was almost 
automatically regarded as a threat to the existing regime"; 
and cites Babism as the chie-f example. We have already 
noted, however, the alienation o-f the ul ama -from the state; 
and in the case of Babism, the danger was initially only to 
orthodoxy. The state reacted seriously only when its own 
security was a-f-fected. The most significant movement o-f 
social revolt in the Qajar period took place precisely 
within an "orthodox" frame of expression, drawing on a long 
47 
tradition in so doing". 
The attempt of Amir Kabir to forbid the bast 
in the shrines also brought about a negative result. He did 
it because he had seen, in the cities of Tabriz, Isfahan and 
Tehran, the mosques giving shelter to the people with arms 
as the hostility to the governmental authority. Again, the 
attempt of Amir Kabir to forbid taziva. the public mourning 
ceremony for Imam Husayn, which was in fact a powerful way 
to arouse the religious feeling leading to the clerical 
47. A.K.S. Lambton, "Persian Society under the Qajars," 
JRCA5. XLVIII (1961), p. 136. 
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power, met with strong opposition. Thus he had little 
success in restricting the power and influence of the 
clerics. His policies aroused the feelings for the 
necessity of a constitutional rule of the country which 
finally burst out in the form of the Constitutional 
Revolution of 1906. The clerics demanded for the repeal of 
Reuter Concession on 1873, the repeal of Tobacco concession 
1891-92 and lastly the grant of a constitutional government 
in 1905-06. 
When Nasir al-Din Shah adopted the policy of 
giving concessions to European powers with the hope that it 
would accelerate the country's economic development, the 
result was the growing exploitation of the Iranian economy 
by the foreign powers 'who obtained sweeping concessions in 
return for poltry sums of money which satisfied the Shah's 
immediate needs'. In 1892 a British national named Baron 
Julius de Reuter was given the right to exploit all the 
48 
minerals in Iran to establish fctories and a national bank. 
The clerics influence expanded to a great extent in this 
situation when they forced Nasir-al-Din Shah to stop the 
Reuter Concession 1873 and expel the pro-west minister Mirsa 
49 
Husayn Khan . 
48. Encvclopaedia of Islam(N. ed .) , art. 'Iran' . 
49. Mirza Husayn Khan was appointed as sadr-i a'aam. after 
remaining for a short ime as the Minister of War in 
October-November, 1871. 
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Nikki R. Keddie writes: 
'The successful opposition to the 
Reuter concession, unlike that to 
the tobacco concession, had its way 
cleared by the -fact that the British 
government re-fused to back Reuter's 
unrealistic scheme. Another 
difference between the two 
situations is that the tobacco 
movement took place two decades 
later, when Iranian nationalism was 
beginning to be expressed by a small 
group of modernists and reformers, 
and Iranian merchants were also far 
more directly involved in the second 
movement than in the first. The 
prime minister who backed Reuter's 
concession was a modernizer, and his 
opponents were mostly reactionary, 
whereas during the tobacco movement 
the leading modernizers in the 
central government and elsewhere 
were an important part of the 
opposition coalition. It was the 
tobacco movement, not the protest 
against the Reuter concessjluon, 
which was the first profound mass 
movement in Iran, but the coalition 
which supported the tobacco movement 
owed something to the earlier 
victory against the Reuter 
concession'. 
The most important event in the nineteenth 
51 
century Iran was the tobacco regie given to a British 
SQ.Religion and Rebel 1 ion in Iran 
1891-1892 (London, 1966), p. 7." 
The Tobacco Protest of 
51 .On tobacco concession see Ibrahim Taymuri, Tahrim-i 
Tanbaku Ya Avvalin Mugavamat-i-Wanf i dar Iran (Tehran , 
1328 Sh./1949), pp. 68-69; Hajji Pirzada, Safarnama. ed. 
Hafiz Farmanfarma'ian (Tehran, 1342 Sh./1963), I, 36-38-
39; Nikki R. Keddie, Religion and Rebel 1 ion in Iran;The 
Tobacco Protest of 1891-1892 (London, 1896>; T.E. Gordon, 
Persia Revisited (London, 1896)5 E.G. Browne, The Persian 
Revolution of 1905-1909 (Cambridge University, 1966) ; 
Ibrahim Safa'i, Rahbaran-i Mayhruta VI t SayyicI 'Abdul 1 ah 
Bihbihani 
Sh./1964) 
va Sayyid Muhammad Tabataba'i (Tehran, 1343 
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company which directly aroused popular opposition against 
the Shah •for the -first time and finally caused the fall of 
the Qajar dynasty. 
At the beginning of the last decade of the 
nineteenth century many concessions were granted for -foreign 
economic interests among which one of them was the tobacco 
monopoly. The negotiation for this concession was completed 
in London during Nasir al-Din Shah's third visit to Europe 
52 
in 1889. According to the agreement all the rights 
regarding the sale and distributions of tobacco inside Iran 
and the 'export of all tobacco produced in Iran, were vested 
in the Imperial Tobacco Corporation' had to pay to the 
government of Iran 15 million pounds per year. The growing 
British influence created anti Shah feeling among the 
53 
masses. Sayyid Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, a nationalist 
leader wrote a letter to the leading mujtahids, Mirza Hasan 
54 
Shirazi at Samara blaming the increasing British influence. 
In response to this letter Mirza Hasan gave a fatva to all 
52.Abdul 1 ah Mustawfi, Tarikh-i-Idari va Ijtima'i7vi Daura'yi 
Qajariva ya 5harh-i Zindagani-yi Man (Tehran, 1321 
Sh./1942-1943), I, 470, cited by Hamid Algar, p. 206. 
53.On al-Afghani see Charles C. Adams Isl am and Mocjernjsm A 
Political Biography (Los Angeles, 1972)5 Nikki R. Keddie, 
An Islamic Response to Imperial ism, Political and 
Religious writings of Sayyid Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani (Los 
Angeles, 1968), Vol.11, pp. 1432-1449. 
54.On this problem see Nikki R., Keddie, Reliqion and 
Rebel 1 ion in Iran s The Tobacco Protest of 18!?1-1892. 
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believers against the use of tobacco till the Shah abolished 
the concession. So much was the resentment among the people 
that the mullahs and mujtahids organized demonstrations in 
Isfahan and Tabriz against this concession. The importance 
of this event was that for the first time the pub! ic 
cooperated with the clerics and openly revolted against the 
Shah. Thus the popular opinion was shown through the 
'medium of the religious classes who could, in certain 
circumstances, be counted on to take the lead in opposing 
55 
the Shah and the government'. It is important to note that 
at the beginning of the agitation the clerics and the 
merchants joined hands with one another. The resentment 
against the tobacco monopoly found its expression in the 
event of 1905-1906. 'They represented two powers largely 
independent of the state: that of economic enterprise and of 
56 
religious directions body'. 
In April-May, 1891, the leader of the tobacco 
57 
merchants of Fars, Hajji, 'Abbas Urdubadi, ordered the 
market of Shiraz to be closed in opposition to the monopoly. 
58 
In the same period HajJ 'Ali Akbar Falasiri preached in the 
masjid-i-Vakil against the government's policy especially 
against the tobacco monopoly. He also called for jihad in 
case 'the agents of the monopoly attempted to enter Shiraz' . 
55" The Encyclopaedia of Islam (N.ed.), art. 'Iran. 
56. Hamid Algar, Religion and State in Iran op.cit.. p. 207. 
57. Dne of the important merchants of Fars. 
58. HajJ 'Ali Akbar Falasiri was banished from Iran by the 
accusation of preaching against the tobacco concession . 
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The opponents o-f the state were given 
ultimate refuge in the sanctuary of-fered by mosques and 
59 
residents of clerics. One of the important places of the 
clerical strongholds was Isfahan in which the clerics being 
led by Aga Najafi started oppositional activities against 
the tobacco monopoly. These clerics opposed the sale of 
tobacco even before the important fai;va against tobacco was 
60 
given . 
The celebrated Mirza Hasan Shirazi's 
intervention began with the sending of a telegram to Nasir 
al Din Shah on July 1891, opposing the granting of tobacco 
monopoly. Mirza Hasan Shirazi, a prominent cleric linked 
this event with Islam by declaring that the use of tobacco 
61 
which was produced by the British was a sin. His first 
telegram was not replied by the Shah, so he again wrote a 
letter to him in September, 1891 stating in details his 
objection to the tobacco concession. In the same month he 
sent a letter requesting the people to reject the use of 
tobacco completely until! the Shah cancelled the 
62 
concessions. 
59. Hamid Algar, op.cit.. pp. 207-298. 
60. Hafez Farmayan, 'Protrait of a Nineteenth - Century Iran 
Stateman, The Life and Time of Grand Vizier Amin ud-
Dawlah, 1844-1904, International Journal of Middle East 
Studies. Vol. XV (1983), p. 344. 
61. Encvcl opaedia of Islam (N.ed.), art 'Iran' . 
62. E.G. Browne, The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909 
(Cambridge, 1966), p . 20 . 
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In the beginning o-f December, 1891 a fatva 
was issued in Tehran announcing the use o-f tobacco 'in any 
•form to be tantamount to war against the Hidden Imam, i.e. 
haram. Its e-f-fect was immediate and total : throughout the 
country the use o-f tobacco was abandoned. Much con-fusion 
surrounds the origin o-f the fatva. doubtless in large part 
created by the government in the hope of lessening its 
63 
effect'. Regarding Hajji Mirza Hasan Shirazi, Masih 
Muhajeri writes; 
'The British witnessed the power 
of Islam when the pen of an Islamic 
Jurisprudent and scholar names Mirza 
Muhammad Hassan Husseini Shirazi 
(known as Mirza Shirazi) defeated 
them, the greatest power of that 
time. Mirza Shirazi's one-statement 
religious declaration proclaimed "In 
the Name of God, the Compassionate, 
the Merciful - From now on the use 
of tobacco and tobacco pipe is 1 ike 
fighting the Imam of time (praise 
and blessings of God be upon him). 
They began to understand the problem 
in Islamic countries that they would 
face because of the gradual 
awakening of the people and their 
return to Islam. They saw that this 
problem would seriously trouble the 
"old crone of colonialism". The 
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- func t ionar ies 
government in I ran saw w i th t h e i r 
own eyes t ha t the people o-f I r a n 
when informed of Mirza S h i r a z i ' s 
d e c l a r a t i o n broke t h e i r hookahs. 
Shah Nasser -ud-Din , who was a pa r t y 
t o the agreement i n t he tobacco 
i s s u e , was os t rac i sed by h i s w i f e , 
maids and servants in the roya l 
p a l a c e . Even wh i le a great f a i l u r e 
of the B r i t i s h , t h i s i n c i d e n t was 
a l s o a lesson f o r them. They 
understood tha t in I r a n , t h e i r t r u e 
opponent was Islam and t h a t the 
people found Islam i n the r e l i g i o u s 
proc lamat ions of t h e i r clergymen and 
64 
not i n the k i n g ' s c o u r t s ' . 
63. Hamid Algar, op.cit.. p. 211 
64. Masih Muhajeri, Islamic Revolution Future Path of the 
Nations (Tehran, 1982), p. 1. 
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Tabriz became the chief centre of the riot . 
The placards of the Tobacco Corporation were destroyed and 
replaced by the revolutionary proclamation. The Shah 
invited the Russian government to restore order in Tabriz 
but the Russians also cleverly supported the abolition of 
the concession. Although the Shah ' endeavoured to 
temporize by encouraging an idea suggested by the Regie that 
Persian should be employed by it instead of foreigners in 
65 
Tabriz and throughout the province of 'Azarbayjan'. The idea 
was rejected by the Tabriziz who wanted nothing except the 
immediate abolition of the Regie. Since the movement turned 
into an anti-foreign movement it became more Islamic because 
66 
patriotism was a part of religious sentiment. The act of 
the people in Tabriz encouraged the people in other cities 
particularly Isfahan and Shiraz to follow the same cause. 
The popular movement was very active when Hajji Mirza Hasan 
Shirazi wrote a letter to the Shah proving that in granting 
concession to the foreigner it was contrary to Durban and 
against the spirit of Islam. 
65. E.G. Browne, op.cit.. p. 51. 
66. Encvcl opaedia of Islam (N.ed.), art. 'Kawmiyya' 
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Dr. Feuvrier says: 
'The Shah, 'whether unwilling to change his 
habits, or in order to escape from his nightmare the Tobacco 
Question', decided to go for a tour in the country 
surrounding the capital , leaving the ftminu's-Sul t^an to deal 
with the situation in Tihran, where the "strom had began to 
growl"; nor would he return at the request of the Russian 
Minister, who "regarded the moment as critical, and 
considered that there was ground to fear for the 1ives of 
68 
the Europeans'. 
The clerics came together to discuss the 
matter of tobacco monopoly on December 19, 1891 at the house 
69 
of Kamran Mirza Na'ib us-Sultana. In the meeting it was 
suggested that they should declare the use of tobacco 
70 
permissible but Abdullah Bihbihani still asserted not to 
follow the fatva. It was evident that he did not consider 
Mirza Hasan Shirazi an a'lam (most learned) and thus worthy 
of tag!id. The meeting then ended with confusion when 
Sayyid 'Al i Akbar Tafrashi accused Bihbihani of having been 
bribed. Finally, in order to compromise, the concession was 
67. A French physician brought by Nasir al-Din Shah on 
September 13, 1889. 
68. E.G. Browne, op.cit.. p. 53. 
69. The son of Nasir al-Din Shah. 
70. Celebrated popular leader, one of the three founders of 
the constitutional movement. The other two important 
leaders of constitutional movement were Shaykh Fazlullah 
and Sayyid Muhammad Tabataba'i. 
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limited to the export of tobacco but the clerics, who were 
not satisfied wanted to continue the boycott and Shirazi 
confirmed that action. 
In order to break the boycott Mirza Hasan 
Ashtiani was threatened by the Shah of banishment from 
Tehran if he did not agree to contradict the prohibiting 
fatva Nasir al-Din Shah wrote a letter to him with violent 
tone saying: 
'Have you decided on demagogy ? Or 
do you want to add 1ustre to your 
position by, instead of praising the 
government and its leaders in your 
circles and assemblies, speaking 
against it ? I thought you a poor, 
disinterested mulla, loyal to the 
government. Now I see that on the 
contrary you are following the 
example of the mujtahid of Tabriz 
(i.e. Mirza Aga Javad) and Aga 
Najafi. Do you know that one may 
rise against the government ?' 
71 
The effort aimed at breaking the power of the 
clerics and then forcing them to reverse the fatva led to 
popular anger and a voilent form of opposition. Mirza Hasan 
72 
Ashtiani did not agree to declare the use of tobacco 
permissible and prepared himself to leave Iran, but his 
departure was prevented by his followers when they heard his 
71. Ibrahim Taymuri, Tahrim-i-Tanbaku ya Avvalin. Maqavamat-
i Manfi dar Iran (Tehran 1328 Sh./1949), p. 170, cited 
by Hamid Algar, p. 214. 
72. Among the famous 'ulama' of Persia one was Mirza Hasan 
Ashtiani, a pupil of Shaykh Murtada Ansari. 
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plan to leave. The market was closed and the citadel was 
encircled by 4,000 people led by a Sayyid. They surrounded 
the Shah, raised angry slogan and threw stones. The troops 
then started ^^ iring as a result of which many including the 
Sayyid , fel 1 . 
It is interesting to note that Mirza Hasan 
Ashtiani who was now threatening to leave the capital was 
requested by the Shah to stay because fearing that the 
attack may happen again. The Shah sent a diamond ring as a 
sign of reconciliation to Mirsa Hasan 'Ashtiani but he did 
not accept it till he was assured that the tobacco 
concession would be stopped, 'by the issue on the part of 
the director of a declaration formally stating that the 
Monopoly was at an end, and inviting those who had sold 
tobacco to the Regie to come and reclaim it. But it was not 
until January 26 that the public crier announced in the 
streets the definite withdrawal of the mul1 as' interdict on 
smoking, an announcement received with universal joy. Two 
days later some forty of the empioyes of the late Imperial 
Tobacco Corporation, their occupation gone, started for 
73 
their homes'. 
The tobacco concession of 1890 ended but 
not its consequences. The clerics exploited it fully. It 
73. E.G. Browne, op.cit., p. 54. 
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gave rise to their predominant role in the political 1 i-fe o-f 
Iran. However, the clerics were not seriously interested in 
undermining the Qajar dynasty. Instead, they were inclined 
to retain the ruler. But this cooperation was not based on 
•firm understanding. Regarding the Tobacco Concession Nikki 
R. Keddie writes: 'The immediate victory of the anti-
concession movement proved to be, its results wiere far-
reaching. Iranians saw for the first time that it was 
possible to win out against the Shah and foreign interests. 
The strange and unstable coalition of Ulama, nationalists, 
discontented merchants and city populations, and powerful 
domestic and foreign interests who were opposed to the 
government of the moment did not disappear after the tobacco 
movement. Although some of the 'ulama were influenced or 
bribed into changing their hostile attitude, and some 
leaders died not long after the tobacco movement, and the 
British replaced the Russians as the country out of favor 
with the government, there is a direct line from the 
coalition which participated in the tobacco movement, 
through various lesser movements of the following fifteen 
74 
years, and culminating in the Constitutional Revolution'. 
74. Nikki R. Keddie, Rel igion and Rebel 1 ion in ;Iran j. The 
Tobacco Protest of 1891-1892. p. 131. 
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As it is clear from the above discussion the 
movement which opposed the Qajar monarchy was known as the 
Constitutional Revolution. The reign of liuza-ffar al-Din 
Shah faced the main opposition, which was the result o-f the 
75 
mismanagement o-F Amin us-Sultan and the extravagance o-f 
Nasir al-Din Shah. Such impecuniosity combined with the 
extravagance, compelled the government to take -foreign loans 
which led to the growth of Russian influence. This brought 
the clerics and merchants together against the government. 
The Constitutional Revolution, therefore, had its root in 
the tradition dual role of the clerics. Events led this 
role to be fulfilled with more determination but it also led 
to a clash between the power of clerics and that of the 
state. 
76 
In 1817/1400 Iran, led by Amin us-Sultan, 
entered into an agreement with Russia for a loan of 2.5 
million roubles with 5Z interest to be paid back within 
seventy five years. Along with this agreement Russian also 
posed a condition that Iran should not take loan from any 
other country unless the amount was repaid. This agreement 
made Iran almost under the complete dominance of the foreign 
75. Abdul -Husayn Mirza Farmanfarma took the post of sadr-i 
a'zatm which was previously occupied by Amin us-Sultan on 
Jumadi ul-Ukhra 17, 1314/November 24, 1896. When the 
office again became vacant as a result of the 
resignation of Amin ud-Daula, Amin us-Sult»n regained 
the office. 
76. On Amin us-Sultan see Nikki R. Keddie 'The assassination 
of the Amin us-Sultan <Atabak-i A'zam) 31 August 1907' 
in Iran and Islam. pp. 315-330. 
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•financial influence. The traders and clerics therefore, 
rose against the Shah when they knew that he spent the 
77 
loaned money extravagantly in his trip to Europe. Although 
the clerics were not successful in stopping the Russian 
loan, but their opposition against Amin us-Sultan who was 
the Prime Minister and his policies during the Shah's absence 
was strong. Those who tried to topple Amin us-Sultan in 
Tehran were Aga Sayyid 'Ali Akbar Tafrashi, Sayyid Muhammad 
Tabatabai and Mirza Abu-i-Qasim Tabataba'i. The serious 
opposition first started in the provinces. 
In the history of modern Iran, one of the most 
significant events was the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-
09 since all the segments of Iranian society were involved in 
it. 'New intellectual currents coming through diplomacy, 
travel, trade. Islamic modernist movements outside Persia, 
and education also contributed to this development, and to 
the progressive dissolution of the old institutions of 
government and society. Little by little a new system of 
government was worked out and the people who were to work it 
came to the fore. In the last ten years or so of the 19 
century these trends were accelerated and reached their 
climax with the grant of the constitution in 1906 and the 
77. Ibid., p. 226. 
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78 
supplementary Fundamental Laws in 1907. As Ervan Abrahamain 
has pointed out, the Revolution 'ended the traditional system 
of government in which the Shah, as the shadow of God on 
Earth, ruled his people without any legal and institutional 
1 imitations and it introduced the constitutional system of 
government in which "the people" were sovereign, and their 
elected representative made and unmade ministers, laws, 
budgets, concessions and foreign treaties. In this 
revolution the political crowd played a prominent role. An 
organized procession in April 1905 raised the issue whether 
the Shah could freely choose his administrators. A larger 
assembly, nine months later, initiated the demand to limit 
the monarch's arbitrary powers by creating a "House of 
Justice". Spontaneous riots in June 1906, and the killing 
of demonstrators, poured a stream of blood into the wide gap 
79 
between the government (dawlat) and the nation (mill at)'. 
When Nasir al-Din Shah was assassinated in 
80 
1896 by Mirza Rida Kirmani, his son, Muzaffar al-Din Shah, 
who was ailing ascended the throne. liuzaffar al-Din Shah 
dismissed Amin us-Sultan who was the Prime Minister during 
his father's time and appointed Amin al-Daula as the Prime 
Minister in 1897. He served as Prime Minister for fourteen 
78. Encyclopaedia of Isi am, (N.ed.), art. 'Kadjar'. 
79. Abrahamain Ervand, The Crowd in the Persian Revolution', 
Iranian Studies. Vol II, no.4 (1969), p.l. 
80. After the death of Nasir al-Din Shah in 1896 through 
being shot by Mirza Kirmani, Iran fell in the condition 
of poverty, corruption and anarchy which continued in the 
new regime. The clerics's political influence then 
enhanced. 
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months. He obtained the Shah's approval -for a cowncil of 
high officials (a'van-i dawlati) to introduce reforms in the 
country. He 'engaged Belgium experts to replace ta^-formers 
Bl 
in the custom administration and sought foreign loan without 
political strings'. As Muzaffar al-Din Shah was not keeping 
good health, the doctor advised him to try the effect of 
mineral water in Europe. But to go to Europe, money was 
necessary and efforts were made to get a loan of 1,000,000 
Pound Sterling from London. This plan which later on 
resulted in the dismissal of Amin al-Daula and the return of 
Amin US-Sultan as the Prime Minister, could not be fulfilled. 
However, an agreement on loan from Russia was completed on 
January, 1900. This agreement made the government of Iran an 
instrument in the hand of Russia. In the trip to Europe the 
Shah and his courtiers spend the loan profusely. The rumour 
of the second loan from Russia was heard in London in March 
1902. The amount of the loan was 10,000 rouble with 4% 
interest. The loan was actually paid in April, 1902. Russia 
after giving this loan had been granted to build a new road 
from Jul fa to Tehran via Tabriz and Qazvin. Muzaffar al-Din, 
after receiving the money went again to Europe and reached 
England on August 17, 1902. 
Iranian people considered that the Shah had 
mortgaged their country to the foreigners. Therefore, there 
arose the anti-government feelings throughout the country. A 
81. F.R.C. Begley 'New light on the Iranians constitutional 
movement' QaJar Iran., p. 49. 
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number o-f secret societies were ^ o^rmed. 'From 1894 to 1900, 
British policy generally remained -favourable to the Amin os-
Sultan and always hostile towards the ulama led opposition, 
even though the -former led Iran into increasing siAjservience 
to the Russians, while the 1atter were now inclined to co-
82 
operate with the British' . 
In January 1903 the Shah dismissed Aynu'd-Dawla 
who was considered to be under British in-fluence -from the 
post of the governor of Tehran but appointed him governor of 
83 
Arbistan to assuage the strong feelings of the people. Right 
from the time of the first Russian loan, there appeared in 
Persian newspapers pub!ished outside Iran, such as Hablu'l 
84 
Matin of Calcutta and Thurayya (1898) of Cairo, the article 
attacking Atabak movement. At least one of these secret 
85 86 
societies Azali Babi members publicised the evil result of 
Persian loan by sending the articles out of the country and 
also to the Foreign Ministers of European countries. 
82. Nikki R. Keddie, 'Iranian Politics 1900-1905; Background 
to Revolution I 'Middl e East St tidies. Vol . V, no. 1 
(1969), p.4. 
S3. E.G. Browne, op.cit., p. 105. 
8 4 . Publ ished by Sayyid Ja la l a l - D i n Mu'ayyid a l - I s l a m who i s 
an a c t i v e r e v o l u t i o n ' s l eade r . 
8 5 . Name given to those Bab i s who fo l l owed Miraa Yahya, 
c a l l e d Subh-i Azal a f t e r the death of t he Bab. 
8 6 . The des igna t ion of the f o l l o w e r s of Bab who however 
p r e f e r t o c a l l themselve a h l - i bayan. 
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In 1900-02 the oppositon could not stop the 
Shah from travelling to Europe nor could they stop the 
Russian loan and the giving of concession to the Russians. 
Part of general dissatisfaction came from the new custom 
regulation and the Belgian control. Apart from these there 
was growing opposition also against the excessiveness of the 
court, the un-Islamic practice of dringking wine. Often it 
led to violent reactions against the non-Muslims and the 
Bab is. 
Part of discontent against the Shah was the 
result of the huge money spent on travel 1ing to Europe and 
against the new rules of customs. To weaken the Russian 
influence and to change the Prime Minister, there developed 
a unity of purpose between the modernists and eVen the 
revolutionary secret societies and the high ranking clerics. 
The dissatisfaction of the people rose up to a terrible 
level on September 15, 1903 as a result of which Amin us-
Sultan had to resign from the post of Prime Minister. 
The Role of the MuJtahids at the Earl y Paft of the 
Constitutional Revolution; 
As it has been rightly pointed out 'the 
'ulama' also played a prominent part in the events leading 
up to the constitutional revolution and largely provided its 
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leadership. This was not due only, or even chiefly, to the 
influence of the Pan-Islamic movement led by Djamal al-Din 
Afghani, though this had a considerable effect, but rather 
to the position of the 'ulama' in society. Under the 
Kadjars the religious institution once more stood over 
against the state and was not wholly incorporated into it. 
The 'ulama' fulfilled certain functions for the government 
and many of them received allowances and pensions from the 
government, which to some extent compromised them, but on 
the whole they were listened to with respect, both by the 
government and the people, from time to time they were able 
to exercise restraint upon the government and to act as 
peacemakers, though they were also sometimes associated with 
movements leading to outbreaks of violence in the cities. 
In the last resort, they provided a refuge for the people 
against injustice, and the people looked to them for 
87 
protection and the fulfilment of their aspirations'. 
From the time of the appointment of 'Ayn-ud-
Daula as sadr-i-a'zam in Rajab 1321/September - October, 
1903, upto the mass migration of the clerics from Tehran, 
there were many oppositions to the state as well as among 
the clerics. 'Anyn ud-Daula was determined to suppress the 
87. Encycl opaedia of Islam (N. ed.) , art. 'Kadjar' . 
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:leni< powar of the clerics. But this united the c cf and the 
people, particularly the merchants, together. This was very 
clear during the first months of the 'Ayn-ud-Daula's 
office. The tul1ab of the Muhammadiya Madrasa fought with 
those from the sadr madrasas over the rich auqaf. ipam jum/a 
88 
of Tehran, Mirsa Abu-I-Qasim, took advantage of the 
situation to avenge the insult to his father at the hands of 
Sayyid 'Abdullah Bihbihani who had given shelter to one of 
the tullab and by doing so had aroused the hostility of the 
opposite party which was supported by Mirza Abul-I-Oasim. A 
89 
number of tul1ab were arrested and banished to Ardabil by 
'Ayn-ud-Daula. This gave a new direction to the 
disturbances. The majority of the Tehran clerics considered 
the treatment meted out to the tul1ab as an indirect threat 
90 
to themselves. Although the matter came from personal 
rivalry, it developed to take the form of a challenge of the 
clerical power to that of the state. In the ensuing period 
91 
the conflict between the state and clerics became sharper. 
Later incidents helped to strengthen the alliance of the 
88. In 1213/1846-1847 near the end of Muhammad Shah's reign 
Mirza Abu-1-Qasim gained the post of imam Jurn'a as a 
successor of Mir Muhammad Mahdi, his uncle and father-
in-law. 
89. Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-i Mashruta-yi Iran 5th imp. 
Tehran, 1340 Sh./1961, p. 34, cited by Hamid Algar, 
State and Religion in Iran, p. 241. 
90. Nazim u1-Islam Kirmani, Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian New 
ed. (Tehran 1332 Sh./1953), p. 138, cited by Hamid 
Algar, Ibid . 
91. Hamid Algar, op.cit.. pp. 241-242. 
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clerics and the merchants and this made the constitutional 
92 -
movement as much nationalist as constitutionalist. An end 
was demanded o-f the monarchy as tyranny as wel 1 as of the 
foreign interest which harmed the national economic 1ife 
directed by the monarch. 
The rivalry between Amin-us-Sultan, the 
predecessor and rival of 'Ayn-ud-Daula and 'Ayn ud~Daul a 
himself further influenced the actions of the clerics. Amin 
US-US-Sultan's agency, Muhammad Taqi Khan, produced a 
photograph of Naus, the Belgian Minister of Customs Tariff 
who favoured Russia and being appointed Minister of Post and 
Telegraphs, dress as a mullah in a fancy-dress ball . The 
clerics felt that it meant the insulting of their dignity so 
they expressed their protest in religious term centering on 
93 
the objectionable photograph of Naus. The protest was in 
vain but it extended to a new protest that was against the 
92. On Constitutional Revolution there are standard works 
such as those of E.G. Browne, The Persian Revolution of 
1905-1906 (Cambridge University, 1966); Mahdi Maliksada, 
Tarikh-i Inqilab-i Mashrutiyat-i Iran (Tehran 1327 
Sh/194S-1949), 6 Vols; Ahmad Kasravi, Tarikh-i Mashruta-
y.,L Ii"an. 5th imp. (Tehran, 1340 Sh/1961); Nasimu ul ~ 
Islam Kirmani, Tarikh-i Bidari-yi Iranian. 
93. The clerics, merchants, and modernists came together in 
opposition to Naus when he dressed himself as a mullah 
in the custom ball and his photograph was taken by 
Sayyid 'Abdullah Bihbihani. A large number of clerics 
planned together to remove Naus. Small cards attached 
with Naus' photograph were distributed with the 
sentence '0 'Muslim! Islam is dead and infidelity is up. 
The sovereign is Naus, the Vizier is Lavers (another 
Belgian)and the stateman Christian it is end". 
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in-fluence of Belgium and Russia in the economic life of Iran 
since Naus was appointed as the Minister of Custom. 
Shortly before Musaffar al-Din left to Europe 
for the third time in June - July, 1905, the merchants of 
Tehran closed the market. The Crown Prince, Muhammad 'Ali 
Mirza could stop the disturbance only with the aid of Sayyid 
94 
'Abdullah Bihbihani. The necessity of using the influence 
of Bihbihani showed clearly the cooperation between the 
clerics and the merchants in their opposition to the 
government. In early 1905, the situation became more 
serious with the coming from Mashhad of Shaykh Barini who 
95 
preached against the Shavkhis despite the fact Kirman was 
the centre of Shavkhis. Mirza Muhammad Rida, one of the 
clerics of Kirman also declared that the Shavkhis were 
'unclean', so he tried to take over one of the masques and 
its auqaf from the hands of the Shavkhis. This caused 
fighting between the troops of the governor of Kirman and 
his followers. The clerics sided with liirza Muhammad Rida 
and called for the dismissal of the governor. 
94. One of the religious leaders was in forefront 
in the struggle for the constitution. 
95. The founder of the Shaykhivva movement was Shaykh Ahmad 
Ahsai who believed only in spiritual resurrection. He 
gave mystical and spiritual meaning to the shari'a in 
expounding his doctrine. He also believed that the 
twelfth Imam lived only spiritually and he might 
reappear near the Day of Judgement. 
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Shaykh Muhammad Rida was one among those who 
were banished from the city. The disrespect-ful activities 
shown to the clerics of Kirman helped strengthening the 
clerical opposition against the government. Another impor-
tant event was the discovery of a number of corpse of the 
men died due to the cholera epidemic secretly burried in the 
96 
disused graveyard near the half-finished building of a 
97 
Russian Bank. The workers disposed the bodies down a well 
and this unrespectful action toward the dead aroused the 
anger of the clerics. A mob of the tul1ab led by a cleric 
named Mirza Mustafa tried to destroy the building. Here the 
use of pretext, well chosen, to arouse agitation against the 
government and the foreigners can again be seen. The ill 
treatment gave a chance to the clerics to agitate. The 
people, led by the clerics gathering in the MasJid-i-Shah 
were dispersed by the forces ordered by 'Ayn-ud-Daula. The 
use of force and bribe was the character of Ayn-ud-Daula's 
policy towards the clerics but it was ineffective. 
The importance of the clerics came from their 
ability to mobilize supports which they had drawn from their 
theological students as well as the urban masses. On 23 
98 
November 1905 there took place an alliance between the two 
99 
most celebrated clerics of Tehran. Sayyid 'Abdullah 
96. Ahmad Kasravi, op. cit. p. 56, cited by l-temid Algar, 
p.245 
97. Ibid.. cited by Hamid Algar, Ibid. 
98. Ibid.. p. 49, cited by Hamid Algar, p. 244. 
99. Malcom E. Yapp' 1900-1921; The Last Year of the Qajar 
Dynasty', in Twentieth Century Iran, ed. Husain Amir 
Sadeghi (London, 1977), p. 7. 
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Bihbihani and Sayyid Nuhammad Tabataba'i. Both the clerics 
100 
were considered by the historian Kasravi as the precursers 
of the Constitutional Revolution. These two men, especially 
the latter, acted as the leaders of the constitutional 
mavement. Their large following forced the government to 
submit to the demands of the clerics. 
The clerics who had left Tehran after the riot at 
the Masjid~i-Shah on the suggestion of Sayyid Tabataba'i and 
had taken shelter at the sanctuary of Shah, 'Abdul-ul-Asim 
gathered there and formulated their demands and submitted 
them to Muzaffar al-Din Shah. Among those demands one was 
for the establishment of the "house of justice" (adalat-
khana). 
There was, however, a doubt concerning the 
source of this demand whether it was made by the secret 
100. Ahmad Kasravi was an Iranian secular nationalist 
thinker. He was assassinated in 1945. 'Born on 29 
September 1890 and educated in Tabriz, he entered the 
theological profession in 1910, but soon left it 
because of his 1iberal ideas and modernistic 
tendencies. In 1919, he entered the Ministry of 
justice, which he left in 1929 to practise law, soon 
after returning a verdict against Rida Shah's royal 
court in favour of a group of peasants. He also taught 
history in the University of Tehran, which he left in 
1934 on an issue involving academic freedom. 
'Kasrawi wrote several books on history and on 
language and linguistics. Among these are history of 
the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, in which he had 
been a participant.' Encyclopaedia of Is!am (N.ed.) , 
art. 'Kasrawi Tabrizi', Kasravi and his disciples had 
condemned the 'ulama' opposition to Reza Shah as a 
'reactionary mixture of fanaticism, superstition and 
corruption. He later on was assassinated by the 
Fedavan-e Islafn. On Kasravi see Ahmad Kasravi 
Zindigani-yi man (Tehran 1945) ; Yahya Dhuka, Cihil 
makala-yi Kasrawi. Tehran 1956. Abrahamain Ervan 
'Kasravi: the integrative nationalist of Iran Middle 
Eastern Studies. Vol .IX (1973), pp. 271-295. 
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s o c i e t i e s working to es tabl i sh the const i tu t ional regime or 
by the c l e r i c s who rea l ly believed in the s ta tus-quo. This 
doubt was widespread and led to the emergence o-f pressure 
•from many direct ion exerted on the c l e r i c s . 'Ayn ud-Daul a 
t r i e d to divide the leadership of the c l e r i c s but i t was in 
vain. 
Bihbihani and Tabatabai returned to Tehran. 
They were received by the clerics with great rejoicing. The 
use of violence by the government -further aroused the demand 
for a constitution. Initially 'Ayn ud-Daul a promised 
Tabatabai to establish the 'adalat khana as soon as 
possible. But when he did not fulfil the promise, 
Tabataba'i began to demand openly the establishment of 
Majl is (the consultative assembly). 'Ayn ud-E«aul a again 
used violence to suppress the protest of the clerics. Many 
101. In 1905, a group called the Andjuman-i-Makhfi (the 
secret Society) was formed. Its membership was mainly 
drawn from the religious classes. It, too, was 
concerned to restrain corruption on the one hand, and 
curtail foreign intervention in the affairs of Persia 
on the other. It was both nationalist and Islamic. It 
is clear from its proceedings as recorded in the 
Ta'rikh-i-Bidari-i Iranivan by Nazim al-Islam-i Kirmani 
(Tehran, 2nd edition, n.d.) that its members were 
convinced that the despotism and the tyranny of 
government on the one hand and the possibil ity of 
intervention by Great Britain and Russia on the other 
constituted a threat to Islam, and secondly they 
believed that all the ills of the country could be 
cured by education'. Encvcl opaedia of, Islam (N. ed.) , 
art 'DJam'iyya'. 'The greatest influence on Iranian 
nationalism was the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05, 
which indeed had far-reaching effects on the rise of 
nationalism throughout Asia' Amin Banain op.cit., p. 9. 
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persons were killed especially in Shiraz and Mashhad. This 
added to the feeling of religious hostil ity against the 
government. In Tehran, one of Bihbihani's followers was 
killed by the order of Ayn-ud-Daula and many prominent 
clerics were arrested for the charge of preaching against 
the government. 'Public opinion, stirred up by 
denunciations of the despotism and tyranny from the minbar 
of the mosques by Aka Sayyid Djamal and others, and the 
efforst of secret and semi-secret societies, which attacked 
the despotism and endeavoured to spread modernist ideas, 
became increasingly roused. 'Ayn al-Dawla expelled Aka 
Sayyid Djamal and another preacher, Shaykh Muhammad, from 
102 
the city'. The clerics in Tehran then gathered in a mosque 
and declared that they would not leave the capital unless 
the 'adalat khana was established. They also demanded the 
dismissal of 'Ayn ud-Daula. In July 15, about a thousand of 
clerics migrated to Qum. The merchants of Tehran who were 
protesting against the government asked for the help of the 
British embassy. 
103 
These merchants with the aid of Grand Duff , 
the British charge d'affairs, submitted a demand to the Shah 
102. Encvcl opaedia of Islam (N.ed.), art 'dustur'. 
103. 'Ayn ud-Dawla, on July 19 forced the markets to be 
opened. Some representatives of merchants and bankers 
asked Grant Duff, the British charge d 'affairs at 
Qulhak whether they would be allowed to take shelter at 
the British legation. 'Mr. Grant Duff expressed the 
hope that they would not have recourse to such 
expedient, but he said it was not his power, in view of 
the acknowledged custom in persia and the immorral 
right of bast, to use force to expel them if they 
came'. Ahrahamain Ervan, op.cit., p. 133. 
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t h a t the c l e r i c s be al lowed t o r e t u r n t o Tehran, t h a t 'Ayn 
ud-Daul a be d ismissed, and t h a t a l i a j l i s be e s t a b l i s h e d . 
'Ayn ud-Daul a t r i e d t o delay as be-fore, but on J u l y 2 9 , 1906 
he r e s i g n e d . A week l a t e r a decree was issued -for the 
estab l ishment o-f the MaJl i s . In the words of Mai com E. 
Yapp; 
'The I ran ian c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
r e v o l u t i o n o-f 1906 must be one o-f t h e 
most s i n g u l a r o-f a l l democrat ic 
r e v o l u t i o n s . I t was organized by a 
t r a d i t i o n a l group using t r a d i t i o n a l 
methods i n the name of t r a d i t i o n a l goa ls 
- the ending of misgovernment and a 
r e t u r n t o the s h a r i ' a . . . Q a j a r depot ism 
broke down p a r t l y because i t was 
a r b i t r a r y but c h i e f l y because i t was 
i m p o t e n t ' . 
104 
The meaning of the mashruta ( c o n s t i t u t i o n ) 
and l e g i s l a t i v e body were s t i l l obscure t o t h e c l e r i c s . 
They had not r e a l i s e d f u l l y t h a t by the estab l ishment of the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l r o l e in soc ie t y would 
d e c l i n e . But t h e i r r o l e had f o r a long t ime been eroded due 
104. Malcom E. Yapp, o p . c i t . . p . 8 . 
105. For an account of the c o n s t i t u t i o n movement see a l so 
Abdul-Hadi H a i r i , Sh i ' i sm and C o n s t i t u t i o n a l ism i n I r a n 
<Leiden E . J . B r i l l , 1977); Abrahamian Ervan. 'The Crowd 
i n the Persian R e v o l u t i o n ' . I S . I I (1969)5 F i r i d u n 
Adamiyyat, F i k r - i Azadi va riuqaddimah-vjl Nahda t - i 
Mashrut ivvat (The Idea of Freedom and t he Background t o 
t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Movement.) (Tehran 1961); Dar iyush 
Ashur i and Rahim Ra isn i ya , Zaminah-yi I c i t i s a d i va 
I j t i m a ' i - y i I n q i l a b - i Mash-rut j i y ya t - i I ran (Economic 
and soc ia l Foundation of the Pers ian C o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
R e v o l u t i o n ) , Tehran, 1950. 
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to various measures taken by the government. The meaning o-f 
constitutional government was clear only to few important 
supporters, even then all o-f them thought that 
constitutional government would solve the crisis through 
which Iran was passing. It was generally believed that: 
'a sense of intolerable 
injustice or tyranny (zulm) which 
had eventual 1y provoked the 
nationalist to action and the aims 
of the movement had never been 
clearly formulated. The general aim 
was simply the establishment of the 
rule of justice ('adalat) which, in 
the tradition of medieval Islam, 
they saw to be the basis of good 
government, rather than the 
establishment of constitutional 
government and representative 
institution'. 
107 
Although we cannot ascertain the real beliefs 
108 
of those clerics who took part in the secret societies but 
it can be seen that they differed from the general religious 
class on the question of reform and modernisation. At the 
109 
beginning of 1907 there occurred a clash between the Shari ^ a 
106. Robert A. Mc. Daniel, The Shuster Mission and the 
Persian Constitutional Revolution (Menneapolis, 
Bibliotheca Isl arnica, 1974), p. 57. 
107. Encyclopaedia of Isl^m (N.ed.) art 'Dustur' . 
108. See above, p. 112. 
109. The law of Islam. 
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and the constitutional supporters. Shaykh Fazlultah Nuri 
and his followers suggested that the constitutionalism did 
not con-form with Islam, while several clerics pointed out 
that the constitutional government was not against religion 
but in fact it was enjoined by Islam. Such ideas became 
dominant among Iranian clerics. 
A1gar writes that 'the agitation leading to 
the granting of the constitution was largely inspired and 
directed by the ulama. They might legitimately have 
expected from its realization a systematic appl ication of 
Islamic law, and hence an expansion or at least perpetuation 
of their function, but little if any thought was in fact 
given to their role in a constitutional system of 
government. While the secret societies in part consisted of 
ulama and were based in part on Islamic ideology, they 
contained also men opposed to clerical influence, who did 
110 
not intend to apply the common shari'at'. 
Right from the creation of the Qajar dynasty 
(1717-1925) upto then, the clerics had been against the 
111 
central government Malkam Khan (d. 1936) a liberal reformer 
accepted that it was only the clerics who could arouse the 
Iranian masses and bring about the change . 
IIO' Ibid., p. 255. 
111. Mirza Malkam Khan was born in Jul fa, Isfahan, in 
1249/1833-4. He was converted to Islam and became a 
translator to the Russian legation. He first studied 
at the Armanian school and then at the Pol ytechnique, 
'where he became acquainted with the writings of the 
18th century French Political theorists especially 
the works of August© Comte (d. 1857). 
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Muhammad Husavn Na^ ini; 
In the constitutional Revolution one of the clerics 
112 
who played an important role was Muhammad Husayn Na'ini (d. 
1936) Na'ini who was a leading scholar of Islamic Science 
and was considered as one o-f the most learned Shi' i 
113 
mujtahids. He was one of the clerics who opposed absolutism 
and defended the idea of constitution from the point of view 
114 
O'f the Shari 'a. but he was also influenced by secular ideas 
of the west. He base his argument on the Sunnah of the 
Prophet and the tradition of the Imams. He had some 
112. For a detailed analysis of the life and thought of 
Na'ini see Mirza Muhammad Husayn Na'ini.Tanbih al-Ummah 
wa, Tanzih al, Mil 1 ah (The Admonition and Refinement of 
the People) Baghdad, 1909, Second edition: (Tehran, 
1910). Third edition: Introduced and annototed by 
Sayyid Mahmud Talliqani. (Tehran, 1955); Mirza 
Muhammad Husayn, Na'ini,'Al-Istibadad wa'al-
Dimuqratiyyah' (Despotism and Democracy). Translated 
from Persian into Arabic by Sal ih Ja'fari Al 'Irfan XX 
(1930), 43-46, 172-80, 432-38 and XXI (1931), 45-52, 
534-52, Na'ini, Mahdi Ayatul1ah-Zadah, 'Sharh-i 
Zindigani-yi Marhum~i-Ayah Allah Na'ini A'la Allah 
Maqamahu' (A Biography of the Late Sign of God, Na'ini, 
May Sod Exalt His Place) Na'in-i-Bidar. April 29, 1955; 
Hamid Algar 'The Oppositional Role of the Ul ama in 
Twentieth Century Iran' in Scholars. Saints and Sufis; 
Shahrough Akhavi, Religion and Politics in Contemporary 
Iran; CIergy - state relations in the Pahlavi Period. 
113. Feresteh M Nouraie 'The Constitutional Ideas of A 
Shi'ite Mujtahid: Muhammad Husayn Na'ini Iranian 
Studies. Vol. VIII, (1975), p. 235. 
114. Na'ini's important Persian treatise Tanbih al-Ummah ya 
Tanzih al -Mil 1 ah ""The Admonition and Refinement of the 
People' including a muqaddimah (Preface), five chapters 
and a Khatimah (Appendix) was published for the first 
time in Baghdad in 1328 (1909) and again in Tehran in 
1374 (1955). This treatise throws light on the socio-
political attitudes of the religious class in Iran 
during the period. 
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knowledge of European constitutional theory. He talked o-f 
the need to resist the aggression o-f Western countries. 
Na'ini believed that any society which wanted to survive 
must depend on some kind of government, whether it was 
established by one person or by any assembly, by right or by 
force, by inheritance or election. He held that the state 
had two functions to perform: One was to educate the 
community of the be!ievers to preserve the right of the 
individuals ummah, and the other was to protect the vatan 
(fatherland) against its enemies. Na'ini thus combined 
Islamic and secular concepts and used the terms ummah and 
115 
vatan interchangeably. 'Ayatullah Na'ini had spent his 
young studenthood studying in Isfahan under the aegis of 
116 
Baqir and had witnessed 1atters many cruelties and 
117 
deceptions while he was the city's leading 'flim. 
115. 'After giving some general definitions of government, 
Na'ini distinguishes two kinds of authority: one is a 
government based on arbitrary rule which he terms 
tamalukiyah and istibadiyah (despotic and tyrannical ) , 
where the king considers the mulk (kingdom) as his 
personal property, bears no responsibility for his 
actions, and regards the people as his "chattels" 
Tanbih al-Ummah. p. 8, cited by Feresteh M. Nouraie, p. 
238. Such a ruler squanders the country's revenues for 
his own personal use; raises his favorites to positions 
of power and wealth, confiscates the property of those 
whom he dislikes, and doles out justice as he sees fit. 
He seeks no other aim with respect to the people, but 
to satisfy his own private whims and pleasures. 
Finally, he claims to possess a divine nature and 
considers himself "an incarnate manifestation of God". 
Tanbih al Ummah, p. 10, cited by Feresteh M. Nouraie, 
p . 238-239. 
116. Hajj Shaykh Muhammad Baqir (d. 1883). 
117. Shahrough Akhavi, op . c i t .. p. 41. 
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According to him, during the absence of the 
ideal state of the imamate, the vilayat va amanat 
(trusteeship) type of government was not free from 
corruption and decay because no one could claim himself to 
be infallible. He believed that the coming into eKistence 
of a just ruler could not solve the problems of evil and the 
abuse of powers. In this condition the important question 
w£is not that of who should rule but that of how to establish 
a protective form of political body by which the abuse of 
power would be barred. Na'ini's ideas in this regard 
deserves to be quoted at length: 
'In the absence of the Imam, some other means must be 
found. These are essentially two: a constitution 
defining the rights and duties of the state and its 
subjects and assembly of "the intelligent and wise ones 
of the land and the well-wishers of the people" to 
supervise enactment of the constitution and watch over 
the workings of the state. The constitution must 
contain no provisions contrary to Islam; and the 
asembly, to secure its religious permissibility, must 
include among its members "a number of just mujtabids 
or of those delegated by them, who amend, approve, and 
agree to the decisions taken by it". The assembly as a 
legislative body should concern itself with 'urf iyat , 
that is, matters pertaining to spatially and 
temporally determined circumstances of no interest to, 
and therefore, not legislated by, the shari"a. The 
presence of mujtabids in the Majlis would ensure the 
religious innocuity of all legislation enacted 
concerning these matters. 
This prevention of absolutism, through the 
establishment of a constitution and a popular assembly, 
is a religious duty despite the occultation of the Imam 
and the concomitant withdrawal of legitimacy from the 
earthly plane. The duty of "enjoining the good and 
forbidding the evil" remains with the community at all 
times, and the impossibility of its perfect fulfillment 
does not release the believers from the obligation to 
strive to perform it as fully as possible. 
Manifestations of evil should always be combatted, and 
the political conclusion to be drawn from this is the 
necessity of a constitution. The unfettered rule of a 
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tyrant is productive of limitless evil, while to 
restric the powers o-f a ruler through the institution 
of laws and the exercise of supervision by a popular 
assembly will result in a restriction of the evil that 
flows from his rule. Unrestricted tyranny is a 
usurpation of the attributes of God, as well as a false 
claim to the right to rule. It moreover, robs its 
subjects of their God - given 1iberty and is therefore 
triply reprehensible. Constitutionally limited rule, 
by contrast, does not offend God by unlawfully holding 
absolute power, nor does it usurp men's freedom; it 
stands as usurper only with respect to the Imam and is 
therefore to be preferred'. Hamid Algar, 'The 
Oppositional Role of the Ulama in Twentieth Century 
Iran', pp.239-240. The words Na'ini used in the form 
of government and people was taken mostly from 
kawakibi . only the term mashrutah was added by him. 
Na'ini advised the creation of a constitution 
and a national consultative assembly to protect the public 
118 
interest and the law and also to limit the power of the 
monarch. This consultative assembly would consist of the 
intelligentsia and learned religious men who would protect 
public interest. He had an idea that when the learned 
religious men took part in the political affairs, the 
legislative assembly consisted of them could not be led 
119 
wrongly. According to Na'ini, the constitutional government 
conformed with the principle of Islamic Law. He held the 
118. Tanbih al -Ummah. p. 15, cited by Fereshte li. Nouraie , 
p.240. 
ll*?' Ibid.. cited by Fereshte M. Nouraie, p. 240. 
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view that since the religious law con-formpd with the 
constitution the opposition to the arbitrary rule was an 
obligation and a religious duty -for every Muslim. He cited 
120 
Quranic verses to prove his argument. If it so happened 
that the ruler mismanaged the country and did not perform 
his duties rightly, it was necessary for the Muslim 
community to react and prevent him from his wrong doing. 
Through the use of a constitution and a national legislative 
121 
assembly, such practices could be effectively checked. The 
mujtahids, who were religious and knowledgeable men, 
together with laymen, would be responsible for many duties 
122 
such as supervising the auqaf and protecting the properties 
of minors during the absence of the Imam. 
He kept on insisting that the leadership of 
the community should rest on the mujtahids and the mujtahids 
should participate in political matters. In case the power 
was usurped and the ruler became a usurper, some methods 
must be used to 1imit the exercise of arbitrary power by the 
government. He believed that the arbitrary rule could be 
ended by the establishment of a constitutional assembly 
under the advise of the clerics. Through this way a ruler 
would act only after consulting with the most learned and 
120. Al-Qur 'an, (see for example, 3;104;75l57;9567). 'Enjoin 
what is good and forbid what is evil (amr-i bi'lma'ruf 
wal-nahy an al munkar) . 
121. Ibid.. p. 50, cited by Fereshte M. Nouraie, p. 241. 
122. Religious endowments. 
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intelligent men in the country. He tried to legitimize 
constitutional ism on the basis that there is in it some 
similarities with Islamic Systems. 
'The best means to preserve 
such privileges as a constitutional 
regime and to avoid tyranny is 
immunity to sin, or in-fal 1 ibil ity 
('ismat) on which rulership in the 
religion of us Twelver Shi'ah 
depends. This is true because the 
infallible person possesses God 
given knowledge ('i1m~1 1adunni) and 
all high qualities; he is far from 
animal passions; he does not make 
any mistake. He enjoys other 
qualifications as well, the truth of 
which is beyond mankind's 
apprehension. However, such a 
qualified man, namely the Imam is 
not presently available. One can 
conceive of a highly qualified 
ruler, such as Chosroes with 
advisors such as Buzurgmihr, who 
might establish a rule based on 
supervision, inspection, and 
responsiblity. First of al 1 , 
however, such a rule does not 
guarantee people's liberty and 
equality and their participation in 
public affairs. Second, the 
privileges that people might enjoy 
under such a government are given to 
them out of condescension (tafazzul) 
not because those privileges are the 
people's own right. Third, examples 
of this sort are very rare. 
Therefore, in such circumstances the 
only possibility left to find a 
substitute for the ideal government 
is to choose a constitutional form 
of government, even though the 
latter would still be a usurpation 
c>"^  the Imam's authority'. 
124 
123. Ibid., p. 53, cited by Fereshteh M.Nouraie, p. 241. 
124. Mirza Muhammad Husayn Na'ini, Tanbih. pp. 12-15, cited 
by Abdul-Hadi Hairi , Qp,.ci,t., p. 191. 
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During Na'ini's time there appeared a number 
of absolutist clerics who said that mashruta was un-Islamic 
and accused the constitutionalists of infidelity and 
irrel igiousity. The constitutionalist were attacked on many 
issues such as equality of Muslim and non-Muslim, liberty, 
equality of men and women, changes in the fundamental laws, 
legislation, punishment etc. 'In addition, the new regime 
makes Europe so attractive to Muslim, closes the gate of 
ijtihad. gives the administration of justice to non muJtahid 
judges, and bases the power of the ruler upon the people, 
not upon God. In all these ways, according to Na'ini's 
125 
critics, it violates Islam'. 
In this situation Na'ini payed special 
attention to find out Islamic justification for 
constitutionalism and change. For him the participation of 
clerics in the governmental affairs is necessary because he 
held that the constitution would work rightly only if it was 
checked by religion. It is interesting to remember that the 
protection of constitutionalism made by Na'ini was important 
because it was for the first time that a prominent mujtahid 
stated a position of the Shi'i in relation to 
constitutional ism. 
125. Abdul Hadi Hairi, op.cit.. p. 192 
124 Cchapter-II] 
Saw id Muhammad Tabataba^ i and other U^1 ama* t 
It is generally known that during the time o-f 
Constitutional Revolution there were three mujtahids who 
were considered to be 'Founders' o-f the constitutional 
movement namely, Shaykh Fazlu'llah, Sayyid 'Abdullah and 
Sayyid Muhammad tabataba'i. In the academic field, 
126 
Tabataba'i was considered to be superior. Tabataba'i paid 
much attention to the people as he asked the Shah and his 
Sad-i-A'z am to establish a maJl is where the people's a-f fairs 
could be settled. He wrote: 
"The removal of these corruption 
depends on the foundation of an assembl y 
and the union of the government with the 
people and the ulama. Reform will soon 
take place, but we want our King and 
Chief Minister to carry them out, not the 
Russians, the British, or the Ottomans. 
With some slight carelessness and delay, 
we will lose Iran. Iran is my country 5 
whatever reputation I have belongs to 
this country; my service to Islam is in 
this place; the respect I enjoy depends 
on the existence of this state. But 
unfortunately, I see it falling into the 
hands of the foreigners. Therefore, as 
126. E.G. Browne, op .cit., p. 113. 
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long as I am alive I will make my efforts 
to protects it and, i-f necessary. I will 
127 
sacrifice my life for it". "We have not 
demanded anything from government but 
justice. Our aim is to establish an 
assembly by which we may find out how 
much our helpless people suffer from the 
oppressive provincial governments. We 
want justice, the execution of Islamic 
law, and an assembly in which the king 
and the poor may be treated according to 
the law. We do not talk about 
12B 
constitutionalism and republicanism". 
From this statement of Tabataba'i we can see 
why he opposed the regime. His aim was not to fight for a 
constitution as he knew that Iran in his time was not 
suitable for the constitutional type of government. The 
reason behind this was that people were not prepared for it. 
They were illiterate and nationalism had not been understood 
129 
by them . 
127. Ahmad Kasravi, Mashrutah. pp. 81-82, cited by Abdul-
Hadi Hairi, op.cit., p. 84. 
128. Muhammad Nazim a1-Islam Kirmani, Tarikh-j Bidari-yi 
Iranjyan (A History of the Persian Awakening). (Tehran, 
1953 and Part II, Tehran, 1970), p. 381, cited by 
Abdul-Hadi Hairi, op.cit. 
129. Abdul-Hadi Hairi, op.cit . 
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Later on Muhammad 'Ali Shah who received the 
support from the Russian troops, tried to diminish the 
Persian Constitution. The Shah himsel-f was considered by 
the clerics as an infidel who helped other in-fidels. In 
this period the Iraqi clerics took part in opposing the Shah 
and the Russian troops. Other Iranian clerics who supported 
constitutionalism and opposed the Shah then appeared. There 
attention was to sweep out the tyrant ruler and the Russian 
troops -from the land of Islam. The other Iraqi clerics who 
supported constitutionalism at the beginning were Isma'il 
Sadr, Mirza Muhammad Taqi Shirazi and Sayyid Kasim Yazdi. 
The role of Iraqi clerics became stronger 
when in 1909, Khurasani together with almost all the clerics 
of Najaf, went to declare a campaign in Karbala. They 
returned to Najaf only after the constitutionalist troops of 
Gil an and Isfahan got victory and reached Iran- Muhammad 
'Ali Shah fled to the Russian Embassy. The Anglo-Russian 
attempt to stop the revolution failed while the efforts of 
the clerics to remove the Russian troops and expel Muhammad 
Shah still went on. At last the British and the Russian 
submitted to the demand of the constitutionalists. One of 
the reasons was that "the Russian wanted to avert the 
serious difficulties which could have been created by the 
Persian 'ulama' of Iraq among the people, especially the 
130 
Musiim subjects of Russia" and that the victory of the 
constitutionalists was not going to put an end to- Russian 
influence in Iran. 
130. Abdul-Hadi Hairi op.cit., p. 98. 
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In Khurasani's l e t t e r i t mentioned tha t 'our 
aim i n t a k i n g such t r o u b l e i s t o b r i n g a c o m f o r t a b l e l i f e 
• fo r t h e p e o p l e , t o remove o p p r e s s i o n , t o s u p p o r t t h e 
o p p r e s s e d , and t o g i v e a i d t o t r o u b l e d p e r s o n s . Me wou ld 
a l s o l i k e t o c a r r y o u t God 's law and t o p r o t e c t t h e I s l a m i c 
l a n d f rom i n f i d e l ' s a t t a c k s . We i n t e n d t o p r a c t i c e t h e 
I s l a m i c concep t of a m r - b i m a ' r u f va nahy-az munkar ( t o 
e n j o i n r i g h t conduc t and f o r b i d indecency) and I s l a m i c laws 
132 
wh ich a r e i n t h e i n t e r e s t o f t h e p e o p l e ' . E. 6 . Browne 
w r i t e s : 
The support given to the 
constitutional movement in Persia and the 
condemnation and practical 
excommunication of the Shah by three at 
least of the chief mujtahids of Karbala 
and Najaf are so well- known that the 
views of lesser Shi'ite theologians are 
of comparatively small consequence. 
133 
131. Taking from scattered statements released on different 
occasions. 
132. Nazim al-Islam. p. 264, cited by Abdul Hadi Hairi.op. 
cit., p. 99. 
133. E. B. Browne, op.cit.. p. 219. 
*********** 
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CHAPTER - III 
THE GROWTH QE CLERICAL INFLUENCE 
An important base of the clerical power in 
Iran was their financial position. The Shi'i clerics were 
obviously stronger than their counterpart the Sunni clerics 
and this continued up to the beginning of the nineteenth 
century and later. The high income of the Shi'i clerics was 
the result of the Shi'i doctrine which assured the clerics 
administration of the khums tax. Regarding khums Lambton 
1 
says: 
'So far as khums is concerned, 
al~Shahid al-Thani asserts the right 
of f uqaha to act for the imafn. 
Commenting on al-Shahid al-Awwal's 
statement that khums due to the in^m 
was to be paid in the ghavba to his 
deputies (nuwwab) he states that the 
nuwwab were the just Imami fuqaha' 
possessing the necessary 
qualifications to give legal decrees 
(al -f uqah^'al-'udul al-imamivvun ^ 1 
Jami 'un 1i-shara'it al-fatwa), who 
were the representatives (wukala') 
of the imam. Baha al-Din al-'Amili 
states that the share of khums which 
belonged to the imam of the age was 
to be given to a mujtabid who would 
distribute it to the sayyids of the 
Bani Hashim provided that they were 
not descended through Fatima and 
were Ithna' 'Asharis, orphans, the 
poor and wayfarers' . 
1. A.K.S. Lambton, 
op.cit., p . 270 . 
State and Government in Medieval Islam. 
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The institution o-f khums tax was introduced 
by the Safavids to seek the support o-f the clerics, 'Whom 
they saw as key supporters and not as potential rivals, the 
Safavids stressed the obligatory nature o-f large alms to be 
administered by the ulama, which the dajars had to follow in 
2 
order to get any cooperation from them' . 
According to Sunni Islam Khums (fifth) tax 
meant a portion of war booty that was reserved for the 
Prophet and later on for the caliphs. For the poor and 
travellers there was zakah tax which became a part of the 
taxes raised by the state. But Shi'is did not recognise the 
right of the temporal government to collect the zakah tax. 
For them, after the Prophet, the Imam will be the sole 
legitimate recipients of the zakah and khums. 
In the beginning it was bel ieved that after 
occultation of the twelfth Imam half of the khums being the 
Imam's share should be hidden in the ground waiting for the 
appearance of the occult Imam. Later on the clerics 
affirmed their right to receive this kind of money which 
brought them a high income. By doing so the clerics became 
economically independent from the governmental control. 
However, through the concept of marja'i-taql id the financial 
power was directed to one man or a small group of men to 
2. Nikki R. Keddie 'The Roots of the Ulama's Power in Modern 
Iran', p. 225. 
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whom the money would be distributed in suitable arnount. The 
waof was also administered by the clerics. In administering 
this property the leading mujtahids would deal with a 
considerable amount o-f the funds. Besides, the clerics 
could also get the -fees for certification of lands and any 
3 
other matters 1 ike marriage and so on. 
The actual ability of the clerics who have a 
right to collect religious taxes <kh>ums and zakah) from 
different sections of the people differed from period to 
period. For instance the clerics got full support from 
craftsmen and tradesmen of the bazaar. The income, 
therefore, coming from this segment of population would 
always be available. In villages it was dependent on how 
influencial the local mullah were. The money which came to 
the clerics would also depend on how much was left after 
being deducted by the government. The clerics had thus 
genuine reasons to be hostile with the government. The 
funds collected through religious taxes (khums and zakah) 
and provided to the mujtahids would go to the poor families 
4 
and needy Sayyids. The mujtahids ran madrasas and supported 
their students by using the same funds. 
3. Moojan Momen, op.crit,., p. 207. 
4. The descendants of the Prophet. 
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As a matter of -fact, even though the khums 
and zakah taxes helped the clerics in becoming independent 
from the government, still they were not totally 
independent. It was a known fact that in some parts of the 
Shi'i community the income of the clerics came from the 
bazaar but 'since the ulama have no way of enforcing payment 
of these religious taxes, the payers of the tax can, to a 
certain extent, express their approval or disapproval of the 
actions of a particular Ayatu'llah by their readiness to pay 
5 
and the amounts they pay'. In some parts of the Shi'i 
community there was a close association between the clerics 
and the landed interest. The bazaar and the landed 
interests tend to influence the clerics to become 
conservative. As Moojan Momin writes 'the theoretical 
freedom of innovative exegesis given to the 'ulama' by the 
concept of ijtihad is, in practice, negated by the 
6 
restrictions imposed by their financial basis'. 
7 
The 'Ulama' and the Auaaf" 
In the Safavid period Isfahan, the then 
capital city of the Safavids, had a considerable amount of 
auqaf lands attached to mosques and madrasas. It is said 
that these lands were appropriated by the local landowners 
5. Moojan Momen , op. c i t.. p. 207, 
6. Ibid ., p. 207 . 
7. See below, chapter VI. 
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during the gap between the Safavids and the Qajar dynasties. 
It is important to note that some clerics 
who did not hold high ranks were engaged in trading while 
some became moneylenders charging interest between 40 tO 50 
percent even though usury is prohibited by the Qur'an. As 
Hamid AT gar writes: 
'Mujtahids are similarly 
reported to have speculated in land 
and urban property, usually through 
intermediaries. There is a record 
of a mujtahid as prominent as Aga 
Naja-fi planning the establishment o-f 
a bank charging IS percent interest 
on loans and paying a dividend of 12 
percent per annum. In the second 
half of the nineteenth century, the 
hoarding of grain by such ulama as 
Hajji Mul 1 a 'Al i Kani and Mirsa Aga 
•Javad further illustrates that on 
occasion venality overcame rel igion . 
Even though the extent of this 
venality cannot be measured with any 
certainty, it is clear that in many 
respects the financial basis of the 
ulama's existence was 
unsatisfactory. . Control of much 
vaqf property was in the hands of 
the state, and the yearly grants 
made to the ulama, from the reign of 
Path 'Ali Shah (1797 - 1834) onward, 
could on occasion be intended as 
"silence money" (haqq us-sukut) . On 
the other hand, voluntary 
contributions from individuals 
tended to make the ulama subservient 
8. Cf . A.K.S. Lambton, Landlord and Peasant in. 
Persia, p. 230. 
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to the pressures of public opinion. 
The growing tradition of inheriting 
clerical prominence caused a general 
increase in the wealth of the ulama, 
acquired over generations, thus 
increasing the temptations of 
venal ity. These serious weaknesses 
in the financial basis of the 
ulama's power were, however, unable 
to affect substantially the role of 
the ulama as dominating, directive 
force in society. 
9 
During the Qajars the lands in Mashhad 
especially those attached to the shrine of Imam Rida, 
largely situated in the province of Khurasan, became a 
10 
source of clerical income. According to 6. Curzon the 
annual income derived from this kind of lands in 1890 was 
60,000 tumans while the total revenue connected with the 
building of the shrine ranged at 2,000 tumans. The clerics 
in the capital got support from the i^ ugaf money. When there 
were disturbances in Khurasan which intervened the operation 
O'f auqaf lands, they evoked the clerics concern as a threat 
to their material existence. As the auqaf became a means of 
securing prominence and power. The struggles to control the 
administration of auqaf became acute among the clerics. 
Since the founding of the auqaf of Mashhad by Shah Abbas in 
1015-1016/1606-1608, the administration of auqajf shifted to 
11 
the hands of the then monarch who appointed mutayal1i bashis 
9. Hamid Algar, Religion and State in Iran, p. 16. 
10. Persia and the Persian Question (London, 1892) , Vol . I, 
p. 163. 
11. 'Chief administrator'. 
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12 
as his representatives. 
The mutaval 1 i bash is who was selected -from 
the clerics rank became an important person in the province 
of Khurasan. 'It was possibly out of fear that his power 
might become an instrument of clerical opposition to the 
state that Nasir ud-Din Shah united the post with that of 
governor in the person of Rukh ud-Daula in 1889. 
Thereafter, the two posts appear to have remained combined. 
On the whole, the situation of religious endowments was 
fairly constant throughout the nineteenth century: the state 
was apparently not interested in disturbing it, and the 
acquisitive instincts of certain ulama were able to find 
13 
e?<pression elsewhere'. 
Traditional Education; 
Education in Iran after the invasion of the 
Arabs in the 7th century and the adoption of Islam 
subsequently was based upon the Qur'an in the same way as in 
14 
Europe it was based on the Bible. 
Before the creation of Iranian modern school 
system elementary education was provided in towns and 
12. See also A.K.S. Lambton, Landlord and Peasant in Persia, 
pp. 129-130. 
13. Hamid Algar, Religion and State in Iran. p. 15. 
14. Donald N. Wilber, Iran Past and Present. p. 202. 
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15 
villages. These elementary schools were known as maktabs. 
16 
Nearly all of them were run by the clerics. 
In these maktabs the mullahs who were 
employed -for teaching received only a small sum o-f money 
•from the pupils' parents. The local maktab was the place 
where the students began their studies. Many maktabs were 
run by women. A-fter the maktab stage the boys would go to 
provincial towns for their lower level of education. Then 
they would go to larger cities for their upper level 
education. Ultimately they would make an effort to go to 
17 
the place where important scholars acted as lecturers. 
There was another kind of school called madrasa. The 
madrasas, which were in the form of formalized schools, were 
attached to mosque or religious shrines. 
15. 'The maktab system was limited in many ways. Its 
curriculum only included such subjects as reading, 
writing and familiarity with the Koran and classical 
Persian texts, like Sa'di's Gulistan and Bustan and 
poems of Hafiz. The maktab-dar taught in rote manner 
and maintained strict discipline by applying physical 
punishment freely. Buildings were seldom adequate nor 
were classrooms conducive study. 'Abdollah Mustawfi, 
Sharh-e Zendegani-ye-man (My Life History), (Tehran: 
Kitab Forushi-e A'lim, 1947), pp. 297-298, cited by Reza 
Arasteh, Education and Social Awakening in. Iran (Leiden, 
E.J.Bril 1 , 1962) , p. 6. 
16. Moo j an Momen , op .cit.. p. 202. 
17. Michael M.J.Fischer, op .cit., p. 38. 
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18 
Both the maktabs and the madrasas were the 
sole sources of formal education available to the Iranians 
in those days. The maktabs which were the products of the 
individual clerics were supported by those parents who 
wished their children to be familiar with various skills: 
the subjects taught in the madrasas included hikmat (Islamic 
law), Arabic grammar ' irfan (philosophy and gnosticism) , 
19 
theology, logic and geography. In the madrasa system of 
education the girls were excluded from learning. In this 
20 
kind of institution there were no formal examinations-
21 
The decisions of constructing madrasas in 
Iran were taken by the rulers. Many of the old madrasas of 
Qum were built by the Safavid dynasty in the sixteenth 
18. According to Von Kramer 'The progress and diffusion of 
knowledge created a body of men who found it difficult 
to make a decent living through their abstract learning. 
It was to promote further study and to provide 
sufficient stipends for such men that the Madrasahs were 
really established'. S. Khuda Bukhsh, Islamic 
Civilization, (University of Calcutta, 1905), cited by 
Ahmad Shalaby, History of Musiim Education, (Beirut, 
Lebanon, 1964), p. 55-
19. Marvin Zonis, Political Elite (Princeton, 1971), p. 32. 
20 . Wi1ber Donald., o£.cit., p. 202. 
2'1 . In the word of Michael M.J, Fischer 'the nisamiyas were 
a kind of culmination of the first five centuries of 
Islamic education. That is, they mark the end of a 
period of creativity and 3.r& a first early attempts to 
introduce widespread system and reduce diversity of 
opinion. They mark a kind of division in the history of 
Muslim education'. Michael M. J. Fischer., o£ cit, p. 
38. According to Ahmad Shalaby 'Al-Nisamiyyah 
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century. It is important to note that the religious leaders 
in this period could separate the madrasas from the state 
involvement, which was not similar to the Ottoman empire in 
which the madrasas were attached to the bureaucratic 
structure. 
22 
The madrasa system which was functioning in 
Iran was considered to be 'statewide and international ' . It 
23 
contained a standard curriculum. Ijaza^ or 'letters of 
permission' were given by recognized scholars to certify 
24 
that one was qualified to teach specified subjects. It was 
institutions were always of high standard as they were 
staffed by the best scholars of the time'. Ahmad 
Shalaby, History of Musi im Ecjucation. p. 140. The 
madrasa system came into being in AD 1066, when Seljuq 
vizier, Nizam al-Mulk, opened the Nizamiyya college in 
Baghdad. This school became the first of a series of 
nizamiyya system which appeared during the Seljuq 
empire. It offered stipends to the students and gave 
salaries to the teachers. 
The 1argest madrasa 
six thousand student 
Mashhad, Tehran, I 
Moreover, besides 
madrasa, c1 asses 
individual masters' 
'Ashari Shi'ism and 
Middle East; Three 
A.J. Arberry (Cambri 
system today in Qum. It has over 
s. There are other major centres in 
sfahan and several other cities, 
the official lessons taught in the 
are often held in the homes of 
c.f. Seyyed Hossein Nasr 'Ithna 
Iranian Islam,' in Religion in the 
Religion in Concord and Conf1ict ed . 
dge, 1964), Vol. II, pp. 105-106. 
23. F^ 'ermission or authorisation. Generally the student 
would obtain the ijaza after he was thirty years of age. 
Mostly it was uncommon for a student to still be a 
student at the age of forty and fifty years. 
24. Unlike the state institutions where the students took 
classes for grade and for diplomas rather than for 
knowledge. There was no grade in a madrasa, and the 
students studied for learning's sake. The students 
could select the teachers by their own choices. Since 
the teacher did not 'pontificate' so the teaching was 
based on a dialectic principle comprising arguments and 
counter arguments which the students were encouraged to 
join. 
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I t was gene ra l l y known tha t a madrasa was not on ly a p lace 
•for p repara t ion of the r i t u a l leaders but a l so 
OCT 
a place of legislature and judiciary. 
Among schools in Iran there were also the 
less traditional schools such as iBol payegani , Dar al-
Tabligh, Haqqani, Amir al-Mu'minin and Raza-viya. The main 
purpose of Go!payegani was to train the students who were 
not prepared to enter into the Qum system which was regarded 
as a place of higher learning. With the improvement of 
transportation a large number of lower level students then 
directly came to the great centre of learning - Qum, 
Mashhad and Isfahan while formerly they studied in the 
smaller provincial centres. The Raza-viya and Go!payegani 
were opened in order to cope with the increasing number of 
the students. A student was accepted to the golpayegani on 
the condition that he must be introduced by some one of good 
character who could take responsibility in case the boy 
misbehaved or did not attend classes. 
25. One important fact is that 'the madrasa system does not 
1 ink into this modern educational vortex of energy and 
attention'. Michael M. J. Fischer, op.c i t. , p. 33. 
Therefore, many professional elites believed that such 
madrasas were considered to be the place that should 
wither away as soon as possible. Moreover, the size or 
institutional centrality is not so important since the 
madrasas could not supply important posts like teachers, 
notaries, judges, lawyers, scientists, or physicians for 
the society. Such posts are now produced by the 
Universities, both domestic and foreign. 
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The madrasa Haqqani was estabiished with a 
slightly different concept. This madrasa became a kind of 
an alternative and modernized centre of religious learning 
known as hawza-i'ilmi in itself because it emphasized on 
research. After completion the student was offered a 
sixteen-year course. In the first ten years he attended 
formal classes while during the last six years the student 
devoted himself to research. The lower-level classes 
followed the traditional course of studies but were 
27 
simplified by lessons in new text books like Sarf-i Sada and 
28 29 ' 
Nahw-i Sada or Nihayat al-Hikam written by All amah 
Tabataba'i. Moreover, modern English and spoken Arabic were 
30 
stressed as the learning medium. 
26. 'In the case of Iran, there has been far less 
development along the dimensions of hierarchy and 
bureaucratization. The closest approximation one has is 
the notion of hawzahs (centers of Shi"i learning which 
are very loosely associated with one another through the 
informal network of clergy relations'. Shahrough 
Akhavi, op.cit., p. 21. 
27. Etymology Made Easy. 
28. Syntax Made Easy. 
29. Beginning of Philosophy. 
30. At the beginning a majority of the students came from 
rural areas but since 1975 this was reversed. Some 
university students started to come to this madrasa. 
However, at the madrasas no fees were charged and the 
students were given room and all allowances for their 
important needs but such allowances were only just 
enough for bare subsistence, so those who belonged to 
poor families would naturally lead harsh and tough 
1 ives. 
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In the madrasa a well known style of teaching 
known as mas^ala-sazi (constructing of hypothetical 
31 
examples) was introduced by Shaykh Murtada Ahsari in the 
nineteenth century. It began with the posing of a 
hypothetical legal system and then discussing of all 
possible ramifications and resolutions of the problem. The 
students were urged to argue points with the teachers and 
thus acquire skill in the art of abstract discursive 
argumentation. 
Finally, after all the efforts in his study 
the student would receive an ijaza from an accepted 
mujtahid. Before the issuing of iJaza the student had to 
prepare a treatise on fiqh and usul al-figh and submit them 
to the mujtahid. The iJaza could be issued to the student 
provided that his work was worthy of it. The ijaza 
signified that the man was capable of exercising iJtihad and 
could be called a mujtahid. A student who desired to be 
recognized would make an effort to obtain the ijaza from a 
famous mujtahid at this centre of learning. 
31. One of the Shi'i scholars who established the 'atabat' 
as the most important centre of religious influence in 
the Shi'i world. According to Al1 amah Sayyid Muhammad 
Tabataba'i 'In the principles of jurisprudence the 
remarkable advances accomplished by the Shi'ite scholar 
Wahid Bihbahani and followd by Shaykh Murtada Ansari 
have never been matched in Sunni jurisprudence according 
to existing evidence'. Al1 amah Sayyid Muhammad 
Tabataba'i Shi'a. p. 105. 
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For a pe rson t o g i v e a l e g a l o p i n i o n ( i - f t a / ) 
o r t o be a m u j t a h i d must have t h e f o l l o w i n g p r e - c o n d i t i o n s 
32 
• f u l f i l l e d : 
a) . Maturity 
b) . Being of the male sex (This is the 
subject of some controversy) 
c) . Being of legitimate birth 
d) . Faith 
e) . Intel 1igence 
33 
f) . Justice. 
Courses of Study in the fladrasa; 
The courses of study in the madrasa were 
divided into three levels. The student had to go on level 
by level. 
(a). Mugaddamat (Preliminary level): An 
effort was being made to encourage the students to master 
Arabic language which was essential for the acquisition of 
further knowledge. Generally senior students or assistants 
of the principal mujtahids were at this level . Practically 
the teacher taught the students with the help of a text book 
and the class lasted one and half or two hours. 
32. Moojan Momen, op.cit.. p. 202 
33. 'The concept of justice is not, however, the usual 
Western view of that word but rather it impl ies one 
whose words and deeds are strictly controlled by the 
Shari'a. refraining from all its prohibitions and 
performing all of its obligations', ibid. 
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tb) . fts-Sutuh (the externals)! At the As-
Sutuh level teachers were generally mujtahids who had Just 
obtained authority o-f ijtihad and aimed at raising their 
reputations. This level students could attend the lectures 
o-f their liking. Moreover, the students with their special 
interest could alter the lectures into one of the optional 
subjects but going to next level depended much on the 
obtaining a thorough grasp of the main texts in the two 
principal subjects - fiqh and usul al-fiqh. 
(c). Pars al-KharaJ (graduation classes) i It 
took two years to come to this level. Mostly students of 
this level were in their mid-twenties and the classes would 
be taken by the principal mujtahids themselves. Students 
could choose the lectures they wanted to attend. The 
subjects taught at this level were generally fiqh and usual 
3± 
al -fiqh . 
In 1851 a change took place in Iranian 
educational system when the reforming Minister, Mirza Taqi 
35 
Khan Amir Kabir played an active role in establishing a 
36 
government polytechnic school (Par al-Funun) . It was for 
the first ime that this academic unit was not run by the 
34. Ibid.. p. 200. 
35. See above, chapter II 
36. The academy was basically European in organisation. It 
was shaped by a majority of Europeanss The miain subjects 
taught here were science, history and culture. This 
academy was an important source for the spread of modern 
scientific ideas in Iran, see T. Cuyler Young ed., Near 
Eastern Culture and Society. (London, 1966) , p. 133. 
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Shi'i clerics. The subjects which were included in Par a1-
Funun were national science, military science, higher 
mathematics and -foreign languages. The traditional madrasa 
course of study was excluded. 
In 1896 many schools were established by 
Nasir al-Din Shah's successor, Muzaffar al-Din Shah (1896-
1906). This was -followed by an attempt to br«ak away from 
the old style maktab and madrasa education. Thus in 1897 a 
school was established at Rushdiyah in Tabriz known as the 
Rushdiyah Madrasa. The establishment of a modern school at 
Rushdiyah met with a strong opposition from the city's 
clerics. 'The clergy leadership of Tabriz appeared to see 
in the Rushdiyyah the beginning of the erosion of their 
37 
power over the education of Iranian youth'. 'By 1906 a 
Mirza Taqi Khan fell victim to a court and harem 
intrigue after three years of beneficial work. He was 
murdered before his programme of wise refor+ms could be 
realized. It was he who founded the first public 
university in Tehran known as the Dar al-Funun ("House 
of Sciences"). Foreign scholars were invited to join 
the teaching staff. He sent a number of young Iranians 
to Europe for higher studies. The Dar a1-Funun included 
the science of medicine, technology, and jurisprudence. 
For a long time its name remained virtually synonymous 
with the law school, until the latter was converted to 
the Faculty of Law (daneshkadeh-ye hoquq) , see Wilhelm 
Eilers, 'Educational and Cultural Development in Iran 
during the Pahlavi Era' in |ra,n Under th^ e Pahl avis. 
George Lenczowski ed. (Stanford,, California, 1978), p. 
305. 
37. Shahrough Akhavi, op.cit... p. 33. At that time there 
were 100 maktabs and madrasas in Tabriz. Shafi Javadi, 
Tabriz va Paranum (Tabriz: Bunyad-i Farhangi-yi Riza 
Pahlavi, 1350 H. Sh./lS71),p. 173, cited by Shahrough 
Akhavi., p. 33. Mirza Ali Khan Amin al-Daula (1844-
1904) also got his reputation, like that of Amir Kabir 
^ and Prime - Minister Sipahsalar who in 19th century 
inaugurated new education policies by creating new 
schools. 
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number o-f the elementary schools of the new type existed in 
Tehran and by 19H the number had increased to 123'. Amin 
al-Daula's educational policy was looked upon with great 
suspicion by the clerics who rightly thought that the 
creation of the new type of schools would mean the loss of 
their influence on the Iranian society. 
The reformers were accused of being in 
alliance with Baha^ ism. The charge was considered a serious 
crime that always led to a very bad consequence. The 
opposition of the clergy, including the two Sayyids -
39 
Taba'taba'i and Bihbihani'. 
'The violence with which the 
population reacted to the early 
experiments with these new schools 
has been wel1 described in the 
memoir literature. The reformers 
were accused of Baha'ism, a charge 
that has always carried serious 
consequences for those so termed. 
The people responded to the clergy's 
appeals against cooperating with the 
new schools, especially to 
statements that their children would 
become corrupt and encouraged to 
stray from the precepts of Shi'ism' 
40 
38. Isa Sadiq (A'Lam), Tarikh-Farhang-i Iran ^z Ayhaz Ta 
Zaman-i Hajir, 7th ed. (Tehran: Chapp-i Ziba, 1354 
H.Sh./1975, pp. 364-65), cited by Shahrough Akhavi., p. 
33. 
39. The leaders of the constitutional movement. 
40. Dawlatabadi, Tarikh-i Mu'asir. II, pp. 110-111; 'Isa 
Sadiq, Yad-i Gar.i'Umr, Vol.1 (Tehran* Shirkat-i 
Sahhami-yi Tab-i Kutub, 1340 H. Sh./1961), pp. 14-116, 
cited by Sharough Akhavi., p. 33. 
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However, it is important to note that at that 
time there were different ideas held by the clerics 
themselves. Some of them were unregenerate orthodox who 
opposed both the constitutionalists and the antimodernists 
1 ike Shaykh Fas lull ah Nuri, and Mirza Abu al-Qasim, the imam 
Jum^ of Tehran; while some others considered as 
'moderates' encouraged the idea of constitution and 
parliament but opposed the cultural reform. Among this 
group were Akhund Muhammad Kazim Khurasani, Mul1 a Abdullah 
Mazandarani, Hajj Mirza Husayn Khalil Tihrani and Agha 
Shaykh Muhammad Husayn al-Na'ini together with Tehran's four 
41 
important mujtahids Sayyid Taba'taba'i, Bihbihani, Mudarris 
and Mirza Hasan Ashtiani. Lastly there were clerics who 
acted as modernists such as Bayyid Yahya Dawlatabadi and 
Mirza Hasan Rushdiyah. 
The Press Censorship Law of 1922 and the 
Education Law of 1911 gave the clerics many rights such as 
the right to teach Islamic Sciences which had become 
compulsory in secular schools. The Censorship Law mentioned 
that the clerics appointed as a mujtahid by the Ministry of 
Education, Auqaf and Fine Arts had a right to censor 
42 
articles and books which they thought contrary to Shi'ism. 
'These guarantees did not ultimately prevent the entropy 
41. Ayatullah Sayyid Hasan Mudarris, one of the Tehran 
clergy who played an important role in opposing Reza 
Khan's ascent to the throne. 
42. See Amin Banani, op.cit., p. 90 
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that be-fel 1 the re) igious institution in the next sixteen 
years a-fter the coronation of Riza Shah. It is probable, 
however, that in their absence the weakening o-f their power 
would have occured much more rapidly than has actually the 
43 
A great change took place during Resa Shah's 
period. The powers and status of the clerics declined. The 
government wanted to give state administration the power to 
limit the jurisdictions formerly given to the religious 
institutions. New rules were, therefore, imposed upon the 
religious authorties. The mujtahids legally had to obtain 
their diplomas only from the living maraj i "yi-taqlid . This 
brought some difficulties to them. Rural mullahs were upset 
by the requirement of examinations. Even the preachers had 
to show that they had a bonafide pulpit in an established 
mosque. Such laws affected the madrasa system. It swept a 
44 
great mass of Iranian clergy on the defensive. 
45 
In January 1929 an administrative decree was 
issued affecting the students and the teachers of the 
madrasas. The decree contained the following details: 
43. Shahrough Akhavi, op.cit.. p. 37. 
44. 'because upon its promulgation harrassment of the 
students became a legal activity on the part of the 
official of the regime'. Shahrough Akhavi Religion and 
Politics in Contemporary Iran. p. 43. These officials' 
harrassment later on led to many incidents with 
bloodshed and arrest. Ultimately a protest against 
these dignitaries was launched by the clerics including 
Ha'iri who was greatly respected by the people. 
45. The decree was issued about a month after the passage of 
the Uniformity of Dress Law of 6 Day 1307/27. 
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'Article 14 : The religious students 
mentioned in paragraph 6 of Article 
2 of the (Uniformity of Dress) Law 
are considered those who have been 
continually studying figChU and t@ul_ 
and to whom the .Ministry of 
Education shall, by special 
administrative decree, have given a 
diploma attesting to their status as 
students of the religious sciences 
(tullab) . 
Article 15 : Teachers of fiql.h3 and 
usul and hikmat-i ilahi as mentioned 
in paragraph seven of Article 2 of 
the Law are considered those who 
have been given the diploma of 
instruction from one of the Mara J,i ' -
vi taglid or by the Ministry of 
Education and who have continually 
been teaching. 
46 
The growing control of the Ministry of 
Education on matriculation and graduation of students and 
the requirement of teacher's certification was considered an 
attack on the religious authority. The anger of the people 
of Qum reached its apex when the yearly 'Ashura occured that 
year. The police put pressure on the religious 
establishments. The Madrasa Fayziyah became the centre of 
harassment. The students were prevented from going out of 
their precinct. Their traditional clothes were pulled out. 
In the town a group of the market merchants and guildmen of 
Tehran sided with the clerics. 
46. Shahrough Akhavi, op.cit... pp. 43 - 44. 
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However, the protest carried no weight and 
the involvement of the government in the madrasas did not 
decrease. Furthermore, there came a decree in March 1929 
making compulsory the examinations for religious students 
and identification of teachers of the religious sciences. 
Students of the madrasas were to obtain certificate each 
year after passing the annual examination. The criteria 
imposed upon the teacher's the following identification: 
(1). Possession of a diploma from a marja-i 
taqiid; (2). evidence of five years of teaching experience; 
(3). successful passing of examination in fioh. usul and 
hikmat-i i1ahi (4) . possession of a certificate from the 
47 
local Office of Education. 
Again, on 21 Farvardin 1309/28 February, 1930 
the department of Education and Instruction of the Ministry 
of Education imposed the following examination scheme for 
religious schools: 'Taking fiqCh] and usul as one category 
and hikmat (philosophy) as another, the schedule listed the 
required books on the basis of three levels (rutbah) and 
three of four grades (darajah) . The levels evidently 
correspond to the traditional cycles of religious education 
s (1) introductory (muqaddamat); <2) intermediate (sutuh) ; 
47. Dawlat-i'Aliyah-yi Iran, Vizarat-i Ma'arif va Awpaf y^ 
Sanayi 'vi Wustazaraf ah Ihsa'ivah-vi Ma'ari-f^  va Madaris. 
1307-8 H.Sh./1938-39 (Tehran: Marba'ah Rawshana'i, 
n.d.), p. 38, cited by Shahrough Akhavi., p. 45. 
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<3) and higher (kharij or "ali)' . 
In 1934 the permanent curriculum -for 
intermediate and higher cycles of the theological colleges 
was announced. Both the intermediate and theology colleges 
were to be composed o-f six grades. Thus educational policy 
was aimed at secularization o-f the curriculum of madrasas in 
Iran. Three of the four authoritative codices of Shi'i 
49 
Jurispurdence were removed rrom the official curriculum of 
education. Those codices included al -kaf i f i Ml m al-Din 
written by Ibn Ya'qub Kulayni (d. 940) Man 1 a Yadhuruhu al ~ 
Faqih written by Muhammad Ibn Babuyah Qummi (d. 991) and 
Kitab al Istibsar, composed by Shaykh Nasir al-Din Tusi (d. 
106B). At the time of the death of Shaykh 'Abd al-Karim 
Ha'iri in 1936, the Iranian government was aiming at 
breaking away the educational establishment in Qum and the 
unity of religious science students. The government 
48. Ihsa'i vahWi Ma^arif va Madaris. 1307-1308, pp. 119-20, 
cited by Shahrough Akhavi, p. 45. 
49. 'The canonical collections of traditions arose, the so-
called "Four Books"; 1. al-Kafi (pr. Tehran, 1312 -
1318) of Kulaini, d. 328/939 or 329/940); of over 16,000 
hadiths on the usul and furu' chapters, 5072 are 
considered "sound" by later authorities, 140 "good" and 
1118 as "established", 302 as "strong" and 9488 as 
"weak"; a popular commentary is al-Shafi of Khalil b . 
Bhazi al-Kazwini, begun at Mecca in 1057/1647 and also 
published by him in Persian with the title al-Saf i. 
Smaller in extent than al-Kafi is 2. Man la Yahduruhu"1 
~ fakih (pr. Tehran 1324) by Ibn Babuya the younger (d. 
381/991-2) of about 6,000 hadiths some 4,000 have a 
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'intended the dispersion of the educational establishmerit in 
Qumm and the -fragmentation of the unity of the religious 
sciences students. It used various methods to eliminate that 
educational center : it arrested students collecijively and 
individually, threw into prison innocent greybeards and 
youngsters; forced their conscription into army; and 
50 
excerted great pressure on them....' 
The importance of madrasa as the place for 
the training of future members of clerics became more 
limited. In 1936 it appeared that 55,650 boys and girls 
were studying in the maktabs while 177,000 were in modern 
complete isnad; in recent times a commentary was written 
on this collection by Muhammad Taki al~Madjlisi, father 
of the author of the Bihar al-anwptr... in two editions, 
Arabic (Rawdat al-muttakin) and Persian (Lawani'-i Sahib 
- Kxrani) , while the commentary Man la Yahduriuhu' 1 -nabih 
of 'Abd Allah b. Sal ih Al-Samahidji (d. 1135/1722-3) was 
never finished; 3. al-Istibsar fima' khtulifa min al-
akhbar (Lucknow, n.d.) and the more comprehensive 4. 
Tahdhib al -ahkam (Tehran 1314) are both by celebrated 
the Shi 
al-Mukni'a 
author of 
a1-Hasan al-Tusi 
commentaries on 
413/1022). In both 
huge mass of material 
course not in a critical 
degree of agreement with the 
prevail 
1 awbook 
DJunaid 
i Fihrish Abu Dja'far - Muhammad 
and were originally intended 
fi'lfikh of Mufid 
the attempt is made to sort out 
that had been handed down 
fashion but according to 
doctrines that had come 
This Tahdhib is not to be confused with 
Tadhib al-Shi'a of Muhammad b. Ahmad b. 
al-Iskaf i 381/991-2) which fell into 
b. 
as 
(d . 
the 
of 
the 
to 
the 
al-
neglect (d 
because he went too far in the application of kiyas. 
Only very rarely do we find in the larger collection of 
Ibn Babuya, Madinat al-'ilm, recognized as the "Fifth 
Book", Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam^ art. Shia'. 
50. Shahrough Akhavi, op.cit 55. 
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51 
modern pr imary s c h o o l s . 
At the t ime when Reza Khan rose t o power in 
1924 the re were 4,980 boys s tudy ing i n the madrasas wh i l e 
52 
3,320 boys and g i r l s were in modern secondary s c h o o l s . I t 
i s c l e a r t h a t t he t r a d i t i o n a l schools had submi t ted t o Reza 
Shah's educat ional p o l i c y . As a mat ter of -fact the number 
o f s tudents in madrasas had dropped t o 2,900 i n 1935, at the 
same t ime the number o-f p u p i l s in modern secondsary schoo ls 
53 
rose to 16,000. 
51. Empire de I'Iran Minister de I'Instruction! Service de 
la Statistique, Annuire, 1935-1936 (Tehran : Imprimeur 
Madjles, n.d.), pp. 70-71, cited by Marvin Zonis, op . 
cit., p. 32. 
32. Marvin Zonis, op.cit.. p. 32. 
53. However, with the coming into power of Muhammad Shah 
after the abdication of his father, Reza Shah, the anti-
religious sentiment disappeared due to the advise of the 
British and American counsellors from whom the new Shah 
sought support. Both the British and the Americans 
asked the new Shah to strengthen the religious elements 
in order to counter communist penetration from the 
Soviet occupation. This resulted in the rise of the 
number of madrasa students. Anyhow, the number again 
was reduced to less than one thousand and since 1950 no 
governmental reports have appeared. 
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CHAPTER - IV 
RISE OF IHE PftHLAVIS IQ POWER 
REZft KHAN 
Iran was in the grip of crisis at the end o-f 
1 
the First World War. Azerbayjan became independent and was 
named Soviet Republic o-f Azerbayjan. Gil an proclaimed 
itsel-f to be a Soviet Republic under Kuchik Khan with the 
support of the Red Army which had already occupied most of 
the areas between the Caspian coast and El buz mountains. 
At the end of the war Iran for all practical purposes, 
came under British military control. Beorge Lenczowski, 
The Middle East in World Affairs (Cornell University 
Press, London, 1956), p. 84. 
Iran and Soviet Russia concluded a treaty of friendship 
on February 26, 1921. The treaty was a pleasant contrast 
to the abortive British treaty inasmuch as it reiterated 
previous Soviet renunciation of old Russian concessions 
and properties and, in many ways, gave expression to 
Soviet friendship toward the people of Iran, ibid. , p. 
177, 'The conclusion of the Soviet - Iranian treaty 
marked the end of what may be called a period of post war 
settlement in Iran. Soviet troops were withdrawn from 
Gilan nine months later (October 1921), and Kuchik Khan's 
regime collapsed following an Iranian military expedition 
into that area. The British treaty was officially 
rejected by the Iranian government'. Ibid., p. 177-178. 
The following were its most important measuress 
1. All debts owed to or concessions held by the 
Imperial Russian Government were revoked. 2. Certain 
territorial restorations were made to Iran. 3. Russian 
rights under the capitulations (by which Russian had 
their own courts and were not subject to Iranian law) 
were abolished, Soviet citizens in Iran becoming subject 
to Iranian law. 4. Russian missionary organisations were 
disbanded and their property handed over to the Iranian 
Bovernment. 5. The U.S.S.R. was obiiged to protect Iran 
from invasion through Armenia or Azerbayjan; in return, 
she was allowed to use Iranian territory to repel an 
invasion from the south (e.g. General Dunstervil1e's 
expedition of 1919) and to demand the expulsion of 
foreign officials who abused their position to indulge in 
hostile activities against the U.S.S.R. 
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o-f-ficials selected by him. In -fact, the Grand vazir who was 
the official leader, ran the government. The profit for the 
economic affairs of the country went to royal coffers who 
tried to have maximum share ot it. As Wilfrid Knapp writes: 
ClranH 'was ruled by a weak Shah, the central authority of 
the state was jeopardized by the unruliness of the tribes; 
the national territory was invaded; the economy in 
5 
disarray'. Iranian territory had become the battlefield for 
Turkish, Russian and British forces during the World War I. 
Although Iran itself was neutral. When the war came to an 
end the traditional pressure from Russia temporarily stopped 
due to the civil war and the revolution in that country. 
But the strength of Britain in Iran increased. In fact the 
major parts of West Asia had come under the occupation of 
the British. When stationed in Iran the British used whole 
of the Iranian territory freely as a transit ground for 
their expedition to the Caucasus and Transcaspia. From 1918 
to 1920, the Caspian ports of Iran were used as bases for 
British military intervention against the valuable Soviet 
oil area of Baku. Attempts were made by the British 
officials to include Iran in the 'British influenced 
6 
protective zone adjacent to India and the Persian Sulf' . To 
exert more pressure on Iran, Lord Curzon, the foreign 
7 
secretary of Britain advised Sir Percy Cox in Tehran to 
5. '1921-1941 : The Period of Riza Shah' Twentieth Century 
Iran, p. 23. 
6. George Lenczowski, op.cit., p. 161. 
7. Sir Percy Cox was the long-time British resident for the 
Persian Gulf. He became chief political officer to the 
expeditionary force. 
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have an agreement with Iran. The then Prime Minister of 
Iran Vasuq al-Daulah, inclined towards the British. 
There-fore, when Vasuq a1-Dawl ah returned to power he became 
8 
a hope for the British. Anyhow he could not neglect the 
demand by the people for immediate withdrawal of British 
forces -from the country. To station British forces in 
Iranian land Vasuq had to risk his governfnent. The 
withdrawal of the British forces was never acceptable to 
9 
Lord Curzon. However, he "agreed" on the gradual withdrawal 
but insisted that at least a nucleus should be retained 
until the British government was able to find some other 
way. With the arrangement of Curzon the Anglo-Persian 
10 
Agreement of August 9, 1919 was signed in London. 
8. The two former Prime Ministers before Vasuq's second 
government, Mustawfi al-Mamalik and Samsam al-Sultanah, 
encouraged policies against the British. 
9. On Anglo-Iranian dispute see J. Frankel. The Anglo-
Iranian dispute, Year Book of Worl d Affairs. 1952, pp. 
56-74; also see Middle Eastersn Studies 2 (1948) « 
10. This Agreement may be divided into two categories; (1) 
Pol itico-militarv; The British government undertook (a) 
to supply, at Iran's expense, expert advisers for the 
Iranian administrationj (b) to supply at Iran's expense, 
such officers and munitions as were regarded necessary by 
a joint commission, and (c) to cooperate with Iran toward 
the improvement of its communication system. (2) 
Economic; The two governments agreed to a revision of the 
existing custom tariff. The British government granted a 
loan of Pound 2,000,000 to Iran to be repaid as 
indicated after the British financial adviser had taken 
up his duties at Tehran. The government of Iran 
undertook to pay monthly interest at the rate of 7 
percent per annum. It also undertook to repay this loan 
from all the revenues and customs receipts originally 
assigned by virtue of a loan, contracted by Iran in 1911.' 
Rouhol 1 ah K. Ramazani, The Foreign Pol icy of Iran 1500-
1941; A developing Nation in World Affairs <The 
University Press, Virginia, Charlottesville 1966), p. 
160. For the text see J.C. Hurewitz, Dipltpmacv in the 
Near and Middle East i_ A Documentary Record 1*^ 14-56, Vol . 
II (Princeton, New Jersey, 1956), pp. 64-65. 
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Under this treaty between Vasuq a1-Daul ah and 
Lord Curzon Iran became virtually a protectorate of Britain. 
This created strong disgust among the reawakened Iranian 
nationalists who had passed through the turmoil of 
Constitutional Revolution, World War I and Russian 
intervention. Lord Curzon had aimed at spreading the 
British influence without 'committing his country to direct 
colonial administration and responsibility'. His plan 
11 
failed when the Iranian Majlis denied to approve the treaty. 
12 
The agreement was also opposed in U.S.A. and France. In 
Iran nothing could be done to salvage the treaty unless 
force was used. But Britain was not prepared to go to that 
13 ' 
extent. At the end of 1919 British troops began to withdraw 
from borderland of Russia. In 1920 the number of military 
establ ishments in Iran declined and between January and 
April of 1921 the whole British troops withdrew from Iran. 
However, it was difficult for Britain to expect Iran to 
approve the abortive treaty. 
At this juncture Iran needed a leader who 
would be able to improve his authority over government and 
11. Pariiament. 
12. The Middle East and North Africa 19B6 (Europa 
Publications Limited, England 1985), p. 384. 
13. George Lenczowski, op .cit.^ p. 154. 
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lead the count ry t o independence and na t i ona l g rea tness . As 
one author p o i n t s out : 'Given the s t a t e of r e l a t i v e anarchy 
i n t o which I ran had f a l l e n i t was most l i k e l y t h a t such a 
1 eader would be an army commander and such proved t o be the 
case. Yet Riza Khan who, f i v e years l a t e r , would be crowned 
t h e f i r s t Shah of the Pahlav i dynasty was the 1eader of a 
de fea ted , not a successful army; and he came t o power not as 
a d iscontented colonel i n an es tab l i shed army but as one 
whose f i r s t task was t o recons t ruc t the armed fo rces and t h e 
m i l i t a r y t r a d i t i o n of the s t a t e ' . 
15 
Reza Khan was born i n 1873, in a small f a m i l y 
16 17 
f rom Alasht in t he Savad Kuh reg ion i n Mazandaran. At t h a t 
t ime Al asht was near l y an i s o l a t e d p l a c e , having l ess than 
one thousand dwe l le rs i n the l a t e r ha l f of the 19th 
c e n t u r y . The f a m i l y of Reza Khan was one of t h e l ead ing 
14. W i l f r i d Knapp, o p . c i t . . p . 2 3 . 
15 . On the l i f e of Reza Khan see Mohammad Reza Shah P a h l a v i , 
Mission f o r my Country (London, 1961), pp . 29-44 . 
Donald N. Wi lber Riza Shah P a h l a v i ; The Ressur rec t ion 
and Reconst ruct ion of I r a n ; A ' l a m , ' A l i Akbar, 
6 i y u t i n h a - v i hukumat-i d i k t a t u r i (Tehran s P a r v i n , n .d . ) 
a l - S a d a t i , Ahmad Mahmud, Rida Shah Bahlawi . nahdat I ran 
a l - h a d i t h a h (Cairo : Maktabat al-Nahdal a l - M i s r i y a , 
1939) , 'Asi—i Pahlav i ; J i l d - i Yekom ± Riza Shah Kabi r 
Pah lav i Awal (Tehran : V i z a r a t - i I t t i l a ' a t , 1346 (1967) , 
n . p . ; Bahar, Mal ik a l - S h u ' a r a ' . T a r i k h - i mukhtasar- i 
ahzab- i s i v a s i . (Tehran : S h i r k a t - i s i h a m i - y i chap - i 
reng in 1323 (1944), V o l . I . 
1 6 . The v i l l a g e of A lasht the Savad Kuh reg ion was more than 
6,000 f e e t h igh from the ground l e v e l . 
1 7 . A d i s t r i c t of Mazandaran, one of the Caspian prov inces 
where the purest I ran ian stock are t o be f ound . Savad 
Kuh was a reg ion s i t u a t e d in the West of the highway and 
r a i l r o a d l i n e running from Firuzkhuh t o the Caspian. 
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•families o-f AT asht. The head of the family, whose name was 
Morad 'Ali Khan had been an officer in the Seventh Savad Kuh 
regiment of the army of Iran and was killed at Herat in 
18 19 
1856. He had three sons, the eldest son Abbas 'Ali Khan, 
who was a colonel in the Seventh Savad Kuh regiment, was the 
20 
father of Reza Khan . 
Efforts have been made by the pro-Pahlavi 
historians to glorify the family background and birth of 
21 
Reza Bhah such as Malik al-Shuara Bahar and Habib Allah 
22 
Nawbakht Shirazi. Donald N. Wilber writes: 
'The family and birth of Riza Shah 
derives from individuals native to his 
birthplace and lacks some of the glamour 
found in semi-official accounts designed 
to give sol id substance to the origins of 
the Pahlavi dynasty. One of these 
Persian sources states that the paternal 
family of Riza Khan belonged to the 
Palani tribe, while a semiofficial 
account published in 1948 calls this 
group to Bavani Pahlavi, or Bavandi 
Pahlavani, and traces its origin to a 
member of the ruling house of the ancient 
Sasanian dynasty' . 
r-f '-\ 
18. L.P. El wel 1 - Sutton op .cit. . p. 70. 
19. 'Abbas Ali Khan, Cheragh 'Al i Khan and Fazal Allah Khan, 
all of them were on big posts. 
20. He died on November 26, 1978 eight months after the 
birth of Reza Khan. Reza's mother left Alasht at the 
end of April, 1879 for Tehran and never returned to 
Alasht again. 
21. Shahanshah-i Pahlavi Tehran, 1323, quoting on page 28 
from Muhammad Hasan Khan, I'timad al-Saltanah, Kitab al-
tadvin fi ahval Jibal Sharyin (1893) . 
22. Tarikh-i mukhtasar-i ahzab-i siyasi (Tehran, 1323) . 
23. Mujtaba Malakuti, Rah-i adhan-i Iran ( 1327, P.D. ) , 
cited by Donald Wilber, op .cit. , p. 5. 
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With the help of his uncle Reza Khan enrolled in the first 
group of the Cossack infantry Brigade at Tehran in about 
1893 when he was about fifteen years old. He worked with 
the Cossack for nearly thirty years, gradually advanced from 
the rank upto the higher one. At that time two elements 
existed in the Persian force; the regular and irregular 
forces, and the Cossack Brigade, when Nasir al-Din Shah 
visited Moscow in 1878, he was received by the Tsar and the 
Cossack regiment which came there to guard the emperor. 
Nasir al-Din Shah was very much impressed by that Cossack 
regiment. Later on Tsar Alexander II helped to arrange a 
Cossack unit to be established in Iran. So the Persian 
Cossacks took birth in 1885 with the main initial functions 
to protect the ruler and foreign legations and 'to help form 
24 
a force modelled upon the Russian Cossacks' . 
The Russians established a school in 1910 in 
the barracks in which Russian language was made compulsory. 
The Russian encouraged or rather forced the Persian officers 
to send their sons to this school. The main intention of 
24. Donald Wilber, Iran s Past and Present, p. 125. A large 
number of the soldiers in the Persian Cossacks were 
taken from the families of the emigrants from Nakhijavan 
and Erivan. These soldiers and officers had a confused 
feeling. In one way they hated the Russians who took 
over their homeland from Iran. In another way they felt 
gratitude for the Russians who provided posts to them 
while the Iranian government was careless in helping 
those families who devoted themselves greatly in order 
to join the homeland. 
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this school was to establish a tradition o-f a family service 
in the Cossacks. By doing so the younger officers would be 
more far from the Persian life than their fathers. For a 
short period Reza Khan might have attended this school in 
order to acquire the basic military knowledge and 
discipline. Young Reza started his life in the barracks as 
an infantry soldier. The duty of the Cossacks was to guard 
all foreign establishments in Tehran. Therefore, during the 
early time of his service he did the guard duty at the 
American Presbyterian Mission compound, at German legation 
25 
and at British and Russian banks. As regards his military 
advancement, first he was promoted to the rank of a 
corporal, then to a sergeant and after ten years he got the 
26 
post of a sergeant major. 
Right from 1903 Reza Khan played a vital role 
in opposing the internal enemies of the government in which 
the Cossacks did their duty together with the regular 
forces. His courageous deeds in the compaign at Shahabad 
brought him the promotion to the rank of third lieutenant. 
Salar al-Daulah, a brother of the then ruler Muhammad 'A1 i 
Shah, who collected forces among the Kalhur tribe in the 
25. See Muhammad Asad, The Road to Mecca (New York, 1947), 
p. 200. 
26. At this period he married a young woman whose name was 
Hamdam and one year later she gave birth to a daughter 
who was given the same name. Reza Khan, his wife and 
his daughter stayed in their residence in Tehran upto 
1924. The good report of his work brought him a respect 
from the military unit in Tehran. 
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AreA o-f Saveh and Hamad an, was also opposed by Reza's force. 
In 1912, at the age o-f thirty four, he received the post of 
lieutenant. During the time he saw the military action 
against rebelling tribes in Kurdistan, Luristan and 
Khurasan . 
Considering the state of affairs in Iran of 
that period, Reza Khan was imbued with the feeling of 
patriotism, which became a major force in his life. By 
reading and by his own observations of the ways in which the 
Persian Cossacks were employed as an instrument of Russian 
Policy in Iran, gave him a firm determination to save his 
country from the hands of the Russians. Reza Khan got the 
post of Yavar or Major of the machine gun unit stationed in 
"28 
Tehran in 1915. 
He got the post of lieutenant colonel in 1916 
at Kermanshah as head of the infantry unit of the atriad 
commanded by a Russian officer. After being summoned to 
Tehran for a short time, he became incharge of infantry unit 
of the Hamadan atriad. He returned to Tehran again in 1917 
27. Thus he was involved in the battle against Rahim Khan 
Chalbiyanlu at Ardabil, under the command of Ja'far Qui i 
Khan Bakhtiari. Malik al-Shu'ara' Bahar, op.c i t. , p. 
72, cited by Donald Wilber, p. 9. After that he joined 
with the force led by 'Abd al-Husayn Mirza to fight with 
Salar al-Daulah, in the charge of the machine guns. He 
was promoted to the second lieutenant in 1911 and the 
commander of the machine guns. 
28. In this year he married with a daughter of Timur Khan, a 
commander of regular army. This was the same wife who 
later on became his queen and the mother of Muhammad 
Shah and three other children. 
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as he was called to command one of the Cossack regiments. 
This period was an important one as the Sreat October 
Revolution took place in Russia so there were intensive 
activities in Iran and on its northern frontiers. The 
British were moving up to the west of the Caspian Sea while 
both communists and anti-communists were fighting each other 
in the same area. A number of autonomous states came into 
eMistence on the northern frontiers. In the same year Reza 
Khan got an important post. He became the incharge for 
training the volunteers of the regular army which was 
established at Hamadan. His rising in position was very 
quick and suddenly he involved himself with politics and 
29 
1 ooked for power. 
30 
Under the patronage of Colonel Starosselsky 
Reza Khan first became sarhang. or full colonel in 1917 and 
very soon in 1918 he was promoted to the post of sartip 
sevumi or brigadier general and the commander of the Tehran 
battal ion. He took this opportunity to introduce a number 
of reforms in the military. At this time he also got 
interested in internal politics and began to discuss the 
problems of his country with his military colleagues. He 
thus gradually emerged as the spokesman of his people. As 
29. Donald N. Wilber, Riza Shah Pahlavi. The Resurrection 
and Reconstruct ion of Iran, p. 12. 
30. Caucasian and the second in command of the Cossack 
division. For an account of the relation between Reza 
Khan and Starosselsky see Richard H. Ul1 man, The Angl o-
Soviet Accord; Anglo-Soviet Relation., 1917-1921 
(Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 377-B6. 
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Donald Wilber writes colonel Starosselsky' was alarmed at 
this new attitude, actually a sudden emergence of long-
suppressed emotions, and appeared to regard Riza Khan as a 
menace to his own position. Unable to move directly against 
him, he made several charges against those Persian officers 
who were looking to Riza Khan for leadership, but these 
efforts, including the court-martial of one of these 
31 
officers, were unsuccessful '. 
In 1920 the British government sent two 
missions to Iran to revise the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 
32 
1919. It is interesting to note that this mission asked the 
Russian officer of the Cossack division in April 1920 to 
turn over that body to them but it was denied by the 
Russians. 
After the campaign of Qazian in 1920, though 
Persia was on the defeated side but the bravery of Reza Khan 
was recognized. He was then promoted to the post of full 
general and became the commander of al 1 the Cossacks 
stationed at Qazvin. It is said that the Cossack Brigade 
33 
was 'the only disciplined force in Iran'. In this place he 
made a close contact with the British whose garrison was at 
31. Donald Wilber, op .cit.. pp. 12-13. 
32. One of the missions dealt with financial affairs and 
revision of custom duties. The second mission dealt 
with military mission under the leadership of Major 
General W.E.R. Dickson. For the text of the Agreement 
see J.M. Balfour, Recent Happening in Persia (Edinburgh 
and London, 1922), pp. 123-125. 
33. Amin Saikal , op.cit.. p. 20. 
Qasvin 
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34 
Resa Khan was now materializing his not-so—far 
reaching dream. A man who helped Reza Khan to gain power in 
35 
Iran was Sayyid Zia-al-Din Tabatabai. As Peter Avery writes 
'The Sayyid was an adroit man in whom poverty had developed 
the charming manners of one who did not possess great 
physical address he was small and delicately -formed - but 
who had to win the approbation of patrons in his early youth 
by pleasant conduct and witty conversation. He was 
originally from Yazd. He spent many of his formative years 
in Shiras. In both cities the foreign element was 
predominantly British. His Patrons were men who admired the 
British. It is not therefore, strange that the Sayyid 
should in his heart of hearts be a lover of the British. He 
was, and remains one of a number of patriotic Iranians who 
be!ieve that the British are to be preferred to either 
36 
Russian or Americans'. Sayyid Zia was twenty years younger 
than Reza Khan and was the editor of a celebrated newspaper, 
34. In October 29, 1920, Starosselsky was dismissed by the 
new Prime Minister. It was said that such an action was 
encouraged by Reza Khan. 
35. Wilfrid Knapp, op . c i t., p. 24. The Young Sayyid Zia-
al-Din Tabatabai was merely in his early thirties when 
he became a writer and reformer with radical character 
and also the Prime Minister of Iran. He used harsh ways 
against a number of rich conservatives because of his 
strong desire for radical reforms. He was the agent of 
the British, who became Prime Minister after the coup 
de'tat. was later on forced by the more nationalist-
minded Reza Shah to resign and leave Iran. 
36. Peter Avery, op.cit., p. 223. 
165 Cchapter-IV3 
37 
r&'d (Thunder) which always encouraged 'political instinct 
•for survival , and had gained some insight into the peril 
facing his country when he was sent by Vusuq al-Dawla to 
Baku in 1919 as Iranian representative to Caucasian 
38 
Azarbaijan' . 
However it was admitted that the Ra^d was a 
supporter of 1919 Agreement and also pro-British. It was 
also said that, 'There was a good deal of coming and going 
between Sayyid Ziya and the members of the British Legation , 
39 
being the day before coup de'tat'• 
Both Reza Khan and Zia got help from Great 
Britain, but this did not mean that they were traitors 
against the interest of Iran since in the twentieth century 
no any country including the super powers have perfect 
independence of action and Iran was then in difficulty after 
the World War I. Therefore, it was not possible for Iran to 
act independently. Zia himself was no less nationalist than 
the others even he had a life long-pro-British policy. As 
one author points out although Reza Khan's ascendency was 
encouraged and promoted by General Ironside of Britain, soon 
37. 'He started a newspaper called ra'd. which means 
'Thunder', breezes for it to become recognised as a 
reputable journal, ranking close to the official gazette 
and only occasionally giving vent to well-informed 
criticism of government policy and, British inaptitude. 
Of the later, the Sayyid had had enough experience to 
speak with authority'. Ibid. 
38. Wilfrid Knapp, op.cit.. p. 24. 
39. Yahya Armajani, Iran (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey), p. 
136. 
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40 
afterward he found himself to be no more British puppet . 
One of the influencial deputy and clerics, 
41 
liodarres says that he was invited by Reza Khan to find a way 
to stop the turmoil. In the night of coup de^t^t the Shah 
and his minister heard a Cossack contingent coming near 
Tehran. At midnight the Shah sent his men to Shahabad which 
was not far from Tehran to watch what happened. 'It is 
significant to note that two representatives of the British 
42 
legation accompanied this party'. 
The troops of some 2,000 Cossack* under Reza 
Khan moved from Oazvin to Tehran. In the morning of 
February 21, 1921 the coup d'etat took place. The people 
were asked to be obedient and to maintain order. After the 
successful qoup de'tat Zia became the new Prime Minister 
while Ahmad Shah was still kept on the throne. The 
appointment of the cabinet was prolonged till the end of the 
week. Reza Khan received a new title, Sardar-e-Sepah 
(commander-in-chief of the armed forces). 'Reza Khan then 
proceeded to commend himself, on one hand, to the British by 
convincing them that he was Persia's 'last hope of salvation 
from Bolshevism'- and, on the other hand, to the Soviets by 
43 
promising to implement a Treaty of Neutrality'. But when 
40. Edward, Mortimer, Faith and Power j. The Pol itics of 
Islam. (London 1982), p. 307. 
41. One of the clerics who opposed Reza Khan. 
42. Yahya Armajani, op .cit. . p. 137. 
43. Ervand Abrahamain , op.cit., p. 25 
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Russian and British troops left Iran, Reza Shah then 
strengthened his own military position. His tactics was the 
centralizing o-f the previously decentralized army, the 
Cossack brigades and the South Persian Rifles. Having now 
the monopoly of military power, he was able to dismiss the 
last Qajar Shah, Ahmad Shah, and paved the way to become the 
first King of the new founded Pahlavi dynasty. After 
becoming the Minister of War, Reza Khan showed himself to be 
44 
a man of strong character. He brought the police and the 
gendemerie under his command. He dismissed the British 
military in the cossack brigade despite strong opposition. 
Soon afterwards Zia was forced to leave Iran. According to 
45 
Bahar: CZiyaD 'was not enough of a communalist to kill 
anyone, not enough of a fascist to cooperate with nobility, 
not decisive enough to silence the communists. He did not 
have a political party so that he could give positions of 
responsibility to fellow members and dismiss the rest. 
Neither was he a member of a tribe to be able to subdue 
others with its help. According to his own statement, he 
had not even planned ahead and did not have a hundred 
friends to count on to prevent Sardar-e~Sepah from pulling 
46 
the rug from under his feets in three months' Zia fled to 
Palestine from where he opposed Reza Khan. He opposed Reza 
44. Percy Sykes, A History of Persia, (London, 1969), Vol. 
II, p. 545 
45. Muhammad Taqi Bahar (d. 1904-5). 
46. Bahar, gg.. cit. , p. 14, cited by Yahya Armajani, op . 
c,i t., p . 138 . 
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47 
Khan saying CReza rule] 'was the negation o-f his ideals' . 
In the military -front Reza Khan was able to subdue various 
uprisings and rebel 1 ions started by various tribes and 
48 
ethnic groups such as the Kurdish revolt lead by Isma'il Aga 
Semtqu in Azerbayjan, the uprising o-f Tabriz, the revolt of 
Shaykh Khazal o-f Muhammarah in 1924, and the revolts of the 
Baktiyari and Lur Tribes which were supressed in 1925. 
The question of supreme authority occured 
when Reza Khan succeeded in maintaining order and advanced 
his own aim. The Shah fled to Europe at this moment to 
avoid the problem facing him and in the absence of the Shah 
the throne was vacant. When he came back after a long stay 
in Europe, he was reduced to a mere nonentity. 'In 1923 the 
Shah, who was apparently in fear of his life, left Persia 
finally for Europe, where he died in 1930'. In the same 
49 
year Reza Khan became the Prime Minister of Iran. As 
El wel 1-Sutton writes 'He became Minister of War in April 
1921, and Prime Minister in October 1923; but most of these 
47. Wilfred Knapp, op.cit.^ p. 24. 
48. Cf., A.R. Ghassemlou 'Kurdistan in Iran' in Peoople 
Without A Countrv ed. Berard Chal iand (London, 1980) , 
pp. 107-133; Margaret Kahn, Children of the Jinn i in 
search of the Kurds and their; Countrv (New York s 
Seaview, 1980) Stephen C. Pelletiere, The Kurds : An 
Unstabl e Element in the Sulf (Westview Press/Boulder and 
London, 1984); Wolfgang Behn, The Kurds^  it) Iran i a 
selected and annotated bibliograohv. (London : Mansell : 
Munchen, Verl ag Dokumentation, 1977) . 
49. L.P. Elwel 1-Sutton, 'The Pahlavi Era', in ed. John A 
Boyle,op .cit.. p. 49. 
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early years of o-f-fice were taken up with the basic task of 
restoring order throughout the country and establishing the 
50 
authority of the Central Government. 
At the Fifth Majlis Reza Khan faced three 
important groups. 'The first were reformers who approved of 
Reza Khan; Socialists who approved of him but hoped to 
influence in line with democracy; and the "minoroty" headed 
by the cleric Modarres who opposed Reza Khan. The rest were 
51 
the "independents". Nevertheless Reza Khan made up a good 
strategy. Apart from organising a strong army, he created a 
central authority and appease the clerics, he could also 
control the cabinet as well as manipulate the Majlis. His 
popularity reached its apex when he established the central 
government's authority over the oil producing province of 
Khuzestan. Shaykh Khaza'l the ruler of the semi-autonomous 
Khuzestan surrendered unconditionally. Reza Khan and his 
50. When Reza Khan became Prime Minister in 1923, Arif , one 
of his supporters wrote: 
O'Arif, may Sardar-i-Sipah live long in 
Persia for he will lead the country facing 
extinction to its survival. 
Kul1iyat-i-Divan-i Arif cited by Munibur Rahman, Post-
Revolution Persian Verse. (Institute of Islamic Studies, 
Muslim University, Aligarh, 1955), pp. 138-139. 
51 . As one writer points out 'What the new minister of war 
has seen very clearly was that a much more modern, 
capable, and centrally controlled army was needed if the 
political fragmentation of Persia was to be prevented. 
Various tribal leaders were beginning to assert their 
authority in the more remote province. From 1921 to 
1925 Reza Khan devoted much energy to suppressing such 
rebel ions', Alvin J. Cottrel1 'Iran's Armed Forces 
under the Pahlavi Dynasty' in Iran Under the Pahlavis, 
p. 391 . 
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troops returned to Iran victorious. The talk o-f Republic 
started after his victory. For the time being there was a 
possibility that Iran could become a republic. This idea o-f 
Rapubl ican state had already won support in case of Mustafa 
Kemal Ataturk of Turkey. So instead of naming himself Shah, 
Raza Khan named himself commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces. It was his plan that the proclamation of the 
Republic of Iran should be made before Iranian New Year of 
52 
1924. 
52. Wilfrid, op.cit >. p. 26. 'In 1924, when there was a 
growing demand for a Republic in Persia, it found in 
'Arif one of its leading supporters. At a concert given 
in Tihran on Sha'ban 5, A.H. 1342 (March 12, 1924) the 
latter recited three poems from which the following 
ghazal may be partly quoted to show his particular 
sympathies: 
The zephyr will carry to the nightingale 
the fragrance of the rose and wil1 bring 
everywhere the news of its arrival. 
O'give the tidings of our republic and. 
by the help of God, the Unseed voice will 
take them everywhere. 
With what fine publicity love will lead the 
Shah of Persia through the market of madness 
to Europe ! 
No one has enquired where the Shah will take 
away the treasure of jewels which Nadir brought 
from India. 
While the preachers and Qajars exist in Persia, 
where will the country of Darius hide its 
shame ? 
If the crown of Kay-Khusraw and the throne of 
Jamshid had any honour it will be destroyed 
by this beggarly Shah. 
O'Arif, may Sardar-i-Sipah live long in Persia, 
for he will lead the country facing extinction 
to its survival'. 
Cf . Kul1iyat-i-Divan-i-Arif, p. 294; cited by Munibur 
Rahman, op.cit., pp. 56-57. 
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The example O'f Turkish Republic had great 
in-fluence on the Iranians. There was a growing -feeling 
among the Iranians for the establishment of Iran as a 
53 
republic with Resa Khan as its first President. The anti-
monarchical movement, particularly led by the press, was 
very strong. This development encouraged Resa Khan to hope 
that the proposal would be brought to the Majlis. 
Unfortunately at that time the caliphate was abolished by 
the Turkish Grand Assembly in 1924. Therefore, such an 
example could not be a good model for Iran. At this 
juncture the mujtahids, with the support of the merchants of 
Tehran who were under the influence of the mujtahids and 
'whose trade at the New Year ( 2lEt. March ) had suffered 
54 
from the political excitement', were successful in stopping 
Resa Khan from materializing this idea. 
Although Ataturk could abolish the caliphate 
and could defy the 'ulama'. Reza Khan could not do this in 
Iran as he was just strengthening his power. He, therefore, 
needed the support of the 'ulama'. To earn the support of 
55 
the 'ulama' he went to the shrine city of Gum in 1924 where 
many mujtahids had found shelter since the British 
occupation of Iraq. In Qum he gave an assurance to the 
leading mujtahids that he was not interested in making Iran 
53. Percy Sykes, op . c i t., p. 546. For details see P. 
Amouzegar, 'The influence of Kemalism on Reza Shah's 
reforms'. Jj. Reg. Cul t Inst. 7: (1974), pp. 31-38. 
54. Percy Sykes, gg.clt., p. 546. 
55. South of Tehran. 
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56 
a Republican State. When he returned to Iran he declared 
In so far as I and all the people in 
the army have, -from the very beginning, 
regarded the preservation and protection 
C.W- the dignity of Islam to be one cf the 
greatest duties and kept before us idea 
that Islam always progress and be exalted 
and that respect for the standing of the 
religious institution be fully observed 
and preserved : thus, when I went to Qumm 
to bid farewell to the (exiled 
mujtahids) , I exchanged views with their 
excellencies regarding the present 
circumstances. And we ultimately saw it 
necessary to advise the public to halt 
the (use of) the term, republic. 
57 
The immediate failure of Resa Khan in this 
attempt was regarded in Tehran as his personal defeat. His 
growing power was then challenged for the first time in the 
past two years. It also gave an encouragement to his 
opponents in public life, in the Najlis as well as in the 
58 
press. To cope with the situation Reza Khan threatened to 
withdraw himself from the public life by saying that in all 
Iran there was no one who could replace him. He, therefore, 
called a number of cabinet ministers and staff officers at 
his residence in April 7, 1924 and told them at length about 
the work done to the country and also state his decision to 
56. Edward Mortimer, op .cit. , p. 30/. 
57. Cited in 'Abdullah Mustawfi, Sharh-i Zindigani-yi Man, 
X§ Tarikh-i IJtima'i va Idari-yi Dawrah-yi Qajariyah 
(Tehran: Kitab furushi-yi Zaddar, 1343 H-Sh,/1964), Vol . 
Ill, p. 601, cited by Shahrough Akhavi, p. 30. 
58. Donald N. Wilber, Riza Shah F'ahl avi .£_ The Resurrection 
1.0..d„ Reconstruction a£ Iran, op .cit,. , p. 80. 
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resign as well as his intention to leave For Karbala and 
59 
Najaf . 
In order to gain more support -from the 
cleric, it was necessary for Reza Khan to develop strong 
relations with them. 'This support came not from Qumm but 
from Najaf, whence Isfahani and Na'ini had repaired in late 
1924, Riza Khan had played a significant role in 
facilitating their return, although it is true that the 
British and Iraqi government authorities were predisposed to 
60 
their resumption of residence in the holy cities'. By 
providing military escort to guard the exiled clerics in 
their going back to Iraq. Nai'ni sent a letter of thanks to 
Reza Khan. 'Reza Khan moved to follow up his advantage in 
his relationship with Na'ini by paying a visit to Najaf in 
January 1925. There, it appears, he made a concerted effort 
to win the support of Isfahani and Na'ini in an attempt to 
block the return from Europe to Iran of Ahmad Shah'. For 
Reza Khan the support of the clerics was useful in 
overcoming the opposition from the clerics as well as from 
the secular politicians in the MaJl is in Tehran. 
Though at this point Ahmad Shah had dismissed 
Reza Khan from the position of Prime Minister his order was 
of no value as the Majlis did not pay any interest to follow 
his request to nominate another person to replace Reza Khan. 
59. Shahrough Akhavi, op.cit.. p. 30. 
60. Ibid. 
61. Ibid. 
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By the Majlis' decision the qajar dynasty was dethroned on 
October 31, 1925 and a constituent assembly to appoint a new 
Shah was called -for. This decision was opposed by only four 
62 
deputies, including Dr. Mosaddeq. Although, -for them this 
move was against the constitution but not even one o-f them 
defended the Qajar. Sultan Ahmad Shah of Qajar was declared 
63 
dethroned as he was absent from Iran. Reza Khan became Reza 
64 
Shah of the new Pahlavi dynasty on 12th December, 1925. 
Dr. Mosaddeq one of the deputies had an opinion that 'it was 
a shame to promote an active prime minister 1 ike Reza Khan 
to the inactive position of a Shah. If, as such he became 
active then he would be a dictator and if not then the 
65 
country would have lost an active pridne minister. 
62. 'Dr. Mohammad Mosadeq was one of the few individuals in 
Iran who stood consistently for his beliefs and refused 
to make any temporary comprimise, even though it might 
promote his goals' Donald Wilber, op . c i t.. p. 119. 
63. Maurice Harari, Government and Politics of the Middl e 
East (Prentice-Hall). Englewood Cliff. N.J.), p. 43. 
64. The constitution was amended on December 12, 1925 as 
follows: 'Art 36. The Constitutional monarchy of Persia 
is vested by the Constituent Assembly in His Imperial 
Majesty Riza Shah Pahlavi and his male descendants in 
succession. Art 37 'The eldest son, if born of a 
Persian mother, shall be the Heir Apparent to the 
Throne. In the event of the Shah having no son, the 
Heir to the throne shall be designated by his Imperial 
Majesty, subject to the approval of the Majlis. No 
member of the Qajar family can, however, be so 
designated. Helen Miller Devis.Constitution, Electoral 
LaWn Treaties of States in the Near an0 Middle East , 
rev. ed. (Durham : Duke University Press, 1953), p. 122, 
cited by Maurice Harari, p. 42. 
65. Yahya Armajani, op.cit., p. 141. 
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The expression of this opinion led to his 
being arrested and banished. Later on he was released at 
the time of the intercession of the new Crown Prince. 
Another deputy Mirza Yahya Dolatabadi left public life while 
the other two, Taqizadah and Ata, got important posts. 
Wilfrid Knapp describes the ascending to the throne of Reza 
Shah in the following words: 
'On 6 December 1925 a new 
period in the history of the nation 
was formally opened, albeit in a 
somewhat provisional manner. The 
ceremony was arranged, not in the 
Majlis building, but in the Takieh-
dawlat attached to the royal placie, 
which could accommodate the three 
thousand participants - the elected 
members of the Constituent Assembly, 
civil servants,foreign deplomats and 
their staff, the press and the 
'cinema operators'. 
The Provisional Head of the 
State drove to the Assembly from his 
residence in the glass coach of the 
Qajars. It was drawn by six bays 
which had been purchased from the 
British - Persian force when it was 
withdrawn. The procession was 
impressive, with its six Generals of 
division, companies of lancers and 
imperial salute; but the interior of 
the Takieh-dawlat showed all the 
signs of hasty improvisation -
1ighted by patches of bright winter 
sun breaking through gaps in the 
faded awning to compete with bright 
arc lamps, heated by iron stoves and 
having a hastily erected small 
platform. The three leading ulema 
of the land were firmly established 
on the platform, accompanied by two 
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other mullas with aspirations to 
grandeur; the veterans oi the old 
dynasty - Farman Farma, Ayn-al-
Dowla, Sipasalar Asam and said-al-
Dawla- were grouped at its bases' . 
66 
An Iranian author has given the following 
estimate oi the character o-f Reza Khan : The background of 
Reza Khan diametrically opposite to Zia. Reza Khan had only 
little education because he joined the Cossack brigade when 
he was 15 years old. He progressed rapidly to a commanding 
position due to his boldness and initiative. Although he 
was a nationalist but the long experience in military 
practice gave him an idea on the salvation of Iran in 
military lines. His difficult time under Russian commanders 
built up his hatred to the foreigners particularly the 
Russians and he naturally anti Bolshevik. To further his 
plan Reza Khan needed a man who knew better in politics and 
who could make speeches and do whatever thing Reza Khan was 
not yet prepared for. In the same way Zia also had an idea 
67 
that to make a coup without the military was not possible. 
Personality they do not know each other but with the help of 
British legation their relation began. It was the British 
legation which led Reza and Zia to work out their plans. At 
the end of 1920 Reza Khan became more determined that if \ 
66. Wilfrid Knapp , op .cit.. p. 27 
67. Yahya ArmaJani, gp.cit., p. 137. 
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turmoil was to be avoided when the British -force left Iran, 
Iranian government must be securely established. These 
ideas led to the alliance between Sayyid Zia and Reza Khan. 
'Reza Khan was a born soldier but he was not 
slow to acquire the technique o-f a statesman. He was a 
passionate Nationalist, but was so -far from hostile to 
Western ideas that, like Mustafa Kemal, he risked popularity 
in his zeal to apply the methods of Europe to the problem of 
Persian. Wiser than the President of the Turkish Republic, 
he compelled the obedience, but did not court the hostility, 
of the preisthood and the private 1 ife of Riza Khan was not 
marked by those excesses of conduct which have often 
characterized Oriental sovereigns and the President of 
68 
Oriental Republic in the twentieth century'. 
68. Sir Arnold T. Wilson, op .cit., p. 149 
*****»*#*#** 
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CHAPTER - V 
THE WESTERNIZING REFORMS QF REZA SHAH 
Reza Shah's efforts to westernize Iran was 
not an easy job. The weak development of the middle class 
in Iran, as in other countries of the Islamic World, was a 
great hinderance in the assimilation of Western influences. 
By the turn of the nineteenth century, Iran 
witnessed the increasing influence of the West. Several 
educated Iranians began to prefer Western socio-political 
values as compared to the traditional values of Islam. 
The intellectual atmosphere at the beginning 
of the twentieth century in Iran was highly receptive to the 
Western influence. Although the young Iranians, who 
favoured the Western values of life, were in a minority, yet 
their influence was growing. These intellectuals adopted 
anti-clerical views. Thus we find that in the decade before 
the creation of Pahlavi regime in Iran, expression of anti-
clerical ism had become especially strong among a group of 
poets and authors. This group known as moteJedcted was very 
1 
well known among the middle classes. 
1. The most reputed and outstanding members of this group 
were Iraj Mirza, Farah, and Eshqi. 
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Banani gives an interesting account of the 
anti-clerical view of the intellectuals. 'In the past', 
he writes, 'these revolutions were caused by the so-called 
prophets-or better yet - the prophets were moved by the 
needs of the time to cause the revolutions. Today, 
fortunately, there is no more need for prophets. And should 
any appear, it is better if they pass unrecognized. Today 
the revolution must come in the light of science and 
association with civilized nations, aided by rapid 
communication and transportation. The leaders of this 
revolution must be educated and rational men'. He further 
writes 'If a revolution is not created by the Iranians, ... 
the forces of nature will saddle them with an oppressive 
foreign master who shall lead them to progress by force. 
Nature develops these strong masters, for this world is fit 
only for the strong. Furthermore, nature is right and just 
in favouring the strong. "Because if we do not wish to 
advance ourselves, we are not only harming ourselves, but we 
create an obstacle in the path of progress and 
civil ization' . 
2. Amin Banani, pp.. c 11, pp. 22-23 
Lambton writes: 
'Riza Shah, however, unlike the later Qajars, 
who failed to understand the need for concessions, 
except in name, to the progressive elements, 
realized that he could only maintain himself in 
power if he conformed with the desire of the 
intellectuals for westernization. In spite of the 
disillusionment of this class with democratic 
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And it was with the help of this group that 
Reza Shah Pahlavi wanted to bring about changes in social , 
political and economic conditions of Iran. In fact this 
spirit of secular nationalism provided an ideological basis 
for Reza Shah's reforms. From 1909 onwards many governments 
in Iran had proposed programs of reforms. Reza Khan also 
introduced various programs of far-reaching reforms in those 
early years with similar motives and intentions as those of 
his predecessors. However, the degree of success achieved 
by Reza Khan was definitely much greater as compared to his 
predecessors. 
The social structure of Iran changed greatly 
as a result of the policies adopted by Reza Shah. This 
change was often linked up with the bourgeois revolution. 
As a result of the reforms introduced by Reza Shah, 
especially in education and law, the powers of the tribal 
and religious leaders were somewhat weakened. However still 
they were very powerful and effective. The landlords still 
owned huge lands. They had a good relation with the 
government as their interests were safeguarded. However, 
government, which they had come to regard as 
synonymous with licence, their desire for material 
progress was still strong. Consequently, Riza 
Shah, although he had in fact established a 
dictatorship, intentionally preserved the outward 
of constitutional government and embarked upon a 
programme of westernization and modernieation. It 
is, moreover, true that much progress in the field 
was made during his reign'. A.K.S. Lambton, 
'Persia', Journal of the pentral Asiap Society. 
Vol. 31 (1944), pp. 12-13. 
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some of the changes made during Reza Shah's reign, namely, 
creation o-f powerful bureaucracy and a high degree of 
modernisation had far reaching consequences. The army, the 
national gendermerie and local police were enlarged, 
modernised and endowed with more privilege and prestige than 
ever. Reza Shah made a strong effort to eliminate foreign 
powers, to suppress the internal opposition and undermine? 
the clergy's power. As a result of his modernising reforms 
the number of professionals and businessmen increased 
greatly. Between 1925 and 1940 many important semi-
professional institutes and various technical centers came 
3 4 
into being. The status of women improved too. 
Throughout his reign Reza Shah tried to build 
up a strong army and bereaucracy for curtailing the power of 
the tribal leaders, 'ulama', and independent landlords. One 
of his significant achievements was communicational and 
industrial development; though the work consumed a high cost 
to general people it paved the way for the foundations of 
5 
the capitalist development of Iran-
3. Reza Arasteh, Education and Social Awakening in Iran 
(Leiden, 1962), p. 38. 
4. Nikki R. Keddie, Iran ^ Religion, Politics and Society, 
p. 152. 
5- Nikki R. Keddie 'The Economic History of Iran, 1800-1914, 
and its Political Impact : an overview' Iranian Studies, 
Vol. V, no. 2-3 (Spring Summer, 1972), p. 76. 
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Educaticyi: 
The Shah was interested in educational 
improvement throughout his reign as he held the view that 
'in universal education lay the key to national strength and 
6 
unity' . In 1921 the fundamental reform aimed at the 
establishment of modern educational structure remained 
unmaterialized. Reza Shah wanted to extend the new state 
school system throughout the country. In order to achieve 
his goals he formed the Ministry of Education in 1921 with 
7 
full control over all aspects of education in Iran. 
The Ministry of Education made the first full 
program for elementary and secondary education in Iran. 
According to this programme it covered a twelve-year span 
which was divided into two six-^ year sections of the 
elementary and secondary levels. The six-year course of the 
secondary education was patterned according to the French 
1 ycee. It was divided into two three-year parts. The 
curriculum of the secondary school was vastly expanded, new 
subjects such as geometry, national science, a foreign 
language (French), Arabic, world history, and hygiene were 
6. Donald Wilber, Iran ± Past and Present. p. 129. 
7. From the early 1934 the Ministry of Education became the 
supervisor of elementary, secondary, and adult education 
including the traditional schooling. The teacher 
recruitment, the writing of text books and the collection 
of statistical data were directed by the Ministry of 
Education. The same Ministry also developed a six-year 
el einentary school program for urban areas and a four-year 
course for villages. 
183 Cchapter-V] 
introduced in the -first year. However, -freedom and 
community initiative were not supported by Reza Shah. It 
appeared that during his reign the highly centralized 
elementary education became the -function o-f the state. The 
state established a Permanent Pub!ic Education Section 
within the Ministry of Education to control education. 
After the centralizing policies of the Ministry of 
Education, every school whether it was a government or a 
private school had to use the same curriculum. In case the 
school wanted to change the curriculum it had to get the 
approval of the Head of the Curriculum Planning Section, the 
Higher Council on Education and the Ministry of Education. 
For technical education, throughout his reign 
the Irano-German Industrial school remained the most famous 
technical school in Iran. During 1921-41, technical schools 
were founded to provide industrial skills. an agricultural 
8 
college was opened in 1929, taught by foreign teachers. 
With the government assistance, a group of German 
technicians established independent polytechnical schools in 
Iran in 1922. 
The University of Tehran : 
The foundation stone of this University was 
laid by Reza Shah himself after the Act concerning the 
8. Charles Issawi, (ed.) The Economic History of Iran 1800-
1914 (University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 
1972), p. 376. 
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9 
establ ishment of the University o-f Tehran was passed in May 
1934. It was an autonomous institution ruled by a board 
composed o-f a President, a Vice-President, the Chairman o-f 
each department and a member-at-1 arge for each different 
faculty. However, the Ministry of Education involved in 
all the appointments of different posts including that of 
the President and the issuing of regulations concerning 
ranks, salaries of instruction, etc. The establishment of 
the university played an important role in the spread of 
10 
enlightened ideas in the country. 'Ali Akbar Siyasi who 
was the President of the University of Tehran made good 
efforts in this direction. 
In the second and third year many new 
subjects such as algebra, biology, physics, chemistry, 
geology and mechanical drawing were added. In the first 
three years the subject like trigonometry, solid geometry, 
zoology, and elementary economics, were added. Also the 
course of twelve years was classified into various 
categories : pure science, natural science, and humanities. 
9. The University of Tehran (Dani«hghah-i Tehran), is the 
oldest and most important of the universities of Iran. 
It grew out of the Polytechnic school known as Dar al-
Funun established in 1851. 
10. Siyasi came from a middle class family. He studied in 
France where he imbibed western ideas. His book La Pers 
£y. Contact de 1"Occident. published in 1931 , makes a 
strong defence of Westernisation. 
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These were the beginnings o-f modern educational structure in 
11 
Iran . 
Other important developments included the 
training of teachers and administrators, creation of new 
kind of text books, the utilisation of different teaching 
methods, and the construction of new schools. As the 
qualified teachers were an urgent need, in 1928 fifteen 
1 r? 
J. Jim 
students were sent to Europe by the MaJl is funds. The 
French e'cole mormale style was fol1 owed and the French 
educators became supervisors of new program in teachers 
training college. 
Capitalist-Land lord Development; 
On the eve of Reza Shah's rise to power the 
Iranian economy was in a very bad shape. From the very 
beginning Reza Shah showed great enthusiasm to develop the 
economy. In 1913 the total loan Iran had borrowed from all 
11. In the words of Reza Arasteh: 'The total number of 
children attending school never exceeded 15 percent of 
the actual school-age children. The traditional social 
structure was so strong and the power of landlords so 
great that education remained concentrated in urban 
areas, especially in the middle class. Geographical 
factors, the 1ack of transportation and the economical 
status of the country also curtailed rural education. 
However, in quantitative terms alone, the number of 
children who attended school in 1939-40 was four time 
the number enrolled in 1924-25'. Reza Arasteh, OQ_. 
citj^ i. pp . 57-58. 
12. Thf? first batch of students were sent to Europe in 1911. 
In, 1918 a teacher col lege c_qmprised two separate 
sections for men and women estabj ished at Tifhran. 
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foreign countries was 6,754,000 pound and she had to pay, in 
addition, an annual service charge o-f 537,000 pound which 
13 
absorbed all the custom incomes. Moreover, there were 
floating debts of nearly 900,000 pound ow^d to arms 
suppliers 'Iran's total consolidated and floating debt had 
14 
been reduced to well under pound 2,000,000 by 1925. 
In the World War I Iran received a harsh 
blow. Though it had declared a policy of neutrality, 
Russian and British troops still fought for her land while, 
German agents aroused the tribes in the south. To add to 
Iran's difficulty more there were also epidemics, crop 
failures and disruption of transport, which led to a great 
famine. But when Reza Shah came to the throne, things 
became better. He abolished foreign capitulations, 
introduced a new tariff and made a civil code. From the 
time on Iran became considerably free from the external 
pressures and had enough power to start on the developmental 
path. 
Western technology and science were freely 
imported to Iran during the reign of Reza Shah. 'The 
national philosophy dictated that the cultural spirit and 
the ancient virtues of Iran were superior to anything that 
the West had to of-fer. By adopting the science and 
13. J.E.F., 'Memorandum as to Persian Government Loans', in 
the Economic History of Iran 1800-1914, p. 371. 
14. Fazlollah, Mochaver, L'evolution des finance? iraniennes 
(Paris, 1938) cited by J.E.F. Ibid 
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technology of the West, I ran would be able t o surpass t h e 
15 
West i t s e H ' . 
The immediate -financial problem in Iran at 
that time was not that of the general increase of the 
national income but how to manage the existing resources so 
that the national treasury could be enriched. The main 
16 
sources of national income in 1921 were state lands, 
internal taxes and custom tariffs on foreign trade. The 
income from the state lands came through renting complete 
17 
villages to private tenants. Actually some steps in 
reforming the land revenue system were taken prior to the 
coming of the American mission. A bill authorising the 
survey of all landed property and the fixing of the same 
rate of land tax was issued. In 1922 a law which forced the 
18 
registration of property was passed but not enforced. In 
1924 the Majlis appointed a study board to explore the 
possibilities to increase state revenue The Board decided to 
sell plenty of state lands for cash. In 1937 after creating 
15. Amin Banani, op.cit.. p. 11^  
16. Landlordism is the principle of the land system in Iran. 
The State is the largest landlord owning vast demesne 
lands, including those which are owned by the State, are 
held in absolute possession called freeholding. Munibur 
Rahman, Post-Revolution Persian Verse, p. 150. 
17. Ibid., pp. 113-114. 
18. A.K.S. Lambton, op.cit.. p. 182. 
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the Industrial and Agricultural Bank, the MaJIis allowed the 
selling of some of the remaining state lands near the 
capital for the new bank. The internal tax came from the 
chief form of property, i.e. the agr*icul tural lends. But 
this tax could be collected only from the small land owners 
since the big land owners had political power to evade the 
paying of land tax. To reform the economy the Shah's 
government invited a group of thirteen American experts 
under the supervision of Arthur Millspaugh who arrived in 
Iran in 1922. The Millspaugh Mission was given the 
authority of the reform of the finance, central ization of 
the treasury, preparation of new financial laws for the 
economic remedy of Iran and above all attraction of foreign 
capital . The revenue provided by the Mission enabled Reza 
Shah to strengthen his army, control the tribes and 
maintain internal security. However, the good relation 
existing between the Millspaugh Mission and Reza Shah which 
existed in 1922-25 came to an end when the latter gained 
absolute power. He increased his demand for funds for the 
army and neglected other projects. Although the work of the 
Mission was discontinued in 1927, it left behind the 
knowledge of a modern financial administration. However, 
the patterns of taxation and tax collection were still 
nearly the same as the previous time. 
The law issued in 1931 gave the government 
monopoly power over the foreign trade and other enterprises 
like the production of sugar, tea, opium, silk, cotton, 
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wheat, dried -fruits etc. Foreign trade gave the largest 
19 
amount of income to the country. 
Another form of financial reform was in the 
banking operation. Before the creation of the Bank MelH in 
Iran in 1927 all the banks in the country were foreign 
concessions 1 ike the British and Russian banks who 
influenced Iranian economic life. Under the supervision of 
German enperts the Bank Mel 1i was endowed with the power of 
issuing currency and regulating fiscal policy. It became 
the main body in capital formation and investment for 
development as well as the formation of social policy. The 
result of the financial reforms during the time of Reza Shah 
was the increase of central control over the financial 
19. By its victory in 1827, Russia, through the Treaty of 
Turkomanchai of 1828, imposed a free-trade policy 
concerning Russian imports into Iran which resulted in 
Iran receiving only 5-8 percent on Russian goods 
imported to Iran. After that this grant had to be given 
to Britain and other European powers too. In 1921 Iran 
was under the Russo-Persian Tariff Agreement of 1902 and 
the Anglo-Persian Tariff convention of 1920. Resa 
Shah's policy concerning tariffs was to continue having 
Belgian supervisors in the customs administrative 
office. The system of work and the structure of the 
Ministry of Finance become more westernized under the 
advice of these foreign officials. Russia's 
geographical closeness to Iran and its ability to absorb 
Iran's exported commodities created the trade 
relationship between the two countries. In 1927 Russia 
became a greatest buyer from Iran. Northern Iran had to 
depend on Russia in selling its crops and others. The 
privilege of Russian monopoly on Iranian goods which 
previously existed was partially withdrawn in 1928 and 
completely denied in 1930. In 1931 Iran established her 
own state foreign trade monopoly in order to cope with 
the new problems. 
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matters of the country. The growth of finaqncial activities 
was accompanied by growing bureaucratic control. At first 
the state officials maintained public responsibility 'but as 
the honesty and austerity of his soldierly temperament gave 
way before the temptations of absolute power, he began to 
acquire land and accumulate wealth by methods not short of 
20 
extortion' . 
Agricultural Reforms: 
Iran's predominantly agricultural economy was 
least affected by the modernizing efforts of Reza Shah. 
(This may be the result of the tradition of a backward 
country to aim at its industrialization, more than the 
modernization of its agriculture). In 1924 a study board 
was appointed to explore the feasibility of land-tenure 
reform and the modernization of agriculture, but the early 
government of Reza Shah was vaguely aware of the problem. 
The 'reform' gave no result because even a mild effort 
towards reforms had to face strong opposition o-f the big 
21 
land-lords who dominated the liajl is. Moreover, during the 
reign of Reza Shah the groups endowed with great privilege 
and power were the groups of army and bureaucracy. Many 
22 
army officers became very wealthy and powerful. However 
20. Amin Banani, op.cit., p. 119. 
21 . Ibid., pp. 119-120. 
22. Nikki R. Keddie, Iran ± Religion. Politics and Society, 
p. 154. 
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'under the rule of Riza Shah the old landed proprietors and 
tribal khans were weakened, and the rising class of 
merchants and contractors, the higher rank of the army, and 
the new bureaucracy were enabled to acquire estates. 
Landowners' interests have, therefore long been identified 
with those of the administration and the army, and they have 
successfully frustrated attempts at other kinds of reform in 
the past, either by turning such attempts to their own 
23 
advantage, or by obstructing the execution of laws' . 
To understand the problem of agricultural or 
land reform in Iran, it is necessary to know about the 
relationship between the land ownership and the tenure 
system. Actually in Iran there were a number of small 
landowners, approximately two-thirds of the 1 and was owned 
by the large landlords. The share of money given to the 
tenant farmers depended, according to Iran's traditional 
custom, on the condition of the land. Usually the farmer 
could get only one-fifth of the product and the rest went to 
24 
the landlord. In Iran there were three types of land 
ownerships - private, state and waqf (religious endowments) . 
The state lands were nominally administered by the Ministry 
of Finnce and the waqf lands were under that of the Ministry 
of Education, but in fact they were 'rented' and managed by 
23. Doreen Warriner, Land Reform in Principle arid Practice 
(Oxford, 1969), p. 110. 
24. William S. Hass, Iran (New York, 1968), p. 196. 
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the big landowners. Private lands could be divided into 
three kinds, depending on the size o-f the land-holding - the 
large, the medium and the small holdings. In the first 
category there was a complete dichotomy between the 
landlords and the peasants. In the latter two categories 
often the owners became little more than hired farmers of 
the owners of the water in the area. In the firgt fifteen 
years of Reza Shah's regime there was no sincere efforts to 
change the pattern of land tenure or the relationship 
25 
between the owners and the tenants of agricultural lands. 
The tenants paid rent which was fixed in terms of a portion 
of the gross yield, not in the terms of money. Usually, 
they had to pay fifty percent of their crops as a rent to 
the landlord. the very large income from the tenants was 
partially responsible due to the reluctance of the landlords 
to invest in development. The Civil Code of Iran did not 
give any attention to this relationship, leaving the 
peasants in a defenceless position. Civil authority in 
Iranian rural areas was totally in the hands of the 
landlord. This condition strongly barred the reform, 
mechanization, and the growth of agriculture in the 
country. 
In the late thirties the government began to 
look after the agricultural sector of the country. The 
25. Amin Banani, op.cit.. p. 12^  
193 Echapter-V3 
effort then was concentrated on the land development rather 
than on the land reform. The Land Development ^ct which 
aimed at agricultural development was passed on 16 November, 
26 
1937. The owners of the land were forced by the Act to 
utilize the agricultural lands they owned. Utilization 
included the development of irrigation, the reclamation of 
exhausted land, the maintenance of canals, and the 
construction of rural roads, etc. The Act also called for 
the government to give credit to the needy owners, and to 
punish the delinquent owners. Despite the fact that the Act 
had given power to the Ministry of Agriculture to formulate 
an over-all plan for the agricultural development of the 
whole country, it handed over the whole project to the 
landlords because the councils were wholly composed of the 
landlords of the region. 
In agricultural field there was certain 
progress in the expansion of industrial crops 1 ike, sugar 
beets, tobacco, tea and cotton, the efforts to improve the 
land tenure system only led to the concentration of big 
26. The Act was designed to encourage the optimum use of 
land on the part of both landlords and peasants. The 
act remained a dead letter, because its implementation 
was entrusted to the landlords. Those landlords who 
disliked the act, did nothing; those whp attempted 
improvement met with opposition from the peasants, who 
saw no point in increasing production until the share-
cropping scheme was changed. In 1939, the Majlis 
authorized the Ministry of justice to examine 
possibilities of reforming sharecropping agreements, but 
no action was taken'. Roger M. Savory, 'Social 
Development in Iran during the Pahlavi Era' in Iran 
under the Pahlavis, p. 96. 
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27 
lands in the hands of the Shah and the landlords. The 
introduction o-f agricultural machinery or mechanization oi 
agriculture further consolidated the strength of the ruling 
c1 asses. 
The large and rough area of Iran (628,000 Sq. 
miles) had created a great need of modern system of 
28 
transportation and communication. The lack of proper and 
adequate transport facilities caused the waste of crops in 
some areas as well as alienation of many tribes living far 
from the capital . The building of a rail-road in Iran had 
been frustrated for nearly seventy-five years. Railway 
construction was considered as 'tantamount to progress, 
29 
sovereignty, and national status'. The Project needed a 
large sum of money, which was expected to come from the 
country's revenues. The employment of an American mission 
27. For details see A.K.S. Lambton, Landlord apd Pesant in 
Persia. Chs. 8,10,13. 
28. For details on the developments of transportation and 
communication see Amin Banani, The Modernization of 
Iran; 1921-1941. Ch. VII. 
29. To modernize his country Reza Shah had to construct a 
trans-Iranian Railway. Before 1921 there was only one 
narrow guage railway leading from Tehran to Shah 'Abd 
al ' Azim five miles from Tehran. The MaJ1 is approved 
the Act governing the construction of the Trans-Iranian 
Railway on February 9, 1926. The 1,394 kilometer 
railway was completed in 1938 and an amount of 
2,552,700,000 rails were spend. 
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helped Iran to achieve her Tari-f-f autonomy in 1928, thus 
30 
Iran could raise duties for revenue. 
Since 1928 industries received great benefits 
-from various protective measures of the government. 
Private, small and medium size factories were founded in 
great numbers in the 1930s and the government itself founded 
31 
many industrial plants. Reza Shah put stress industry more 
32 
than on agriculture. The attempts of the government in 
promoting industries in the country were made stronger in 
1930. Private investments were encouraged by the granting of 
tax exemption for these enterprises for five years. Even 
though the government's attraction was drawn towards the 
heavy industries, it gave first attention to light 
30. Issawi writes: There was a large amount of revenue for 
oil. Moreover, 27 government monopolies were founded, 
including tobacco, sugar, tea, matches, opium, textiles, 
automobiles, etc. In 1931 the country's revenue rose 
from 229 million rials in 1922 to 400 million rials in 
1931 and the debt to Britain and India reduced from 
2,619,000 pound to 1,601,000 pound. In 1938 total 
revenue became 1,376 million rials and by 1941 (The last 
year of Reza Shah's reign) it was 3,200 million. The 
Economic History of Iran 1800-1914. pp. 376-377. 
31. Issawi writes that private industry was encouraged by 
exemptions from customs duties and certain other taxes, 
by rebates and preferences by credit supplied by the 
Agricultural and Industrial Bank founded in 1933, and by 
protective measures including Tariffs, quotas, and 
eKchanges control . In addition the government set up and 
ran several plans in textiles, sugar' refining, cement 
and other industries, and a steel mill and iron foundry 
were under construction in 1941. By then, the cement, 
textile, food, drink and tobacco industries met a large 
part of domestic consumption' Charles Issawi 'The 
Iranian Economy 1925-1975: Fifty years of Economic 
Development', op .cit. . p. 131. 
32. Charles Issawi Economic History of Iran 1800-1914, 
p.378. 
196 Cchapter-V] 
industries. Before Reza Shah came to power, there SKisted 
in Iran small scale manufacturing industires like rug and 
silk-weaving which were done by hand. 
In 1941 a steel mill and iron foundry was 
established, which could extract a small amount of coal , 
iron, copper, and other kinds of minerals. The neglect of 
agriculture had an adverse affect. According to Charles 
Issawi 'Large-scale investment, high indirect taxation, and 
Credit expansion raised prices sharply, the cost-of-living 
index rising by over 50 percent between 1936-37 and mid 
1941; the burden of this rested largely on the poor and the 
32 
salaried middle class'. 
Throughout the reign of Reza Shah many 
developments in various fields took place. Consequently 
special institutes were established to produce a semi-
professional staff and supervisors. Also the vocational and 
technical schools were built in order to supply semi-skilled 
technicians and manpower. As a result of various 
capitalistic measures a new middle class began to develop in 
Iran which played important role in the spread of 
westernising of ideas in the country. 
32. Ibid.. p. 379, However only a small percentage of the 
Iranians were affected by the industrial establishments. 
The figures showed that not more than 300,000 were 
employed in industries. Most of these workers worked 
in the oil-drilling and refining, transportation, carpet 
weaving and a few number of other industries. Monthly 
Labor Review, September, 1946, cited by Munibur Rahman 
Post-Revolution Persian Verse, p. 151. 
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Emancipation of Women: 
An important aspect of Reza Shah's re-forms 
33 
included his desire to emancipate the Iranian women from the 
feudal bondage. The task was not an easy one as the 
conservative 'ulama' considered the education of women as a 
menace to the Islamic society. In Iran as in some other 
Muslim countries female education was completely identified 
with religious education which was imparted in the mosques 
by the clergy. Moreover, 'the idea expressed in Iranian 
philosophy that education should be highly selective for 
34 
those who can profit by it'. This idea debarred girls from 
the right to have an education. 
The pioneers for female education were Sadigeh 
35 
Khanum Dawlatabadee and Khanum Azamodeh. Each established a 
33. In Iran the 7th Day of January of evei"y year is 
considered as the Day of Women's Emancipation which 
reminds the same day in 1937 when Reza Shah made an 
announcement which forbade the Iranian women wearing of 
the veil. F.R.C. Bagley, 'The Iranian Family Protection 
Law of 1967: A Milestone in the Advance of Women's 
Rights' in Iran and Islam, p. 47. 
34. Ruth F. Woodsman , Women in the Changing Islamic System. 
(Delhi , 1983), p . 147 . 
35. Khanum Daulatabadee was still a young girl when she 
started the first girls' school in Isfahan. She was at 
that time perhaps among the few Iranian girls 
sufficiently educated to teach. She had borrowed the 
advanced ideas from her father who was an enlightened 
man. She had received her education at the boys' school 
and dressed as a boy. This education, unusual for her 
time, inspired her to start a school. As the school 
entirely conformed to the requirements of 
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school -for girls which was followed by the emergence of 60 
private girls' schools in 1914. In 1919 a small amount of 
public fund was allocated for the female education. In 1926 the 
government granted one half of one percent of land revenues for 
this purpose, which was too meagre for the rapid growth of 
girls' education in the country. In 1936 the HaJlis voted in 
favour of female education. At that time the number of 
governmental boys' schools, both primary and secondary, was four 
times that of the schools for the girls. Boys enrolment in Iran 
was slightly more than three times of girls enrolment in the 
years 1933-34. In rural areas the education of girls received 
very little attention. 
The educational development could be seen when 
ten primary schools of three grades for boys and girls together 
were opened in 1935. The form of co-education led to the 
advancement in educational facilities as well as social 
progress. The co-education schools were run by women and half 
of the pupils were girls. The same type of schools were also 
36 
planned for the provinces. 
religion, the conservatives found no harm in it. Khanum 
Daul atabadee saw girls' education develop from the simple 
beginning of private schools into a national system, and she 
herself became an inspector of girls' education for Iran 
under the Ministry of Public Instruction. 
'Quite in contrast to the youthful effort of Khanum 
Daulatabadee... Khanum Azamodeh's active interest in 
education for girls did not begin until she had become a 
widow after fifteen years of married life. Her husband, an 
Iranian general , a man of liberal ideas, had promoted 
education for the Iranian girls'. Ibid.. p. 145. 
36. Ibid., p. 147. 
199 Cchapter-V3 
A majority of girls had been given a chance 
to study in only elementary schools (four years' course). 
The middle schools for girls (11 years' course) were few. 
The American Mission schools with 12-13 years' course gave 
the highest education for girls in Iran. 
As regards higher education for girls in 
Iran, the conservative always believed that advanced 
education for girls was not only unnecessary, but also bad. 
the official endorsement had an effect in encouraging the 
desire for higher education among girls. The most desired 
thing in order to improve girls' education in Iran was the 
better training of teachers. In fact the teaching 
profession for women in Iran was not considered a good 
career, so the women-teachers did not have equal financial 
status as male-teachers. Iranian girls who entered this 
teaching profession were, therefore, very few. But the Shah 
gave special recognition to the women teachers who graduated 
37 
from Normal Schools. The Shah's signal recognition 
undoubtedly acted favourably on the public attitude towards 
38 
teaching. 
37. A teachers' training school in Tehran 
38- Ibid., p. 154. 
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In the time of Reza Shah, the training o-f 
39 
women -for health education was at the early stage. The 
training course for the nurses was given at the Mission 
hospitals, but in 1928 the first centre for such training 
was opened in Tehran. A number of girls who completed the 
course were sent to France or England. This training centre 
encouraged Muslim girls to enter into this line of career in 
40 
which previously only Christian girls took interest. 
39. 'Prior to the Pahlavi era, public health was nonexistent 
in Iran, in 1924, there were only 905 physicians in the 
whole country, and only 253 of these had been trained in 
accredited schools such efforts in the field of public 
health prior to the accession of Reza Shah, had proved 
largely abortive, mostly due to the opposition of the 
religious classes. The League of Nation's Report on an 
Investigation into Sanitary Condition in Persia (1925), 
quoting Banani, state clearly the magnitude of the 
difficulties confronted by the government in this 
regard : 
The beliefs of the people and the 
teachings of the rel igious instructors or 
mullas as they are called have not only 
an effect on the character of the people 
but also prevent the introduction of 
sanitary and other reforms. The opinions 
of the 1eaders of Mosl em thought are 
important factors in all affairs of 
state... 
Many of the customs of the 
people are interpretations of the koran . 
The manner of killing the anima)s in the 
slaughterhouses, the washing of the dead, 
and their burial, are all performed in 
the manner laid down by the religious 
laws. The belief that all running water 
which is open to the air is good and safe 
for drinking is taught by the religion. 
Dissection or postmortem of bodies is 
forbidden. 
Roger M. Savory 'Social Development In Iran during the 
Pahlavi Era' ofi.. crt.., pp. 92-98. 
40. Ibid., p. 318. 
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Removal gf. the Veil ; 
The most striking event in Reza Shah's time 
41 
was the movement aiming at 1ifting the chaddur which was 
considered to be an act initating the Kemalist example. The 
reforms towards -female emancipation made by Reza Shah in the 
42 
early part of the year 1928 effectively diminished the 
influence of the 'ulama'. Before the end of the same year 
the government issued regulation which provided police 
protection to women who might choose to appear unveiled in 
public. The opportunity offered by these regulations was 
availed of by a large number of women in Tehran who 
43 
abandoned the veil in favour of European dress. 
The removal of the veil , writes Eh". Munibur 
Rahman, 'represented an important landmark in the movement 
for female emancipation. It is true that conservatism and 
deep-rooted prejudices prohibited many women from taking 
41. The compulsory unveiling in 1937 was a royal move to 
force the pace of social evolution. At that time the 
great majority of the people, and even many of the 
intel 1 igensia, were not ready for such a change. Poor 
women possessing no suitable outer garment other than 
the Cha'dor (veil) suffered severly'. F.R.C. Bagley, 
'The Iranian Family Protection Law of 1967. A Milestone 
in the Advance of Women's Rights Qfi.. c i t.. p. 48. 
42. 'Movement for the Emancipation of Women in Persia' , 
Bui 1 etin of Institute of Isl amic Studies (Institute of 
Islamic Studies , Muslim University, Aligarh no. 1, 
1957) , p. 35. 
43. Ibid. 
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advantage o-f the opportunity o-ffered to them, but those who 
desired could now come out -freely, and take part in social 
activities side by side with men. No longer were they 
forced to keep within the -four walls of their homes. Thus 
one of their most interesting features of the change which 
has taking place in Persia with the awakening of women is 
44 
their increasing participation in cultural activities'. 
The Shah and the queen appeared at a function 
of the diplomatic circles held at the Normal School in 
Tehran. In this function the queen and the two young 
princess were seen unveiled in their European dresses. 
While the queen was addressing the new students in one room, 
the Shah was addressing the girls who had graduated from the 
school . This function was considered as the most 
45 
significant step for the cause of female emancipation. To 
the gathering comprising five hundred women the Shah said: 
'It is not too much to say that 
formerly half the population of our 
country was not counted, or in other 
words - half the working forces was 
unemployed. There was no census 
taking for women, as if they 
belonged to another species. You 
women must consider this a great day 
and make use of your opportunities 
44. Ibid., p. 36. 
45. Woodsmal1 , op.c i t.. p. 44, 
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in the progress o-f the country. My 
sisters and daughters now that you 
have entered society, know your duty 
that you must work -for your native 
land. The happiness o-f the future 
is in your hands' . 
46 
In 1934 it was rumoured that the unveiling o+ 
the girls would be made compulsory and in the spring of 1935 
the unveiling became practically compulsory. There was a 
statement in the regulation that 'no girls wearing the veil 
47 
could receive school prizes or diplomas'. It also ruled 
that the girls, i-f veiled, will not be allowed to attend the 
school. In order to encourage the constant promotion of 
unveiling, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of War 
passed an order opposing the veil . The officers or cadets 
were not allowed to appear in Tehran on Ladezor or Istanbul 
streets together with their women wearing chaddur no matter 
the veiled be their mothers, sisters or wives. 
After ascending the throne Reza Shah had 
announced the establishment of constitutional government in 
which political parties could actively play their parts. 
This brought about the change in atmosphere as a result of 
which a number of new women's organisations came into being. 
An organisation named Tashkilat-i Zanan-i Iran 
46 . Ibid ., p. 43. 
47. Ibid.. p. 46. 
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(Organization of Persian Women) was founded in 1943. In the 
following year the same organisation issued a Journal 
entitled Bidari-yi Ma "(Our Awakening)" of which Zuhra 
Iskandare was the editor. 
However, the removal of the veil remained 
confined to the women who lived in towns, particularly those 
who belonged to the middle classes or upper-middle classes, 
48 
while the village and tribal women wore the veil as usual . 
William S. Mass says: 
'The veil, as the symbol of the 
seclusion, was also the symbol of 
polygamy... It will suffice to state 
that the most serious drawbacks connected 
usually with polygamy are not so much 
outcomes of polygamy itself as the result 
of the seclusion by which polygamy is 
nearly always accompanied. It is this 
isolation which accounts for most of the 
intellectual , moral , and social injuries 
and handicaps. 
49 
Even before the time of Reza Shah there was a 
growing desire for reforms in the marriage and divorce laws 
of Iran. Reza Shah discouraged polygamy which became 
socially ostracized in the towns. Inspite of the 
opposition from the 'ulama', a law regarding marriage and 
divorce was introduced in the MaJlis on July 26, 1931 which 
was passed with few amendments on September 14, 1931. By 
this law, the registration of marriage contract and act of 
48. Munibur Rahman, op .cit. , p. 37. 
49. William S. Hass, op.cit., pp. 166-67, 
205 Cchapter-VD 
divorce with civil of-ficials became obligatory. To prevent 
child marriages the law mentioned that marriage could be 
contracted only by those who had physical aptitude for it. 
Moreover the marriageable age -for boys and girls was -fixed, 
i.e. at eighteen and sixteen years -For boys and girls 
respectively. It was made obligatory that those who sought 
second wife must get the consent of the first wive. Without 
the prior consent of the first wife the second marriage was 
not valid. Besides, women were entitled to seek divorce 
50 
from their husbands. 
Legal Reform; 
According to Shi'i Islam two legal systems 
based on the shari'a and the urf should work together. Both 
the 1 aws can be cal1ed as canon 1 aws as wel 1 as the secul ar 
laws. The purpose of the shari'a courts was to have 
jurisdiction on matters pertaining to personal status and 
civil law while the urf courts were meant for the cases 
involving the state. However, the weak government of Iran 
had put only shari'a courts into practice. Urf system was 
not fully developed and before the Constitutional Revolution 
the urf was confined only to divankhane-ye ^adliye (Court of 
Justice) in Tehran. The divankhane-ye 'adliye 'had no code, 
51 
no regular organization, and no established administration'. 
50. For details see William S. Hass og. cit. pp. 181-183; 
Amin Banani, op .cit. „ pp. 80-84. 
51. A. Matin-Daftari, A'iyn-e Padresi-ye Modoffii va Bazargani 
(Civil and Commercial Court Procedure) (Tehran, 1945), 
p. 8. 
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Thus the practice of jurisdiction was vague 'and the 
dispensation of justice highly individual and 
52 
decentralized' . 
When Reza Shah rose to power he paid much 
attention to the reformation of judicial system. He was 
aware of the foreign affairs and he had 'realized that so 
long as Iran did not have a judicial system along Western 
53 
Lines, the abolition of capitulations might attract adverse 
54 
publicity in Europe' keeping in view these objectives he 
tried to give a practical shape to his plans. He introduced 
experimental commercial and penal codes in 1924 and 1926. 
He also dissolved the old Ministry of justice in 1927 and on 
April 26 of the same year, several personnel who had 
received education in Europe took over the administration of 
the new Ministry of Justice from the former clerical 
55 
officials. 
The Ministry of Justice employed a foreign 
adviser named 'Adolph Perni, a French jurist, for assistance 
52. Amin Banani, op.cit.. p. 68. 
53. It was about a century that the chance of Russian 
intervention in Iran was frustrated by Britain. But the 
Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, which WAS in Britain's 
interest in India and the Persian Gulf, gave a chance to 
it. Since then Iran was forced to accept the privilege 
of the foreign powers' citizens to be exempted from 
Iranian law. At the time when Reza Shah began his rule 
there were only the British who had this capitulatory 
privilege as aresult of Turkomanchai Treaty of 1828. In 
1928 Iran abolished the capitulation and nearly at the 
same time it regained the autonomy in the fields of 
customs and tariffs. 
54. Amin Banani op.cit.. p. 70. 
55. Ibid. 
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and advise for the preparation o-f a panal code. He finished 
his work by the end of 1911. The first panel code, which 
was never promulgated in Iran, was submitted to the Majlis 
for approval in January 1912. It comprised 506 articles and 
was the first attempt in Iran to incorporate the Napoleonic 
Code in the Shari'a. The penal code was signed by three 
leading mujtahids. They also agreed that the new features 
of the code were not against the tenets of Islam and that 
the code was acceptable by the standards of the shari"a As 
Banani writes 'It is significant that three leading 
mujtahids should not have objected to a French jurist 
preparing a code of laws for Iran. But far more significant 
was the implicit admissions by the mujtahids that the body 
of the shari'ah was no longer adequate and that legal 
56 
concepts of the West might be added to Islamic precepts. 
Almost ten years after the rise of Reza Shah 
the power of the clerics was greatly curbed. The state 
courts were given preference over the shari ^a courts in 
1922. Its jurisdiction was later on expanded in 1926. The 
reform of judiciary system of 1926 witnessed the demise of 
57 
the Shari'a courts. Also the shari'a courts as defined in 
article 7 of the law were confined only to matters of 
personal status such as divorce, marriage and the 
appointment of trustees and guardians. Moreover, the law of 
27 December 1936 forbade the clerics to be a judge in the 
56. Amin Banani, op.cit.. p . 38 . 
57. Shahrough Akhavi , op.cit.. p . 38 . 
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courts of law. This law was preceded by the Law of 
Religious endowment of 1934. By this law the religious 
endowments whose administrators were not known would be 
taken and looked after by the government's Department of 
Endowments. The above laws introduced by Reza Shah led to 
58 
the hostility between Reza Shah and religious institutions. 
The other law which reduced the prestige and authority of 
the clergy was the conscription Law of May 1925,in which the 
government had a role to decide as to who could be exempt 
from military service. The achievements of Reza Shah can be 
summed up under the main three headings: First he built up 
the infra-structure of modern state, secondly, he strove for 
national independence from forein domination, and lastly he 
introduced socio-cultural reforms in the country. 'With 
regard to the first, Reza Shah did indeed lay down the 
foundations without which a modern state could not function. 
These included assertion of government authority and natural 
unification in the face of various centrifugal and 
anarchistc forces; the creation of a reliable army under 
national command; establishment of a modern fiscal system 
based on rational organization; and development of minimum 
of communications and transportation facilities compatible 
59 
with the requirements of a modern state. 
58. For details see chapter-VI . 
59. George Lenzczowski, 'From Assertion of Independence to 
the White Revolution in Iran under the Pahlavis, p. XVI. 
• X - * * * * * * * * * * 
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CHAPTER - VI 
THE CLERICS RESPONSE IQ. IfcE. REFORMS 
When Reza Shah came to power in the 1920s he 
initiated a series of re-forms to modernise his country. 
Most of the reforms were not liked by the 'ulama' as these 
affected their socio-economic position. Some of his reforms 
were radical in nature and hence they were considered as 
heretical by the clergy. Reza Shah met with strong 
opposition from the 'ulama' when he introduced certain 
reforms in the field of education on the western pattern and 
other reforms such as republicanism, legal and judicial 
reforms and the emancipation of women. The 'ulama' by 
opposing the socio-economic formation of the country lost 
their contact with the newly emerging middle classes and 
bureaucrats. As one writer points out 'the ulema were 
caught unaware when Reza Shah came to power in the 1920s and 
were hence unprepared to meet his sweeping changes. They 
correctly perceived the changes being introduced into 
Iranian society as a threat to their privileged positions, 
1 
and withdrew into their ranks' . The mental f ram^ i^ork of the 
'ulama' remained feudal and conservative. 
1. Gustav Thaiss, 'The Bazaar as a case study of Religion 
and Social Change' in Iran Faces Seventies ed. Ehsan 
Yar-shater (Praeger Publishers, New York, U.S.A., 1971), 
p. 205. 
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When Reza Shah -forced Ahmad Shah to leave 
Iran in 1923, there was a talk of turning Iran into a 
'-} 
republic. 'But the 'ulama', writes Moojan Momen 'seeing the 
markedly secular direction o-f the newly-formed Turkish 
republic under Ataturk, took fright and began to call for a 
3 
rejection of republicanism. This idea was not liked by the 
'ulama' as they regarded the newly formed Turkish republic 
under Ataturk as a secular and un-Islamic country. Banani 
writes that Reza Shah 'was strongly influenced by the events 
Immediately after the coup of 1921 it was widely believed 
that Iran would become a republic presided over by Reza 
Shah. But the example of Turkish Republic which rejected 
the caliphate and had the religious institution and the 
state separating from each other brought del ightness to 
the Shi'i clergy and made them support the will of Reza 
Shah in establishing the new dynasty with the ancient 
form of monarchy. If they could know in advance 
would treat them, they probably have chosen 
democratic form of ruling. T. Cuyler Young, 
of Westernization in Modern Iran' in The 
Journal. Vol. II. 1948. 
how he 
a more 
'The problem 
Middle East 
'Reza Shah was 
neighbour, Kemal Ataturk 
he was fully aware. The 
deal in common : the 
determination to modern 
critical attitude towards 
the public 1 ife of thei 
Lenczowski, 'From Assert 
Revolution' in Iran under 
frequently compared to his 
, of whose attitudes and reform 
two leaders had certainly a good 
ir burning national ism, their 
ize their countries, and their 
the intrusion of religion into 
r respective nations'. George 
ion of Independence to the White 
the Pahlavis, p. XVI. 
3 . An, Introduction to Shi' i Isl am, p 
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in neighbouring Turkey, and he considered -forming a 
republican government in Iran. The spring of 1924 
accordingly witnessed a vigorous campaign -for the 
establishment of a republic, and the enlightened segments of 
public opinion were prepared for its acceptance. However, 
the abolition of the Caliphate by the Turkish Republic 
coincided with this campaign and provided Modarres and other 
religious elements with their last potent weapon against 
Reza Khan. Quick and irrational arguments were advanced 
against a republican form of government. Ugly passions were 
aroused against Reza Khan by suggesting that he i^ as a Babi 
4 
and that he conspired to destroy Islam'. 
Thus the 'ulama' as leaders did not like the 
country to be fashioned on the pattern of Ataturk's Turkey 
which Reza Shah wanted to follow. For them Ataturk was 'the 
destroyer of the caliphate and the scourge of organized 
5 
Islam'. At that time the support from the 'ulama' was 
necessary for Reza Khan because he was yet consolidating his 
6 
power. Between October 1923 and December 1925 Rega Khan was 
eager to follow the policy of alliance with the 'ulama' for 
his own benefit. As a result of widespread internal 
rebel 1 ions in the state during the period and the British 
preparation to impose the League of Nations Mandate over 
4. Amin Banani, op.cit., p. 42. 
5. Nikki R. Keddie, 'Iran : Religious Orthodoxy and Heresy, 
in Pol itical Culture' in Rel igion and Society j, Asia and 
the Middle East. <ed.) Carlo Caldorola (Berlin, 1982), 
p. 214. 
6, Edward Mortimer, gfi,. cit.. p. 308. 
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Iraq, the idea of creating a monarchy and establishing an 
alliance with United Kingdom was introduced by the British 
to solve the problems. The crisis occurred when preparations 
were made for election to the parliament. The leaders of 
7 
the anti-election group, Isfahani and Na'ini, issued fatvas 
to the masses forbidding them to participate in the 
8 
election. This action of the two mara4.i consequently led to 
a direct confrontation between the 'ulama' and the British 
who later on issued order to exile the two 'ulama'. In 1923 
Isfahani and Na'ini went to Qum. Ahmad Shah and Reza Khan 
went, separately, to pay their respects to the jnaraJi at 
Qum. 
Ahmad Shah tried to spread the fear of 
Kemalism in the minds of the 'ulama' when Reza Khan 
expressed his desire to follow the way of Kemalist Turkey. 
He (Ahmad Shah) raised the slogan of "oriental" 
traditionalism to counter the republicanism of Reza Khan. 
He went to Qum, to meet the three important mujtahids, 
Ha'iri, Naini and Isfahani. These three mujtahids sent a 
telegram to the 'ulama' of Tehran apposing the idea of 
republicanism in the following words: 
7« Mirza Muhammad Husayn Bharavi, Na'ini (1860-1936) and 
Haji Sayyid Abu al-Hasan Isfahani (d. 1945) 'were living 
in Najaf, having a certain number of followers in both 
Iraq and Iran'. Abdul-Hadi Hairi, Sh.i 'ism and 
Consititutionalism in Iran. p. 65. 
8. MaraJi'-vi taqlid (sing marja'-i taalid) . 
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There have been expressed 
certain ideas concerning a 
republ ican -form of government which 
are not to the satisfaction of the 
masses and inappropriate to the 
needs of the country. Thus, when 
His Excellency, the Prime Minister 
came to Qum ... to say goodbye 
(to the exiled muJtahids) we 
requested the elimination of this 
rubric (or republicanism), the 
abolition of the above-mentioned 
expressed ideas and the proclamation 
of this to the whole country. He 
has accepted this. May Sod grant 
that all people appreciate the 
extent of this act and give full 
thanks for this concern. 
9 
It appeared that the idea of the 
establishment of a republic was opposed not only by the 
'ulama' but also by the ultra-liberals who opposed on the 
10 
ground that this idea was presented by a 'dictator Cossack'. 
Resa Khan made the following proclamation to pacify the 
'ulama' which deserves to be quoted at length: 
"It 
experience 
government 
contradict 
and it is 
principle 
government 
has become clear from 
that the leaders of the 
must never oppose or 
the ideas of the public, 
in keeping with this very 
that the present 
has avoided impeding the 
sentiments of the people, no matter 
whence they may derive. On the 
other hand, since my only personal 
aim and method from the beginning 
has been, and is to preserve and 
guard the majesty of Islam and the 
independence of Iran, and fully to 
watch over the interests of this 
country and nation, assuming anyone 
9. Shahrough Akhavi, g£. cit.. p. 29. 
10. Yahya Armajani, og.. cit,. p. 140. 
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who opposes this method to be an 
enemy o-f the country, and striving 
mightily to repel him; and 
determined to continue, hence-forth 
in this method; and inasmuch as at 
present the thoughts o-f the masses 
have become divergent and the minds 
poisoned, and since this confusion 
of thought can produce results 
contrary to what 1ies at the bottom 
of my heart : i.e., to preserve 
order and security and to stabilize 
the foundations of the state; and 
insofar as I and all the people in 
the army have, from the very 
beginning, regarded the preservation 
and protection of the dignity of 
Islam to be one of the greatest 
duties and kept before us the idea 
that Islam always progress and be 
exalted and that respect for the 
standing of the religious 
institution be fully observed and 
preserved: thus, when I went to Qumm 
to bid farewell to the (exiled 
mujtahids), I exchanged views with 
their excellencies regarding the 
present circumstances. And we 
ultimately saw it necessary to 
advise the public to halt the (use 
of) the term, republic. Rather 
every one should spend his efforts 
to el iminate the impediments to the 
reforms and progress of the country, 
and to help me in the sacred aim of 
consolidating the foundations of the 
religion, the independence of the 
country and of the national 
government. It is for this reason 
that I advise all patriots of this 
sacred aim to avoid calls for a 
republ ic and to unite efforts with 
me to achieve the supreme abjective 
upon which we are agreed" 
11 
1 1 . C i ted i n 'Abdu l lah Mus tawf i , Sha rh - i -Z ind iga r? i - y i Man Ya 
T a r i k h - i - I J t i m a ' i va I d a r i - y i Dawrah-yi-QaJariyah . Vol . 
I l l , 2nd, ed . (Tehran : K i t a b f u r u s h i - y i Zadtiar, 1343 H. 
Sh . /1964) , p . 601 quoted by Shahrough Akhav i , o p . 
c i t . , pp 29-30. 
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As mentioned above the immediate -failure o-f 
Reza Khan to implement the idea of rupublic was regarded as 
his personal de-feat. It meant that his growing power was 
challenged for the first time within the period of two 
years. It also encouraged his oppostion in the Mail is as 
12 
well as in the press. To cope with the situation, Reza Khan 
once threatened to withdraw from the public 1 ife since he 
felt sure that there would be no one in all Iran who could 
replace him. On April 7, 1924 he called a number of cabinet 
ministers and staff officers to his residence and told them 
at 1 ength about the work he had done for the country and 
stated his decision to resign and his intention to leave 
13 14 
Tehran for Karbala and Najaf. In order to gain more support 
from the 'ulama', Reza Khan wanted to forge stronger 
relations with them. He played an important role in 
bringing Isfahani and Na'ini back to the city of Iraq, 
though this did not please the Iraqi government and the 
British. But Reza Khan received support from both Qum and 
Najaf. In January 1925 he visited Najaf to win the support 
of Isfahani and Na'ini in order to block the returning of 
Ahmad Shah from Europe to Iran. Reza Shah, the then Prime-
Minister, issued a manifesto stating that s 
12. Donald N. Wilber, Riza Shah Pahlavi j. The Resurrection 
and Reconstruction of Iran , o£. cit., p . 79. 
13. Ibid., p. 81. 
14. The Shrine city in Iraq. 
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It should be specified -for all the 
Muslims that those who revolt 
against the Is!amic government of 
Iran are 1 ike those who fought 
against the prophet during the 
15 
battles of Badr and Hunayn such 
people are those to whom the 
Qur'anic verse (about polytheists) 
is applicable. The punishment for 
polytheism is death (in this world) 
and torture in the hereafter; 
therefore, it is obligatory for us 
to inform the people not to deviate 
from this Muhammadan circle (the 
government of Riza Khan) which gives 
currency to Islam. Those who oppose 
this command will be considered 
infidels willing to destroy this 
religion, and consequently it is 
necessary to anathemize them 
according to the rules and proofs of 
16 
the Qur'an. 
The manifesto had several significant implications: 
15. Fought in 624 and 630 A.D. respectively 
16. Shahrough Akhavi, op cit.. p. 30-31. 
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(1). Monarchy, though not in the Qajar -form, was important 
to the 'ulama'. 
(2). Resa Khan had realized the power of the 'ulama' and 
tried to employ it -for his own benefit. 
(3). The Iranian 'ulama' in Iraq supported the government 
in Tehran hoping that Tehran government would help to 
check the power of British colonialists in Iraq. 
(4) . The 'ulama' in Tehran began to be suspicious of Reza 
Khan as a man who would let himself to be the tool for 
the British policy. 
Immediately after gaining power Reza Shah 
17 
started to curtail the power and influence of the 'ulama' . 
He lost ground among the clergy, but gained popularity among 
civil, merchant and the commercial bourgeoisies on account 
18 
of his national economic policies. 
The 'ulama's power and intellectual influence 
was undermined due to the development of modern education 
and judicial system as well as centralization of power in 
army and bureaucracy. Inspite of a number of westernising 
reforms introduced by Reza Khan the 'ulama' still commanded 
great respect among the people. Nikki R. Keddie remarks : 
'As in many Islamic countries there developed a split 
17. Moojan Momen, Ofi crt., p. 250. 
IS. Oilip Hiro, Iran under the Avatol1ahs. (London,1987) , p 
27 
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between the higher classes having a modern education and 
generally hostile to the 'ulama', and the lower classes who 
were still largely subject to the 'ulama's' influence. Many 
in the government and upper classes, however, continue to 
think that the influence of the 'ulama' on the lower classes 
is a good thing, since it helps keep these classes from 
19 
getting dangerous and revoltionary ideas'. 
At the same time the government did not dare 
to oppose the 'ulama' openly. What they tried to do i^s to 
appease them by giving them some power on matter which were 
not directly challenging the power of the government. 
During the last month of Reza Khan's office 
of Prime Minister, the Conscription Law of May 1925 was 
issued. This law gave many powers to the government to 
decide as to who could be exempt from military service and 
at the same time it reduced the prestige and authority of 
the clergy. It allowed the government to call the 'ulama' 
who were su«»pected to be against the state pol icy to 
military service. Besides the Conscription Law there were 
many other matters which crestted enmity between the 
religious institutions and Reza Shah, Briefly speaking 
these matters included: (1) the 1926 reform of the judiciary 
which gave a death blow to the religious courts; <2) the 
riot provoked by the 'ulama' in Isfahan which resulted in 
the government's order to limit the growing of poppies and 
production of opium in 1924; (3) the law requiring 
19. Nikki R. Keddie, 'The Roots of the Ulama's Power in 
Modern Iran', op cit.. p. 227. 
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uniformity of dress; (4) the banishment of the well-known 
20 
Ayatullah Bafqi to Qum in 1920 and to Shah Abd al-Azim in 
1928 ultimately leading to his mysterious death? (5) the law 
of •xamination of religious students and the licensing of 
religious teachers of 1928; (6) the law of 1931 introducing 
the new syllabus for religious schools; (7) the new law on 
the authority and prerogatives of the Endowment Department 
of the Ministry of Education of 1934; (8) the establishment 
of the Faculty of Theology in 1935 as one of the four 
constitutive colleges of Tehran University; (9) the crisis 
21 
and fatalities at the shrine of Imam Riza Mashhad in 1935. 
The government also banned the traditional religious 
activities such as pilgrimage to the shrines, public 
20. According to an Iranian author Muhammad Razi 'The crisis 
arose allegedly over the offensive behavior of the 
1 adies of the Court inside the courtyard of the shrine 
of Hazrat Ma'sumah (the sister of the eighth Imam) , 
Ayatullah Bafqi's sternly worded admonitions against 
them, and the descent upon the city by Riza Shah and his 
chief military aide, Taymur Tash. Surrounding the 
shrine with artillery and armor the Shah is reputed to 
have sent Taymur into the sanctuary to rout the 
ensconced Bafqi. Deliberately striding in with his 
boots and thus violating the sanctity of the shrine, 
Taymur upbraided the unfortunate Bafqi with excoriation 
and dragged him by the beard out of the haram 
(sanctuary). His ultimate fate was imprisonment for six 
months and exile to Shah 'Abd al-Azim, where he is 
reported to have died in mysterious circumstances -
perhaps by poisoning - in 1944, Asar-i-HuJjab. Vol . I 
'Qumm I Hikmat, 1332 H.Sh/1953), pp. 35-36, cited by 
Shahrough Akhavi , p. 42. 
21. Shahrough Akhavi, QP cit.. p. 38. 
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22 
preachings, passion plays, etc. In 1926 Davar, th« new 
Minister of Justice, introduced a new civil code. The civil 
coda ratified on 8 May 1928 was tantamount to the 
23 
secularization of the shari'a. 'It was a verbatim 
24 
translation of the civil code of France, 
A big defeat for the 'ulama' came on 17 March 
1932 when the shari'a courts were deprived by authority of 
the 'Permanent Law Concerning the Registration of Document 
and Property'. This law led to the lost of major part of 
the total annual income earned by the mujtahids and mullahs 
who acted as registrars. The shari 'a courts then could only 
deal with matters of personal status such as marriage and 
inheritence. Bringing cases to these courts had to be first 
approved by the civil court. Article 7 of the law included 
only (1) desputes involving in principles of marriage and 
divorce and (2) the appointment of trustees and guardians. 
In the latter cases all actions of the shari'ah courts were 
subject to the concurrence and supervision of the Attorney 
General . Article 8 of the law forbade the shari ^ah courts 
22. Davar who had a middle class origin, was one of the 
chief young lieutenants of Reza Shah who showed great 
zeal in his efforts to modernise Iran. He was a man of 
great ability and tact. He graduated in law from the 
University of Geneva, and became Minister of Justice 
while still a relatively young man. Amin Banani, op . 
cit., p. 71. 
23. Amin Banani, og. cjjt., p. 71. 
24. A. Matin-Daftari, A'iyn-e Dadresi-ve Modoni va Bazargani 
(Civil and Commercial Procedure) (Tehran, 1945), p. 12, 
cited by Amin Banani, p. 71. 
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from pronouncing sentences. Their verdicts were to be sent 
to the state court that had referred the case to them, to be 
pronounced by that court. In case of appeal by the 
defendant, the verdict of the shari'ah court could be 
reviewed by the state court. The provisions of this law 
were made retroactive to January 5, 1929, in all cases 
pending before shari'ah courts (article 17), thereby 
removing a large number of cases from those courts'. They 
could not pass sentences but they had power to determine 
guilt. Again, the Law of 27 December 1936 forbade, the 
cleric to be a Judge in the courts of law. The 'ulama's 
position was very much undermined when reforms 
26 
were introduced in the religious endowments (auqaf) of 1934. 
25. Amin Banani, ofi. cit., p . 79 . 
26. The government administration of religious 
endowments (auqaf) can be traced back to the Safavid 
period (1501-1722). 'In part two, chapters one and five 
of the famous book of government organisation in the 
Safavid period, the Tadhkirah al-Muluk references are 
made to a Daftai—i-Mawqufat, i.e., an Endowments,Bureau; 
and its director was entitled the Sadr al-Sudur (also 
variously called the Mustawfi al-Mawqufat and/or the 
Vazir al-Awqaf. This individual had been invested by 
the Safavid monarchs with broad power to superintend the 
dispatch to the Daftar of accounts by the mutaval 1 is and 
other functionaries involved in matters of religious 
endovijments, the auditing of such accounts, the 
registration of properties, etc. But after the Afghan 
invasion, the accession Nadir Shah, the interlude of the 
Zand Dynasty and the assumption of power by the Qajars 
(that is, from 1722-1785), the extent and number of 
religious endowments declined markedly. 
the administration of awqaf under the 
It may be said as a general principle 
was able to restore its institution 
throughout the 18th century. It was 
in the Usuii victory over the Akhbari 
school under Muhammad Baqir Bihbihani (d. 1803) - a 
victory which ... affirmed the position of mujtahid. 
Information on 
Qajars is scarce, 
that the clergy 
after its eel ipse 
done doctrinal 1 y 
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According to the law such religious endowments whose 
administrators were not known would be taken over and looked 
a-fter by the government's Department of Endowments. The 
auqaf was the result of the post-constitutional development. 
Nevertheless, it was not until 1 1911 that the 
rationalization of the administrative structure of 
endowments was attempted. The Civil Code of 1928 contained 
a number of articles regarding religious endowments. Six 
years later the Majlis passed the Endowments Law of November 
1934. As a result of this legislation, the Jurisdiction of 
the Department of Endowments within the Ministry of 
Education was broadened. This change adversely affected the 
traditional madrasa system of Iran. With this there started 
a period of intervention, subsidization and direct control 
over the large number of religious schools that persisted 
till the end of the reign of Muhammad Reza Pahlavi (1941-
1979) . 
Thus a number of religious schools fell under 
the control of the government which enabled the regime to 
control their officials, teachers and students. This action 
was, naturally, a great source of the 'ulama's' 
dissatisfaction. Moreover, certain charitable auqaf which 
The clergy triumph was in terms of involvement in social 
affairs, especially in the second half of the century. 
They cannot readily have done so without improvement in 
their economic condition. This in turn meant, in 
likelihood, an improvement in the state of awqaf at 
least in the Isfahan and Azarbayjan regions. Browne 
states that the Amin al—Dawl ah (1844-1904) served as 
the head of Awqaf in 1880, so we know that it persisted 
as a department of government'. Shahrough Akhavi, op. 
cit., pp. 55-56. 
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were constituted for purposes such as the holding of 
rawdakhanis came under Reza Shah's muta'azzir u) masraf. 
i.e. their proceeds could no longer be devoted to the 
purposes for which they were founded since rawdakhanis were 
prohibited. In some cases these auaaf were taken over by 
the Ministry of Education and in other cases usurped by the 
individuals. After the abdication of Reza Shah the proceeds 
of some of these auaaf were again devoted to the purposes 
27 
for which they were founded. At the time of Reza Shah most 
of the 'ulama' accepted that the government of Iran was not 
really Islamic. These 'ulama' claimed that the Shah himself 
w«s not pious and that he did not follow the advice of the 
'ulama'. Further, he attempted to modernise, control and 
depoliticise the religious institutions. For the religious 
leaders Reza Shah's claim to be an Islamic ruler was absurd. 
The acts of the Shah such as making posters showing himself 
and the Qur'an could attract loyalty from the masses who 
were simple and traditional minded, but not from the learned 
'ulama' . 
In 1935 Reza Shah launched a campaign 
persuading the people to dress in European style. The women 
28 
had to unveil themselves and men had to wear hats. Two 
27. A.K.S. Lambton, Landlord and Peasant in Persia, p. 236. 
28. According to Shah's decree of 1928, European clothes 
became compulsory for men except the mullahs who were 
allowed to retain their traditional robes and turbans. 
For offieial-head-dress at the beginning was the Pahlavi 
cap, a low cylindrical affair with a flat peak like a 
french kepi. This head-dress was intended as 
intermediate step. Later on the Pahlavi cap was to be 
replaced by the fedora hat. By 1935 European dress 
style became universal. 
224 Cchapter-VI3 
religious leaders from Pars, Sayyid Noroddin and Ja'-far 
Mahal! ati, protested against this order of the Shah which 
resulted in the confiscation of their waqf pension by the 
government. Regarding women's dress at the initial stage 
only propaganda campaign was launched and only school girls 
29 
were unveil led. But by the end of 1935 the police b»gan to 
order veiled women off the street and out of public places 
30 
such as cafes, cinemas, and hospitals. Reza Shah's unveiled 
wife and daughter appeared in the public. In a speech which 
29. The poet La'huti wrote a ghazal supporting the women to 
discard the veil in January 1920. This ghazal began: 
O'lift veil, my beautiful sweetheart, so that thy 
countenance may increase my dignity. 
Wherever thy veil is mentioned the rival laughs, but 
sobs choke my throat. 
I long to see thee free in the community. Upon thy soul 
I have no other desire except this. 
Divan-i-Lahuti. p. 256,cited by Munibur Rahman, Post-
Revolution Persian Verse, p. 147. Regarding the 
unveil ing of women Poetess Parvin (1909-41) wrote: The 
eyes, and the heart, need a covering - but one of 
decency. The flimsy veil is no foundation for being 
Muslim. F.R.C. Bagley, 'The Iranian Family Protection 
Law of 1967: A Milestone in the Advance of Women's 
Rights' Iran and Islam. p. 48. 
30. In 1936 Iran became the only noncommunist government in 
a Muslim country to have abolished the veil . 'A much 
more spectacular and possibly more fundamental change 
has been the emancipation of women. Outwardly, this has 
taken the form, as in the case of the men, of 
modernisation of dress. For centuries Iranian women had 
been shrouded in black and unbecoming veils, covering 
the body from head to foot even more throughly than in 
most Muslim countries; they were only permitted to leave 
their houses during certain hours, and in general were 
not regarded as active members of the community' L.P. 
Elwel1-Sutton, op cit.. p. 121. 
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31 
he d e l i v e r e d i n 1936 he sa id s 
i 
1 am extremely pleased to see 
women who as the result o-f knowledge 
and study have come to know their 
true position and to understand 
their rights and privileges. As 
Mme. Tarbiat has pointed out, the 
women of our country, because of 
their exclusion from society, have 
been unable to display their talent 
and ability - indeed I might say 
that they have been unable to do 
their duty towards their beloved 
country and people or to show their 
service and devotion as they should; 
but now, in addition to their 
distinctive privilege as mothers, 
they are going to enjoy the other 
advantages of society. 
We must not imagine 
indefinitely that one-half of the 
community of our nation need not be 
taken into account, in other words, 
that one-half of the country's 
working power should be idle. A 
census of women has never been taken 
- as though women were a separate 
community and not to be reckoned as 
part of Iranian society. 
It is most unfortunate that 
there has only been one case where a 
census of women was possible, and 
that was when there was a shortage 
of food; then a census was held in 
order to ensure the suppl y of 
provisions. 
I do not wish to appear 
affected, I do not want to give a 
survey of the progress that has been 
made, nor do I want to draw a 
distinction between today and former 
days. But you women must recognise 
this day as a great one and must 
make use of the • opportunities you 
have for the advancement of your 
31. Michael M.J. Fischer, ofi cit.. p. 98, 
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country. I believe that we must all work 
to the best o-f our ability -for the 
prosperity and progress of this nation, 
just as we must strive along the road of 
education; although education is making 
progress through the efforts of State 
employees, yet no one should be heedless 
of the fact that the nation needs work 
and energy, and everyone must 1abour 
harder and better for the prosperity and 
wel1-being of men. 
You, my sisters and daughters, now 
that you have entered society, and have 
taken this step for the advancement of 
yourselves and your country - you must 
understand that your duty is to work for 
your country; the happiness of the future 
is in your hands. You will have to 
educate the race of the future, you will 
be able to be good teachers and bring up 
good citizens. 
I expect from you educated women, 
now that you are conscious of your rights 
and privileges and are going to perform 
your duty towards your country, that you 
will be contented in your lives, will 
work efficiently, practise economy in 
your daily life and abstain from luxury 
and extravagance. 
32 
As one author writes s 'nothing could have 
been more of audacious slap in the collective face of 
clergy', than the Empress' appearance withgout the veil. 
Soon Reza Shah heard that one mujtahid from Qum denounced 
the Empress for appearing unveiled. The man was then beaten 
33 
by an iron rod in a mosque by the Shah himself. At social 
32. L.P. Elwell-sutton,gfi. cit.. pp. 122-123, Cf., above,p 
203-204. 
33. Margaret Laing, Ihe Shah (London, 1977), p. 51. 
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meetings, the government o-f-ficials as well as members of the 
'ulama' were invited to attend along with their unveiled 
wives. A Britisfi diplomat named (Jrquart noted the 
•f ol 1 owing : 
There is much talk o-'^  how the 
various mullahs wept over this rape 
of Islamic tradition and people are 
enjoying with a morbid horror and 
indignation definitely cautious, the 
prospect of some of the religious 
leaders dying of grief and strain, 
or else committing suicide ... it is 
rumoured that a Sayyid, prominent at 
Khoi , in resisting the order to 
unveil was arrested, shaved and sent 
home wearing a European hat, and 
that he was found dead in bed on the 
following morning. 
34 
A new situation developed on the occasion of 
the twentieth anniversary of the bombing by the Russians of 
the Imam Reza Shrine in Mashhad. A mul 1 a was sent by Hajj 
35 
Mir::a Hoseyn Qummi to spei^ k against the unveiling of women. 
This mul1 a climbed on to the minbar of Gawhar-shad mosque 
then took out his turban and squatted over it. This made 
the audience attentive. He then started to speak. In his 
speech he demanded the abolition of the order concerning 
we^stern headgear a.nd unveil:!.nq and abused the Shah and local 
34. British Public Records Office, file number FO 416/94, 
1936 cited by Michael M.J.Fischer, p\ 98. 
35. Ibid. 
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officials. This was supported by the people who raised 
slogans against the Shah. The shrine officials of Navvab 
Ehtesham and other shrines were snatched off their official 
headgears. The policeman who came to the place met with 
strong resistance by the people. According to the British 
Consul Day'a fracak occured during which the general officer 
commanding was pushed into a water channel. He appears to 
have lost control of himself and ordered machine gun fire to 
36 
be opened'. Thirty two people died. The Shah ordered the 
shrine to be cleared by force. The men assembled outside 
the shrine, beating their breasts, and chanting 'Husayn, 
protect us from this Shah'. The villagers armed with 
sticks, sickles, shovels and daggers started to reach the 
town. The garrison sympathetic with the people, disarmed 
themselves and returned to their barracks. However, there 
was one detachment which on the fourth night at 2.00 a.m. 
forced the door of the shrine open and fired at the people 
assembled in it. The death toll as officially declared was 
37 
28. Shaykh Muhammad Taqhi Sabsevari, the mullah who 
preached on that eventful day escaped across Afghan border 
and remained in exile for forty years. 
36. Ibid. 
37. The unofficial figure was 128, 
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As mentioned above, the un i ' fo rmi ty o-f Dress 
Law D :^ 6 Day 1307/27 December 1928 a lso fo rced I r an i an men 
t o wear western d ress . A r t i c l e 2 of the law exempted t h e 
• fo l lowing e i g h t ca tegor ies of i n d i v i d u a l s : 
1 • ^Muj tahids who have rece ived the i j azah from one o f t h e 
maraJ i ' v i t a a l i d who were pursuing a r e l i g i o u s ca l1 i ng . 
» 
2 . Those engaged in mat ters of the ho ly law i n the v i l l a g e s 
and r u r a l areas a f t e r the passing of a spec ia l 
exa f l i ina t ion . 
3 - Mu'^tis of the Sunni f a i t h who had the i j azah from two 
o the r Sunni m u f t i s . 
4 . Muhaddithun ( r e l a t o r s of the T r a d i t i o n s ) who were 
1 icensed by two mu j tah ids . 
5 . Preachers who had p u l p i t s . 
6 . Re l i g i ous s tudents in f i q h and usul ( j u r i sp rudence and 
t h e p r i n c i p l e s of ju r i sprudence) who had passed an 
examinat ion geared t o t h e i r leve l of s tudy . 
7« Teachers of f i q h . usul and h i k m a t - i - i l a h i ( t h e o l o g y ) . 
38 
8 . Non-Muslim I ran ian c lergymen. 
38 . I hsa^ i vahWi Ma^ar i f va Madar is . 1307-1708, pp . 7 0 - 7 1 , 
c i t e d by Shahrough Akhav i , p . 4 3 . 
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Among the Shi "i clergy only the mujtahids 
were exempted of the burden of proving their exempt status 
39. 
before secular councils or examination board-s'. As mentioned 
40 
above it was necessary for the mujtahids to obtain diploma 
from the 1iving maraj i ^ -y i-taglid. However the requirement 
of examination weakened the rural mullahs. The preachers 
had to produce a certificate of his having hold of a 
bonafide pulpit in an established mosque. Naturally the 
passage of the law put the Iranian clergy to a defensive 
position. It became a legitimate practice for the oficials 
of the regime to harass the madrasas. The steps taken by 
the officials led to many bloodsheds. Abd al-Karim Ha'iri 
launched a protest against such measures only to meet with 
another law which further stiffened the requirement for the 
student and teachers of the madrasas to prove their status. 
The involvement of the Ministry of Education in certifying 
teachers and students posed a challenge to the self-
selection system within the religious institutions. 
41 
When the yearly Ashura occured that year 
(i.e. 1929) the 'ulama's anger reached its apex when the 
policemen put a great pressure on the religious 
institutions. A group of the market merchants and guildmen 
39. Shahrough Akhavi, qp.cit., p. 43. 
40. See above Ch.III 
41. Yearly observances of the martyrdom of the third Imam. 
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of Tehran sought for the opinion of Ha'iri concerning the 
Dress Law. Ha'iri then sent a telegram to the Shah saiying : 
'Although I have up to now not interfered in any (political) 
matter, I hear that steps »re being taken that are openly 
contradictory to the Ja'fari path and the law of Islam (in 
the face of which) it is difficult for me any 1onQer to 
43 
restrain myself and remain tolerant'. The strict control 
over the education system showed that the government aimed 
to reduce the number of students and teachers in rftligious 
schools. The self-autonomy of the religious institutions 
then came to an end. After Resa Shah's abdication in 1941 
42. Abd al Karim Ha'iri Yasdi (d. 1937), the teacher of 
Khumayni, taught him religious sciences in Qum. 'In 
1920 a mujtahid who had been resident in Arak (a town in 
Western Iran) by the name of Shaykh 'Abd. al-Karim 
Ha'iri Yazdi, journeyed to the shrine city of Qumm, some 
90 miles south of Tehran. It is standard practice for 
Iranian clergymen to move from locality to locality in 
response to requests sent them by the local irjhabitants 
to take up duties in their area and generally provide 
guidance in matter of prayer, arbitration, social 
welfare, moral leadership, instruction. Ha'iri had 
undergone the normal training and education of muJtahids 
Shi'i holy places Catabat) in Iraq. Although 
were in a state of increasing pol iticization 
the period between 1890-1914, he seems to have 
preferred strict non-involvement in political matters. 
Hence, when matters became extremely agitated in Najaf 
(the site of Imam 'Ali's tomb), Ha'iri took, himself to 
Iran between 1914-20 and settled in the region of Arak'. 
i n the 
these areas 
du r ing 
Shahrough 
A l g a r , 'The 
cen tu ry I r a n ' 
Akhavi, . q p . c i t 
Opposi t ional 
i n Schol arsi . 
p. 27. See a lso Hamid 
Role of Ulama in Twen t i e t h -
Sa in ts and Suf is« p . 245. 
43 . Shahrough Akhav i , o p . c i t . . p . 44 
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0 •' 
the •'ulama's demand to control educationfi.I system, waqfs ahd 
to have an influence in the legal, system grew stronger. The 
'ulama' began to take more "active part in politics. A group 
o-f religious fundamentalists emerged at that time who 
subsequently became very powerful . These ^ ""ul ama^ joined 
those opposition parties, groups and individuals who were 
44 
opposing the monarch , 
44. Summarising the career of Reza Shah as a reformer 
an Iranian author writes: 'Although in the early, 
uncertain days of his career he showed that he knew how 
to play upon the religious emotions of the people, he 
was basically apathetic to religion and antagonistic 
toward the clergy. Moreover, once his power was 
consolidated, he acted with less caution, and he 
affronted the clergy and other religious elements on 
many occasions. His broad social reforms, such as the 
r'emoval oi tlie veil were, of course, the subject of deep 
religious controversy. In his personal life, too, he 
would occasionally take advantage of an opportunity to 
offend the sensibilities of the clergy and the zealots. 
At trade fairs, for example he made a point of sampling 
the local beer and commenting on its yeai—by-year 
improvement, and at, the wedding reception of the Crown 
Prince he raised a toast t"o his son in Champagne' . 
Ne'matollah Mehr-khah, ed. , Ketab-e Reza Shah 
(Appreciations of Reza Shah (Tehran, 1946), pp. 59, 79, 
cited by Am in Ban an i, op -cit . , pp. 39--40 . 
^-l/.-WH-^WM-M-*'*: 
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C O N C L U S I O N 
The mujtahids have always occupied special 
importance in the religious milieu of Iran. Uril ike the 
Sunni 'ulama' whose hold on the society has not been so 
strong, the Shi'ism became politicised during the chequred 
history of Islam. The political situations in the history 
of Islam determined the religious development of Shi'ism. 
In Shi'i Islam the concept of absolute mujtahid (mujtahid 
mut1aq) is very important. He is regarded as the 
representative of the occult Imam. It is this special 
position occupied by the Shi'i mujtahids that distinguished 
him from the Sunni 'ulama'. In the Shi'i belief sv%tem the 
Shah is merely a '1ocum tenens' and preserver of order 
during the absence of hidden Imam, ^de_ Jure dev^no' whereas 
the Sunni ulama are considered as subservient of the 
government. 
The Shi'is believe in the concept of the 
occultation Imam. According to Shi'i creed Imam is the 
divinely ordained successor of the Prophet. Though the 
Shi'i principle denies the legitimacy of the secular power, 
the still occultation of the Imam means that all real 
authority cannot be availed in worldly affairs. With the 
fall of the Safavid dynasty there was interregnum before the 
emergence of the Qajar dynasty. The end of that interregnum 
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witnessed that the relation between the 'ulama' and state 
had changed. The factors responsible for this change was 
the more assertion in Shi'i figh which emphasized the 
•function of the mujtahids in directing and even ruling the 
community. Therefore, the 'ulama' who established their 
position as the representatives of the Imam became more 
powerful and more assertive. 
The Constitutional Revolution of 1906 was in 
fact the culmination of a long-drawn conflict, perhaps 
inevitable between the clerics on the one hand and the 
government on the other. In the beginning of the Qajar 
period the reassert ion of Shi'i theology emphasized the 
duties and functions of the Shi'i 'ulama' in Iran. However, 
it was during the reign of the first king of Qajar dynasty, 
Agha Muhammad Khan Qajar, that there developed a new 
relationship between the triangular forces; the 'ulama', the 
affairs of the state and the monarchy. However, the first 
king of Qajar dynasty Agha Muhammad Khan Qajar did not allow 
the influence of the 'ulama' to grow. The personal 
disposition of the monarch and the condition of his reign 
strictly limited the scope of the clerics. But during the 
reign of Path Ali Shah <d. 1814) reconcil iatory attitude 
towards the 'ulama' was adopted. On several occasions the 
contradictions between the state and the 'ulam«' during this 
period became manifest. The 'ulama' acted strongly against 
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the Russian aggression which took place during his reign. 
They appointed themselves as the de -facto leaders of the 
people to -fight against the internal tyranny and the 
aggression -from the external power. During the reign of 
Muhammad Shah (1251/1836) 'ulama's malice towards the state 
showed itself more clearly. It became serious during the 
reign of Nasir al-Din Shah (d. 1896). The 'ulama' became 
afraid that their power would be reduced due to certain 
reforms attempted by some reform minded officials. Thus 
they acted more strongly against the modernising trends. 
When Nasir al-Din Shah, the king with extravagant nature, 
ignored the reforms, corruption and wasteful expenditure of 
the court necessitated the loans from foreign countries 
which led to the emergence of foreign influences in the 
country. Although he was known for his piety, he did not 
1 ike the reformist measures taken by Amir Kabir, Mirza 
Husayn Khan and others. Moreover, as the reformers were 
generally considered to be friends of foreign nations, they 
inevitably evoked strong hatred from the clerical elements. 
Russian's expansionism in Caucasus offered a chance to the 
'ulama' to establish themselves as the main opposition force 
against the regime supported by other sections of the 
people. This alliance of the 'ulama' with other classes of 
the people led to the Constitutional Revolution of 1905 -
1906. The 'ulama' therefore might legitimately have 
expected from its realization a systematic application of 
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Islamic law, and hence an expansion or at least perpetuation 
of their -function, but little i-f any thought wa« in fact 
given to their role in a constitutional system of 
government. While the secret societies in part consisted of 
ulama and were based in part on Islamic ideology, they 
contained also men opposed to clerical influence, who did 
not intend to apply the shari'at.' 
The situations sometimes forced cooperation 
between the 'ulama' and various other groups such as those 
of the merchants and artisans. In the beginning of the 
constitutional movement, they had to Join with the 'liberal 
reformers'. In fact, we can say that there were two types 
of 'ulama' involved in the Constitutional Revolution - the 
absolutists and the constitutionalists. The first were 
those 'ulama' who rose against the tyrannical rule which 
existed in Iran and continued to support liberal merchants, 
trades'men, artisans and the likes. They did not have any 
real idea of the European constitution because of their 
inability to read English or French. They generally were 
against the constitutional government on account of its "un-
Islamic character", and therefore they were not able to 
reconcile it with Islam. That is why sometimes they even 
sided with the regime who opposed the idea of constitutional 
government. But there were those 'ulama' who desired the 
establishment of a better administration based on justice 
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and a constitution Islamic character, because they supported 
any idea o-f re-form which was within the framework o-f Islam. 
All their activities were conducted in the name of Islam. 
The modern liberal thinkers felt the need to be supported by 
the 'ulama' since the latter commanded much influence in the 
society. The 'ulama' were generally unaware of the 
conflicts between modern political institution and Islam. As 
elements of justice, democracy, freedom, equality etc, could 
be traced in Islam, some 'ulama' felt that there was no 
contradiction between Islam and the modern western concepts. 
In this way they tried to Islamize these ideas. Na'ini was 
one of these 'ulama' who had different approach to 
constitutionalism as compared to the modern thinkers like 
Malkam Khan. Na'ini had an aim to defend Islam by way of 
Islamization of the constitutional principles while Malkam 
Khan wished the European constitutional ideas to be 
materialised in Iran. But since the western system was not 
in the interest of the 'ulama', it had to be Justified in 
the name of Islamic tradition rightly or wrongly Malkam 
Khan's suggestion conformed with many others, like Zayn ul-
Abidin Maragha'i and Hajji Abu-1-Hasan Mirza Shaykh ur-
Ra'is that Islamic government was similar to the 
constitutional government. His ideas gained a number of 
supporters among the 'ulama' who played an active role in 
the Revolution which at least released the country from the 
claws of her despot. 
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A-fter the Revolution the 'ulama' had to lose 
their influence temporarily as national leaders. They 
ceased to be the spokesmen o-f the social and pol itical 
grievances o-f the country. The uses o-f religious terms for 
social and political purposes receded into background. 
However, this was a transitory phase. The influence of the 
'ulama' upon the masses was still strong although dormant. 
Their hold continued to grow until it culminated in the 
Islamic Revolution of 1979. 
The 'ulama' during the Pahlavi period 
continued to play the role of the main political opposition. 
However, they were not able to provide any real and worthy 
answer to the various problems existing in Iran during the 
period. In fact traditional preoccupations and the 
scholastic nature of the learning that was the basis of 
their entire function hardly permitted accurate 
comprehension of problems deriving from the Western impact. 
In addition, their essential 1ack of hierarchic organization 
would have been an obstacle to any active reshaping of the 
political structure. 
The 'ulama' were able to consolidate their 
power in modern Iran, because they opposed the internal 
tyrannical as well as the foreign powers in the country. 
They claimed that they were fighting against the growing 
influence of foreign powers or the infidels as they called 
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them. Another important base o-f 'ulama's strength was their 
secure economic position. The high income o-f the Shi'i 
'ulama' was the result of the Shi'i doctrine which assured 
the administration of khums tax Since the Safavid times the 
large amount of alms was considered as obligatory to be 
administered by the 'ulama'. This practice was later 
followed by the Qajars who needed 'ulama's co-operation. 
With the rise of Reza Khan to power in the 
beginning of the twentieth century there developed a close 
association between him and the 'ulama'. His reconciliation 
with the ulama during this period was aimed at merely to 
consolidate his political power. The ambition of Reza Shah 
was to follow Mustafa Kemal of Turkey. His aim was to free 
Iran from foreign encroachment and introduce Westernizing 
reforms and scientific ideas. He was a nationalist and his 
aim was to liberate his people from the hold of the clergy. 
Reza Shah wanted his people to be pround of their native 
land. However, his reforms were not aimed at economic 
advancement only but also aimed at developments in social 
and educational fields. For example, the French judicial 
system was introduced in 1927 which challenged the 
competence of religious courts in civil matters. The 
capitulation which gave powers to foreign influences was 
abolished in 1928. But as Lenczowski has noted the trend 
toward secularization was clearly discernible, but never did 
it assume propotions similar to those in Turkey. He 
240 
be! ieved that the sharing o-f authority with any independent 
group in Iran was not useful. He was convinced that the 
role played by influential 'ulama' was a hindrance for the 
advancement of the country on the path of westernisation and 
modernisation of the country. 
Reza Shah's attempt to introduce a Republican 
state in 1924 ended up in failure. The defeat of king 
Amanul 1 ah of Afghanistan at the hands of the 'ulama' in 1929 
also gave a lesson to Reza Shah that what was achieved in 
half Europeanized Turkey may not be achieved in Iran. A 
great difficulty faced by Reza Shah was the constitutional 
law which said that "the official religion of Iran is Islam, 
and the true sect is the Jafariya. The Shah of Iran must 
profess and propagate this faith". Furthermore, the Majlis 
did not allow any legislation to be passed which was 
considered contrary to the shari'a. The constitutional law 
of October 8, 1907 (amended, December 12, 1925) 'confirmed 
that the doctors of theology (may God prolong their 
beneficent lives !) are charged with the duty of determining 
any contradiction between the laws made by the Assembly and 
the principle of Islam. It is, therefore, laid down that at 
all times there shall be constituted as follows a body of at 
least five doctors of religious sentiments who shall at the 
same time be conversant with the needs of their age s The 
theologians and doctors of the religion of Islam who are 
recognised by the Shi'ites shall nominate to the Assembly 
>41 
twenty doctors possessing the above qualifications.! the 
Assembly shall choose five of them or a greater number, 
according to circumstances, by a unanimous vote or by 
drawing lots, and shall recognise them as members of the 
Assembly with the right to discuss and deliberate the laws 
proposed by the Assembly, and to set aside any that 
contravene the holy principles of Islam, so that they shall 
not become law; the decisions of this body of doctors on 
this point shall be final and binding'. Therefore, Reza 
Shah policy towards the 'ulama' was obscure and different 
from that of Ataturk. The latter did not openly attack 
religious beliefs institutions. Thus ascending the throne 
in December 1925 Reza Shah served his relation of 
rapprochment with the 'ulama'. In fact he launched several 
programmes to secularize the Iranian society. During his 
time efforts were made to confine Islam to 'private' 
affairs. The 'ulama's role in the society and politics cjf 
Iran was very much controlled. Their influence as a whole 
declined. They were removed from the social positions which 
they had held at the beginning. Their approach to the 
imperial court which they once maintained was discontinued. 
The reforms of Reza Shah in 1928 - 41 greatly lowered the 
power and status of the ulama as a political community. 
But the 'ulama' were determined to regain 
their lost position. They defended the Shari'a as practiced 
in Iran. They strongly condemned government's policy of 
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westernisation and modernisation as Kemalist atheism. They 
opposed any re-form regarding the emancipation of women 
because as they believed, it would lead to the breakdown o-f 
families and village communities of Iran and encourage 
migrations to the cities resulting in moral laxity. They 
said that the demand for the liberation of women was only 
'an imperialists trick of the West to sell European 
cosmetics and other sex-linked goods'. The celebrated 
religious leader Sayyid Hasan Muddaris who rose against the 
secularisation programme in the Ma41is was imprisoned and 
killed in 1937. 
Reza Shah measures to put an end to the 
ta'ziyas and rawdakhanis in 1932, and replace Muslim Lunar 
calender by Solar calender and prohibit pilgrimage to Mecca, 
and take over the orphanages as well as the hospitals which 
had been under the control of the 'ulama' greatly offended 
the ulama. They were attacked harshly only when they 
preached against the Shah's reforms such as the unveiling of 
women which the ulama opposed vehemently. In 1935 the queen 
unveiled herself in the public. This led to the rise of the 
feminist movement in Iran aimed at abolition of the veil . 
Thus as compared to the earlier decades of 
the twentieth century, the 'ulama' during the reign of Reza 
Shah had little political role to play. They were openly 
under attack and were on defensive. A modernist thinker 
Mirza Rida Quii Shariat Sanglaji asked the 'ulama' to employ 
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iJtihad in order to reinterpret and modernise the shari'a 
and give up obscurantism and superstition. Reza Shah tried 
to build up a strong army and bureacracy and curb the power 
of the tribal leaders, the clerics and independent 
landlords. However his aim was to build capitalism in Iran. 
However, the modernising efforts of Reza Shah was not 
successful in completely undermining the position of the 
clerics. The clerics remained dormant and showed their 
strength when occasions arose. 
•*******•## 
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